Similarly, Georgia courts have rejected the idea that shipping and distributing a product makes a company a manufacturer. See Ream Tool Co. v. Newton, 433 S.E.2d 67, 69-70 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that a company that ships, distributes, and sells a product is a product seller). Georgia courts have also made clear that even providing requirements or minor design specifications is not sufficient to make a company a manufacturer under Georgia law.
OCGA § 51-1-11.1; Farmex, Inc. v. Wainwright, 269 Ga. 548, 549-550 ( 501 SE2d 802) (1998); Robinson v. Williamson, 245 Ga. App. 17, 19 (1) ( 537 SE2d 159) (2000); Thomasson v. Rich Products Corp., 232 Ga. App. 424, 426 (2) ( 502 SE2d 289) (1998); Ream Tool Co. v. Newton, 209 Ga. App. 226, 227-228 (3) ( 433 SE2d 67) (1993). Thus, the grant of summary judgment under strict product liability was appropriate as to this theory of liability.
The distinction is important because an action for strict liability can be maintained against a manufacturer, but not against a mere seller of a product. See Ream Tool Co. v. Newton, 209 Ga. App. 226, 227 (3) (a) ( 433 S.E.2d 67) (1993). OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (1) provides, in relevant part, that the manufacturer of personal property is liable in tort to any person who may reasonably be affected by the property and who is injured because the property when sold was not merchantable and reasonably suited to the use intended.
1. The record shows that plaintiffs purchased the used ATV for their 13-year-old son from defendant Battersby. The trial court granted summary judgment to Battersby on plaintiffs' strict liability and failure to warn claims, but denied summary judgment to Battersby on plaintiffs' breach of warranty claims. Battersby contends the trial court erred because the trial court specifically found that plaintiffs had failed to present evidence that the ATV was defective, and plaintiffs must show that the ATV was defective to maintain an action for breach of an implied warranty under OCGA section 11-2-314. Ream Tool Co. v. Newton, 209 Ga. App. 226, 229(4) ( 433 S.E.2d 67) (1993); see also Jones v. Marcus, 217 Ga. App. 372, 373(1) ( 457 S.E.2d 271) (1995). We agree that the trial court erred in denying Battersby summary judgment on this claim.
Under Georgia law, one who supplies a chattel for use by another is subject to liability "for physical harm" if the supplier (a) knows or should realize that the chattel is or is likely to be "dangerous for the use for which it is supplied," (b) has no reason to believe that the user of the chattel will realize its "dangerous condition," and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its "dangerous condition" or of the facts which make it likely to be so. J. C. Lewis Motor Co. v. Williams, 85 Ga. App. 538, 541-542 ( 69 S.E.2d 816) (1952) (citing § 388 of the Restatement of Torts); Greenway v. Peabody Intl. Corp., 163 Ga. App. 698, 702(2) ( 294 S.E.2d 541) (1982) (citing § 388 of the Restatement of Torts, Second). So formulated, the duty-to-warn doctrine does not require a product manufacturer to warn of a product-connected danger which is obvious or generally known. Ream Tool Co. v. Newton, 209 Ga. App. 226, 228-229(4) ( 433 S.E.2d 67) (1993). Even if the risk of product failure as a result of normal wear and tear could be characterized as a "dangerous condition," it is obvious that the internal component parts of a device such as a toilet tank wear out over time.
" "[T]his includes a seller who merely labels a product as its own prior to sale. Alltrade, [ Inc. v. McDonald, 213 Ga. App. 758, 759 ( 445 S.E.2d 856)]; Ream Tool Co. v. Newton, 209 Ga. App. 226, 227 (3a) ( 433 S.E.2d 67) (1993)." Buford v. Toys R' Us, 217 Ga. App. 565, 566 (1) ( 458 S.E.2d 373).
"OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (1) provides for strict liability with respect to the manufacturer of personal property sold as new." (Emphasis in original) Buford v. Toys R' Us, 217 Ga. App. 565, 566 (1) ( 458 S.E.2d 373) (1995); Ream Tool Co. v. Newton, 209 Ga. App. 226, 227 (3) (a) ( 433 S.E.2d 67) (1993). "A mere `product seller' is not a manufacturer, and is not liable as a manufacturer on grounds of strict liability.
The presence of this open and obvious danger was adequate to warn the user that use of the [saw] with an exposed [blade], regardless of the care taken in such use, could (and in fact did) result in serious injury to the user's [hand]." Ream Tool Co. v. Newton, 209 Ga. App. 226, 228 (4), 229-230 ( 433 S.E.2d 67). It follows that the plaintiff is barred from any recovery.
" Banks, supra at 735, fn. 3. See also Wilson Foods v. Turner, 218 Ga. App. 74, 75 (1) ( 460 S.E.2d 532) (1995); Ream Tool Co. v. Newton, 209 Ga. App. 226, 228 (4) ( 433 S.E.2d 67) (1993). 3. As stated in his Statement of Material Facts for Trial, Lowman's contention is that the ratchet ". . . either [was not] manufactured properly [wrong dimensions used in manufacturing] or [the pin] wasn't pushed into the hole properly, or, the design of it was such that even if it was manufactured properly that the pin's dimensions were such that it would come out."
In this case, the television was manufactured, prepared, assembled, and packaged according to Curtis Mathes' own "plan, intention, design, specifications, [and] formulation." Id. Curtis Mathes was not a "mere" product seller (see Ream Tool Co. v. Newton, 209 Ga. App. 226 227 (3) (a) ( 433 S.E.2d 67)) merely because the product it sold through its agent, C. M. City, was assembled by others according to Curtis Mathes' plan, intention, design, specifications, and formulation. One who merely sells a product is a "product seller" (id.) but one who sells a product and has "input" or is actively involved in the conception, design, or specification of the product is a manufacturer.