Reass v. United States

44 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Blecker

    657 F.2d 629 (4th Cir. 1981)   Cited 44 times
    Finding proper venue for a false claims conviction "in either the district in which the false claim is submitted to the intermediary or the district in which the intermediary transmits the false claim to the agency"

    The defendants argue, however, that venue could not possibly lie in the Eastern District of Virginia, which the claims only "passed through." In support of their position, the defendants rely heavily on Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 81 S.Ct. 358, 5 L.Ed.2d 340 (1961), and Reass v. United States, 99 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1938). The courts in both these cases restricted venue solely to the district in which a false statement was actually submitted to or filed with a governmental agency.

  2. United States v. Brown

    898 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 2018)   Cited 5 times
    Holding that when considering venue, "the location of a crime 'must be determined from the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it.'" (quoting United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703 (1946))

    II. We first address whether signing the loan application in the Eastern District established venue there. Brown relies on an 80-year-old Fourth Circuit case, Reass v. United States , 99 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1938), which held that a charge of making a false statement to a federal credit institution can only be tried in the district where the federal agency received the document. Id. at 755 (concluding that the "communication of the false statements to the corporation constitutes the very essence of the crime"); accord United States v. Katzoff , 268 F.Supp.2d 493 (E.D. Pa. 2003).

  3. S.E.C. v. Tambone

    597 F.3d 436 (1st Cir. 2010)   Cited 552 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Reinstating portions of withdrawn panel opinion

    The SEC also endeavors to prop up its "use" theory of Rule 10b-5(b) liability by referring to a venerable Fourth Circuit case deciding, for venue purposes, whether a defendant violated a federal mortgage fraud statute in West Virginia or in Pennsylvania. See Reass v. United States, 99 F.2d 752, 755 (4th Cir.l938). The only reason the opinion has even an epsilon's worth of relevance to the issue at hand is that the challenged statute rendered it unlawful to "make[] any statement, knowing it to be false, for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of a Federal Home Loan Bank upon any application for loan." Id. at 752.

  4. United States v. Valenti

    207 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1953)   Cited 24 times
    In United States v. Valenti, 3 Cir., 207 F.2d 242, relied upon by appellant, the court held that, since the offense of filing a false affidavit with the National Labor Relations Board was not committed until the affidavit was received by the Labor Board, the offense was triable only in the district in which the affidavit was received.

    While the matter may constitute the crime of perjury under state law, a false statement has not been made in a matter within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, within the meaning of section 1001, until the affidavit through its filing has become the basis for action by the Board. Compare Reass v. United States, 4 Cir., 1938, 99 F.2d 752, and United States v. Borow, D.C.N.J. 1951, 101 F. Supp. 211, in which similar conclusions were reached under analogous statutes. The evidence in this case was that the defendant signed and swore to the noncommunist affidavit in Camden, New Jersey. The notary public who took the affidavit was an office secretary of the defendant's union in Camden.

  5. United States v. Mosby

    Criminal 22-cr-00007-LKG (D. Md. Feb. 22, 2024)

    In Reass v. United States, the Fourth Circuit addressed venue under another statute-12 U.S.C. § 1441(a)-which, at the time, criminalized making a statement, knowing it to be false, for the purpose of influencing the action of a Federal Home Loan Bank upon application for a loan. 99 F.2d 752, 752 (4th Cir. 1938). In that case, the alleged false statement was prepared and signed in West Virginia, but the false statement was later hand delivered to the bank in Pennsylvania.

  6. U.S. v. Lang

    766 F. Supp. 389 (D. Md. 1991)   Cited 19 times

    Defendants next complain that Count 2 should be dismissed because venue is not proper in this district. Relying on Reass v. United States, 99 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1938) and Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 81 S.Ct. 358, 5 L.Ed.2d 340 (1961), defendants argue that proper venue lies in the District of Columbia where the Form 10-Q was filed, rather than in this district where the Form was prepared. The Sixth Amendment mandates trial in the "State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed," and proof of venue is therefore an essential part of the government's case.

  7. United States v. Sweig

    316 F. Supp. 1148 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)   Cited 53 times
    Rejecting defendant's motion to dismiss indictment based on defendant's argument that he was not an "agent" within § 205 in the sense of having "power to affect the legal relations" of the principle, and explaining that "the court deems it best to go no further now than to say that the strict common-law notion of `agency' does not necessarily exhaust the meaning of the prohibition. On the contrary, the language of the statute and the background materials the parties have cited point to a different and wider meaning."

    The fact that preparations, even essential ones, may take place "elsewhere," and that effects may radiate widely, does not render a discrete and identifiable wrong "continuing" so as to give the prosecution a choice of two or more districts in which to prosecute. Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 81 S.Ct. 358, 5 L.Ed.2d 340 (1961); Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 25 S.Ct. 243, 49 L.Ed. 482 (1905); Krogmann v. United States, 225 F.2d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 1955); Reass v. United States, 99 F.2d 752, 754 (4th Cir. 1938). While the cited cases involved statutes other than the one that concerns us here, the principles they serve to define and illuminate seem plainly to govern the present situation.

  8. United States v. Borow

    101 F. Supp. 211 (D.N.J. 1951)   Cited 6 times

    Under such circumstances, Section 42 of the Judicial Code becomes inapplicable. Reass v. United States, 4 Cir., 1938, 99 F.2d 752, is a case in point. In that case the defendant was indicted, tried and convicted in the Northern District of West Virginia for knowingly making a false statement for the purpose of influencing the action of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in violation of 12 U.S.C.A. § 1441(a).

  9. People v. Buffum

    40 Cal.2d 709 (Cal. 1953)   Cited 174 times
    In Buffum, the People contended that California had jurisdiction over the defendants' offenses pursuant to then section 27, subdivision (1), and pursuant to then section 778a.

    [5] It is apparent from the authorities which have discussed subdivision 1 of section 27 and similar statutes in other jurisdictions that such a provision can apply where the acts done within the state are sufficient to amount to an attempt to commit a crime but not otherwise. ( People v. MacDonald, 24 Cal.App.2d 702, 709-711 [ 76 P.2d 121]; People v. Werblow, 241 N.Y. 55 [ 148 N.E. 786, 789] [opinion by Judge Cardozo]; see Rest., Conflict of Laws, § 428; Comment e; People v. Botkin, 132 Cal. 231, 233 [ 64 P. 286, 84 Am.St. Rep. 39]; People v. Sansom, 37 Cal.App. 435, 438-439 [ 173 P. 1107]; People v. Chapman, 55 Cal.App. 192, 196-199 [ 203 P. 126] [act constituting an "essential ingredient" of the crime]; cf.People v. Harden, 14 Cal.App.2d 489 [ 58 P.2d 675]; People v. Lakenan, 61 Cal.App. 368 [ 214 P. 1021]; Reass v. UnitedStates, 99 F.2d 752, 755 [stating that certain acts were only preparation and not "part" of the crime itself].) To read such a statute as authorizing the punishment by one state of acts which do not amount to an attempt but are merely preparatory to the commission of a crime in another state would seem tantamount to an effort to regulate conduct in the other jurisdiction.

  10. United States v. Johnson

    No. 16-4146 (10th Cir. Apr. 19, 2018)   Cited 3 times

    We recognize that Johnson's opposite view finds support in dicta from other circuits. See, e.g., Reass v. United States, 99 F.2d 752, 755 (4th Cir. 1938) ("[C]ommunication of the false statements to the corporation constitutes the very essence of the crime. . . . [I]t is only when [the statements] are communicated to the lending bank that the crime takes place."). But so too does the government's.