To address the question of whether there was minimum evidence before the Commission to support its award, we first consider whether Dupuytren's contracture could ever be an occupational disease. Although this issue may be a novel one in Maryland, a cursory review of out-of-state cases discloses that the question was first litigated more than 75 years ago, see John Reardon's Case, 275 Mass. 24, 175 N.E. 149 (1931), and continues to be contested today, see Hollingsworth v. Goodyear Tire Rubber Co., 183 N.C.App. 154, 643 S.E.2d 675, 2007 WL 1247050 (N.C.App. 2007), with mixed results. The County did not contest in the circuit court the Commission's finding on causation.
Id. at 518. Other examples in which recovery has been denied include Begin's Case, 354 Mass. 594 (1968) (job experiences may have contributed to mental illness), Spalla's Case, supra (years of hard labor weakened abdominal walls), Reardon'sCase, 275 Mass. 24 (1931) (years of handling tools injured hand), Pimental's Case, 235 Mass. 598 (1920) (years of sitting with poor posture to roll cigars caused nerve disorder), and Maggelet's Case, 228 Mass. 57 (1917) (same). See also Korsun's Case, 354 Mass. 124 (1968) (general concern over job security, not proved related to incidents at work, aggravated heart condition).
That case held that the emotional disturbance sustained by an employee resulting from the stress of his employment over a three and one-half year period was not a personal injury within the meaning of the act. Begin's Case relied on Maggelet's Case, 228 Mass. 57 (1917), Reardon's Case, 275 Mass. 24 (1931), and Pimental's Case, 235 Mass. 598 (1920), which have come to stand for the doctrine of wear and tear. Under that doctrine the "gradual breaking down or degeneration of tissues caused by long and laborious work is not the result of a personal injury within the meaning of the act." Maggelet's Case, supra at 61.
P. 518. But see G.L.c. 152, ยง 1 (7A); Perron's Case, 325 Mass. 6. See also Pimental's Case, 235 Mass. 598, 602; Reardon's Case, 275 Mass. 24, 27; Mercier's Case, 315 Mass. 238, 240. We are not disposed to vary the doctrine of those cases which have followed the principles elucidated in Maggelet's Case. Any change in those principles should come through legislative, not judicial, intervention.
We recognize that there are decisions which hold that where the employee's incapacity or death is caused by a gradual breaking down of tissue as a result of work over a long period it cannot be said to arise from a personal injury within the meaning of the act. Cases applying that principle are Maggelet's Case, 228 Mass. 57, 61, Burns's Case, 266 Mass. 516, and Reardon's Case, 275 Mass. 24, 27. The line between cases of that type and those where an employee suffers a strain in the performance of his work may at times be difficult to ascertain, but it exists nonetheless.
Bodily wear and tear resulting from a long period of hard work is not a compensable injury even if it diminishes capacity to earn. Maggelet's Case, 228 Mass. 57. Burns's Case, 266 Mass. 516. Doyle's Case, 269 Mass. 310. Reardon's Case, 275 Mass. 24. Belezarian's Case, 307 Mass. 557. The present case is distinguishable from Gaglione's Case, 241 Mass. 42, Mills's Case, 258 Mass. 475, and Harrington's Case, 285 Mass. 69, in all of which the employee sustained a hernia and the question was whether it was shown to have had a causal relation to the employment.
We hold that no such accident or hazard has been shown. Maggelet's Case, 228 Mass. 57. Pimental's Case, 235 Mass. 598. Burns's Case, 266 Mass. 516. Doyle's Case, 269 Mass. 310. Reardon's Case, 275 Mass. 24. Smith's Case, 307 Mass. 516. Belezarian's Case, 307 Mass. 557. The petitioner contends that there is an analogy between the instant case and those arising under the workmen's compensation act where death was caused by an injury to the heart resulting from overexertion or overwork.
Gradual wearing out of the body through years of toil is not a "personal injury" within G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152, ยง 26. Maggelet's Case, 228 Mass. 57, 61. Doyle's Case, 269 Mass. 310. Reardon's Case, 275 Mass. 24, 27. Gee's Case, 283 Mass. 23, 26. Before the reviewing board the employee presented seven requests for rulings of law.
See e.g. Duggan's Case, 315 Mass. 355 (1944); Kulig's Case, 331 Mass. 524 (1954); Casey's Case, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 859 (1978). The judge, properly recognizing the question as close, ruled that the case was governed by such authorities as Spalla's Case, 320 Mass. 416, 418 (1946) ("[b]odily wear and tear resulting from a long period of hard work is not a compensable injury, even if it diminishes capacity to earn"); Burns's Case, 266 Mass. 516, 518 (1929) (heart weakened by disease; no sudden injury or peculiar strain); Reardon's Case, 275 Mass. 24, 27 (1931) (a contracture of the hand marked by "the gradual breaking down of tissue as the result of many years of continuous labor"); Belezarian's Case, 307 Mass. 557 (1940) (gradual wearing out of tissue due to heavy shoe factory work as a laster); Costa's Case, 333 Mass. 286, 289 (1955) (no evidence that the employee sustained a specific injury subsequent to initial injury and first of three successive insurers held to be on the risk). While the board found that the condition in the employee's leg which occurred as the result of his 1964 injury was aggravated by "his standing and working on concrete floors at work from 1966-1976", there was no finding that the aggravation was attributable to any specific instance of strain or identifiable series of strains.
We are not unmindful of the cases from other states which are in apparent conflict with our view. The cases of Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Lambert (1933), 126 Ohio 501, 186 N.E. 89; Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Borchert (1934), 49 Ohio A. 5, 194 N.E. 881; Reardon's Case (1931), 275 Mass. 24, 175 N.E. 149; Zajkowski v. American Steel Wire Co. (1918), 258 Fed. 9, are quite similar in many respects to the case at bar. The Lambert case, supra, and the Reardon case, supra, are cases involving Dupuytren's contraction.