Opinion
C/A No. 8:17-cv-3128-TMC-JDA
07-10-2019
John Thomas Reardon, Plaintiff, v. S. Lee, Edgar Morales, Mr. Mont Alvo, Ms. Ramos, P. Walton Battle, Cynthia Coleman, Donardo Fonte, Mr. Sizemore, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment filed by Defendants. [Doc. 72.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), D.S.C., the undersigned magistrate judge is authorized to review this case and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint on November 10, 2017, alleging that prison officials refused to provide him with medical care in violation of his civil rights. [Doc. 1.] The Clerk docketed an Amended Complaint on April 18, 2018. [Doc. 31.] According to Plaintiff, all Defendants named in the Amended Complaint allegedly contributed to the denial to Plaintiff of appropriate medical treatment, either at Coleman Low Federal Correctional Institution in Florida ("FCI Coleman") or Edgefield Federal Correctional Institution ("FCI Edgefield"). [Doc. 31-1 at 4.] All Defendants are named in an individual capacity, not in an official capacity. [Docs. 31 at 2; 31-1 at 1, 4.] Plaintiff alleges claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by exhibiting deliberate indifference to his medical needs. [Doc. 31 at 4 ;Doc. 31-1 at 1.]
A prisoner's pleading is considered filed at the moment it is delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988). Accordingly, this action was filed on November 10, 2017. [See Doc. 1-3 at 10 (Complaint signed November 10, 2017).]
Plaintiff amended his original Complaint after the Honorable Timothy M. Cain ruled that Plaintiff's original Complaint was subject to dismissal because although it was properly construed as a Bivens action, it did "not allege any personal involvement on the part of Defendants." [Doc. 25; see also Docs. 19, 29.]
On November 9, 2018, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment ("Defendants' motion"). [Doc. 72.] On November 13, 2018, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), Plaintiff was advised to respond to the motion and of the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond. [Doc. 73.] The Clerk docketed a response from Plaintiff to this motion on June 3, 2019. [Doc. 90.] The motion is now ripe for review.
BACKGROUND
The facts included in this Background section are taken directly from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. [Doc. 31.]
The events giving rise to his claim began in January 2016 and occurred at Coleman Low Federal Correctional Institution in Florida ("FCI Coleman") and FCI Edgefield. [Docs. 31 at 5, 7; 31-3 at 3-4.] According to Plaintiff, he was injured in January 2016 in his dorm unit at FCI Coleman. [Doc. 31-1 at 2.] While attempting to step down the ladder from his upper bunk, he "fell violently to the floor and hurt [his] back." [Id.] An appointment with a doctor was set for later that week, and he was diagnosed with appendicitis within a few days of the original injury. [Id.] He was checked into a hospital in Leesburg, Florida. [Id.] He received blood work, an x-ray, a CT scan, and an MRI. [Id. at 3.] The MRI revealed a "T-10 and T-11 bul[]ging disk," as well as a severe staff infection throughout his entire spine. [Id.] He then spent 10 days in the hospital on various medications, which was followed by a 60-day medicine treatment at the prison. [Id.] According to Plaintiff, "[t]he staff infection was thankfully cured and I am thankful everyday for the efforts of the prison and hospital staff for saving my life." [Id.]
Nevertheless, Plaintiff has continued to endure severe pain due to the bulging discs in his back. [Id.] He has been to "sick call more times than [he] can count." [Id.] He pursued administrative remedies at FCI Coleman in hopes of addressing his condition but all of his requests for assistance have been denied. [Id.] Plaintiff was transferred to FCI Edgefield in March 2017. [Id.] He received a notice of final denial of his administrative remedies in June 2017. [Id.] According to Plaintiff, he has continued to address his pain by "going to sick call only to be told there is nothing that can be done for [him]." [Id.] Accordingly, Plaintiff filed this action requesting that the Court order the Bureau of Prisons to provide a back surgical specialist, permitting Plaintiff to explore all available medical remedies, including surgery, to address his severe back pain. [Id. at 7.] Plaintiff also seeks a transfer to a qualified Bureau of Prisons facility. [Id.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even under this less stringent standard, however, the pro se complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. Id. at 520-21. The mandated liberal construction means only that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court "conjure up questions never squarely presented." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). Requirements for a Cause of Action Under Bivens
In Bivens, the Supreme Court established a direct cause of action under the Constitution of the United States against federal officials for the violation of federal constitutional rights. 403 U.S. at 389. A Bivens claim is analogous to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; federal officials cannot be sued under § 1983, however, because they do not act under color of state law. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814-20 (1982). Case law involving a § 1983 claim is applicable in a Bivens action and vice versa. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 511 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); Turner v. Dammon, 848 F.2d 440, 443-44 (4th Cir.1988). To establish a claim under Bivens, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and (2) the defendant did so under color of federal law. See Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (setting forth requirements for a § 1983 claim under color of state law); see also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389 ("In [a previous case], we reserved the question whether violation of [the Constitution] by a federal agent acting under color of his authority gives rise to a cause of action for damages consequent upon his unconstitutional conduct. Today we hold that it does.").
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Standard
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim should be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court should "accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). However, the court "need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts" nor "accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). Further, for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may rely on only the complaint's allegations and those documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference. See Simons v. Montgomery Cty. Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 31 (4th Cir. 1985). If matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
With respect to well-pleaded allegations, the United States Supreme Court explained the interplay between Rule 8(a) and Rule 12(b)(6) in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," in order to "give the Defendants fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief" requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (footnote and citations omitted); see also 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, at 235-36 (3d ed. 2004) ("[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than a bare averment that the pleader wants compensation and is entitled to it or a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion that the pleader might have a legally cognizable right of action.").
"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the Defendants is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a Defendants has acted unlawfully." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2)—the pleader must plead sufficient facts to show he is entitled to relief, not merely facts consistent with the Defendants's liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ("Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a Defendants's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement to relief."'" (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)). Accordingly, the plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to articulate facts that, when accepted as true, demonstrate that the plaintiff has stated a claim that makes it plausible the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference
Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment because deliberate indifference constitutes "the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'" Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). Deliberate indifference exists when prison officials know of a substantial risk to a prisoner's health or safety and consciously disregard that risk. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994); Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851-52 (4th Cir. 1990) ("Deliberate indifference may be demonstrated by either actual intent or reckless disregard. A defendant acts recklessly by disregarding a substantial risk of danger that is either known to the defendant or which would be apparent to a reasonable person in the defendant's position." (citation omitted)). Within the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, "the treatment must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness" to violate a prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights. Miltier, 896 F.2d at 851.
To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, the prisoner must demonstrate (1) his medical condition was a sufficiently serious one and (2) subjectively, the prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind, which is satisfied by showing deliberate indifference by the prison officials. Goodman v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 425 F. App'x 202, 204 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998)). As the United States Supreme Court has explained,
"A medical need is 'serious' if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing Monmouth Cty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3rd Cir. 1987); Hendrix v. Faulkner, 525 F. Supp. 435, 454 (N.D. Ind. 1981)).
Since, we said, only the "'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain'" implicates the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner advancing such a claim must, at a minimum, allege "deliberate indifference" to his "serious" medical needs. "It is only such indifference" that can violate the Eighth Amendment; allegations of "inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical
care," or of a "negligent . . . diagnos[is]," simply fail to establish the requisite culpable state of mind.Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (emphasis and alteration in original) (citations omitted). Further, in the context of prisoner medical care, the Constitution requires only that prisoners receive adequate medical care; a prisoner is not guaranteed his choice of treatment. Jackson v. Fair, 846 F.2d 811, 817 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Layne v. Vinzant, 657 F.2d 468, 471 (1st Cir. 1981)); see Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 318-19 (4th Cir. 1975) (citing Blanks v. Cunningham, 409 F.2d 220 (4th Cir.1969); Hirons v. Director, 351 F.2d 613 (4th Cir.1965)) ("Prisoners are entitled to reasonable medical care."); see also, e.g., Barton v. Dorriety, No. 9:10-cv-1362, 2011 WL 1049510, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2011) (citing Jackson, 846 F.2d at 817). The fact that a prisoner believed he had a more serious injury or that he required better treatment does not establish a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Russell, 528 F.2d at 319.
"A delay in treatment may constitute deliberate indifference if the delay exacerbated the injury or unnecessarily prolonged an inmate's pain." Abraham v. McDonald, 493 F. App'x 465, 466 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff's Claims for Injunctive Relief are Moot
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff explicitly names Defendants in their individual capacities only and he seeks only injunctive relief, not money damages. [Docs. 31 at 2, 6; 31-1 at 1,4, 7.] However, since commencing this action, Plaintiff has been transferred from FCI Edgefield to Federal Correctional Institution Schuylkill ("FCI Schuylkill") in Minersville, Pennsylvania. [Docs. 70; 71.] Because Plaintiff is no longer being housed at a prison where any of the Defendants work, his claims for injunctive relief against Defendants in their individual capacities are moot even to the extent there was standing when the action was filed. See Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009) ("[A]s a general rule, a prisoner's transfer or release from a particular prison moots his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to his incarceration there."); Washington v. United States, 5:16-cv-03913-BHH-KDW, 2017 WL 4404401, at *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 14, 2017) (holding that claims for injunctive relief based on denial of medical care and assistance were mooted by transfer to different federal prison), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 4348592 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2017); McClamy v. Bell, No. 1:14-cv-485 (LMB/MSN), 2015 WL 4127593, at *1 (E.D. Va. July 6, 2015) (holding that prisoner's claim that he had been denied proper medical treatment of his hand at two prisons and requesting the court to order proper treatment was mooted when prisoner was transferred to a third prison). Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983).
Defendants represent, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that Plaintiff requested the transfer from FPC Edgefield so that he could be closer to his family. [Docs. 72 at 5 n.3; 90.]
Adding Damages Claim Would be Futile
In his response opposing Defendants' motion, Plaintiff, for the first time, requests money damages. [Doc. 90 at 2.] With Defendants having filed their motion many months before, it is too late at this point for Plaintiff's attempted amendment. But in any event, as the undersigned will explain, any such amendment would be futile. See Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006) ("We have interpreted Rule 15(a) [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] to provide that leave to amend a pleading should be denied only when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment would have been futile." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Court notes that Bivens claims for damages are not actionable against public officials acting in their official capacities. Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 184 (4th Cir. 2002).
Personal Jurisdiction
Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed against Defendants Lee, Morales, Montalvo, and Ramos (the "Florida Defendants") for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). [Doc. 72 at 6-8.] The Court agrees and concludes that any damages claim against the Florida Defendants would fail for this reason.
Personal jurisdiction in federal courts is typically determined by whether the defendant would be "subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). In determining whether South Carolina state law would authorize personal jurisdiction over these defendants, the Court properly examines both the state long arm statute and the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 623 (4th Cir. 1997).
South Carolina's long arm statute provides
(A) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent as to a cause of action arising from the person's:
(1) transacting any business in this State;
(2) contracting to supply services or things in the State;
S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-803. "South Carolina's long-arm statute has been interpreted to reach the outer bounds permitted by the Due Process Clause." ESAB Grp., 126 F.3d at 623. Therefore, the appropriate question for the Court in considering a personal jurisdiction defense raised by an out-of-state defendant is whether that defendant has "established 'minimum contacts' with [South Carolina] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'" Id. (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).(3) commission of a tortious act in whole or in part in this State;
(4) causing tortious injury or death in this State by an act or omission outside this State if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this State;
(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this State;
(6) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this State at the time of contracting;
(7) entry into a contract to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this State; or
(8) production, manufacture, or distribution of goods with the reasonable expectation that those goods are to be used or consumed in this State and are so used or consumed.
Personal jurisdiction may arise through specific jurisdiction, based on the conduct alleged in the suit, or through general jurisdiction. ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 711 (4th Cir. 2002). To determine whether specific jurisdiction exists, courts should examine "(1) the extent to which the defendant 'purposefully avail[ed]' itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the State; (2) whether the plaintiffs' claims arise out of those activities directed at the State; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally 'reasonable.'" Id. at 712 (alteration in original). If the defendant's contacts with the state are not the basis of the suit, then jurisdiction must come from more persistent, unrelated contacts with the state; "the defendant's activities in the state must have been 'continuous and systematic.'" Id. (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9 (1984)).
A plaintiff has the burden of proving that a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 628 (4th Cir. 1997). If a court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1993). In considering whether a plaintiff has met this burden, the Court draws all reasonable inferences arising from the proof in a plaintiff's favor and resolves all factual disputes to the benefit of the plaintiff. Id. Both sides may present proof on the issue. See id.
In this case, declarations attached to Defendants' motion indicate that the Florida Defendants all worked at FCI Coleman during the relevant time period and that their business office was located in Florida. [Docs. 72-7; 72-8; 72-9; 72-10.] None of these Defendants resided, worked, or owned real property within the State of South Carolina during any times relevant to the allegations in the Amended Complaint. [Id.] And Plaintiff does not allege that any of the Florida Defendants took any actions within South Carolina. Nor does he offer any argument as to how they could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in South Carolina. Accordingly, the Court concludes that any damages claim against the Florida Defendants would be subject to dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Absolute Immunity
Defendants contend that Defendants Sizemore and Walton-Battle are entitled to absolute immunity under the terms of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 233(a). [Doc. 72 at 9-10.] The Court agrees and concludes that any damages claim against these two Defendants would fail for this reason.
Section 233(a) makes the Federal Tort Claims Act the exclusive remedy for legal actions against members of the Public Health Service ("PHS") "for damage for personal injury, including death, resulting from the performance of medical, surgical, dental, or related functions . . . by any commissioned officer or employee of the [PHS] while acting within the scope of his office of employment." Hui v. Castaneda, 559 U.S. 799, 805 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Supreme Court observed in Hui, "proof of scope is in most § 233(a) cases established by a declaration affirming that the defendant was a PHS official during the relevant time period." Id. at 811. Sizemore and Walton-Battle aver that they are commissioned PHS officers. [Docs. 72-3 ¶ 1; 72-6 ¶ 1.] Accordingly, even were Plaintiff allowed to add a claim against them for money damages, the claim against them could not succeed.
Qualified Immunity
Defendants maintain that the remaining two Defendants, Coleman and Fonte, would be entitled to qualified immunity regarding any damages claim against them in their individual capacities. [Doc. 72 at 12-22.] The Court agrees.
Defendants actually contend that all Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity against such a claim for damages. [Doc. 72 at 12-22.] Because the Court concludes, for the reasons already discussed, that no damages claim against the other Defendants could succeed, the Court declines to address whether these other Defendants would also be entitled to qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damage suits as long as the conduct in question does not "violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Thus, qualified immunity does not protect an official who violates a constitutional or statutory right of a plaintiff that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation such that an objectively reasonable official in the official's position would have known of the right. Id. Further, qualified immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
"In determining whether an officer is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry." Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015). The first concerns whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate that the officer's conduct violated a federal right. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The second "asks whether the right was clearly established at the time the violation occurred such that a reasonable person would have known that his conduct was unconstitutional." Smith, 781 F.3d at 100. For purposes of this analysis, a right is "clearly established" if "[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
District court judges are "permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). If a court decides in the negative the first prong it considers—i.e., the court decides the plaintiff has not alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right or the right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation—the court need not consider the other prong of the qualified immunity analysis. See id. at 243-45; Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding the court "need not formally resolve" the constitutional question of "whether the [plaintiffs] were arrested without probable cause" to address the plaintiffs' § 1983 claim; the court stated that it "need only determine whether [the defendant]—a deputy sheriff performing within the normal course of his employment—acted with the objective reasonableness necessary to entitle him to qualified immunity").
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he has a bulging disk at T-10 and T-11. [Doc. 31-1 at 3.] He alleges that after his transfer to FCI Edgefield, Coleman "[d]enied [p]ain [m]edication on multiple occasions" and that Fonte "[d]enied surgical consultation and surgery for relief and pain" and "prescribed 30 days ibuprof[e]n," which did "not address level of pain."' [Id. at 4.] But as exhibits to their motion, Defendants attached Plaintiff's medical records for the period in question. [Docs. 72-11-72-14.] The records show that although Plaintiff's medical providers at FCI Edgefield did not pursue surgery, they treated him with pain management, diet, and exercise. [Doc. 72-12.] He was told to return to Health Services if his conditioned worsened, and to return to sick call if his condition did not improve during his clinical encounter on June 19, 2017. [Id. at 1-2.] His records reflect that he had not returned to sick call at FCI Edgefield since June 19, 2017. [Docs. 72-11-72-14.]
In light of the care that Plaintiff received while at FCI Edgefield, his expression of dissatisfaction at most demonstrates a disagreement with the course of treatment he received. See Jackson, 846 F.2d at 817; Russell, 528 F.2d at 318-19. It does not call into question the objective reasonableness of Coleman's and Fonte's actions, nor does it call into question the subjective sincerity of the attempts to provide Plaintiff with appropriate treatment. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not forecasted evidence that could give rise to a reasonable inference that his Eighth Amendment rights have been violated and he therefore could not overcome the first qualified-immunity prong even had he properly presented a claim for money damages against Defendants. As such, the Court concludes that any damages claim asserted against Coleman or Fonte would fail for this reason.
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment [Doc. 72] be GRANTED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge July 10, 2019
Greenville, South Carolina