June 14, 1965.Robert G. Horine, Esq., of Columbia, for Appellant, cites: As to the services rendered by the real estate salesmen associatedwith the Respondents in their real estate salesbusiness being performed in employment subject to the provisionsof the South Carolina Unemployment CompensationLaw: 178 Va. 46, 16 S.E.2d 357; 63 Ga. App. 130, 10 S.E.2d 412; 171 Or. 93, 136 P.2d 426; 215 N.C. 479, 2 S.E.2d 583; 67 Ga. App. 861, 21 S.E.2d 663; 12 Ariz. 354, 236 P.2d 44; 104 Utah 196, 141 P.2d 694; 171 Or. 93, 136 P.2d 426; 178 Va. 46, 16 S.E.2d 357; 155 Fla. 772, 21 So.2d 599; 116 Utah 385, 210 P.2d 1006; 59 N.M. 379, 285 P.2d 493; 197 Okla. 308, 169 P.2d 761. N. Heyward Clarkson, Jr., Esq., of Columbia, for Respondents, cites: As to the services rendered by the realestate salesmen associated with the Respondents in theirreal estate business not being performed in employment subjectto the provisions of the South Carolina UnemploymentCompensation Law: 144 S.C. 84, 141 S.E. 893; 113 S.C. 116, 101 S.E. 657; 339 Mich. 713, 64 N.W.2d 545; 28 Cal.2d 812, 172 P.2d 497; 179 Tenn. 579, 168 S.W.2d 182; 21 F.2d 596; 289 N.Y. 110, 44 N.E.2d 387; 104 P.2d 201, 129 A.L.R. 511; 132 U.S. 518, 10 S.Ct. 175; 348 Mo. 147, 152 S.W.2d 184; 163 F.2d 980; 165 F.2d 181; 27 Am. Jur. 483, Sec. 3; 179 Tenn. 579, 168 S.W.2d 182; 313 Ky. 735, 233 S.W.2d 511; 29 A.L.R.2d 773; 22 Wn.2d 760, 157 P.2d 954; 28 Cal.2d 812, 172 P.2d 497; 197 Okla. 308, 169 P.2d 761; 117 So.2d 538; 137 So.2d 164; 29 A.L.R.2d 773; 229 S.C. 1, 91 S.E.2d 548; 50 Am. Jur. 337; 244 La. 314, 152 So.2d 33.

The Christesson court held that Christesson was a broker of the services of independent contractors, a relationship "in which each party to the arrangement makes certain contributions and performs certain services in order to produce a result mutually profitable to them." Id. citing Realty Mortgage Sales Co. v. Oklahoma Sec. Comm'n, 169 P.2d 761, 764 (Okla. 1945). The court reporting service was not an employer because the critical element of control and direction, essential to an employment relationship, was missing.

MASTER AND SERVANT — TAXATION — Real estate salesmen associated with mortgage company were not "in the employment" of such company under Oklahoma Unemployment Act of 1936. The syllabus of Realty Mortgage Sales Co. v. Oklahoma Employment Security Commission, 197 Okla. 303, 169 P.2d 761, is adopted as syllabus herein. Appeal from District Court, Tulsa County; Leslie Webb, Judge.

The Legislature therefore impliedly approved such administrative construction of the Act made by the Authority. Realty Mortgage Sales Co. v. Oklahoma Emp. Sec. Comm., 197 Okla. 308, 169 P.2d 761, 770. The Authority contends that Article 18, Section 7 of the Oklahoma Constitution prohibits it from entering into a contract which establishes fixed rates, relying upon City of Bartlesville v. Corporation Commission, 82 Okla. 160, 199 P. 396; City of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil Gas Co., 64 Okla. 214, 166 P. 1058, writ of error dismissed, 250 U.S. 394, 39 S.Ct. 526, 63 L.Ed. 1054; and American Indian Oil Gas Co. v. George F. Collins Co., 157 Okla. 49, 9 P.2d 438, as supporting their contention.

CJS Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 74 Cal.App.4th 294, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 109 (1999). In Oklahoma, just as workers' compensation statutes are liberally construed in favor of the employee, see ¶ 17 and accompanying footnotes, infra, so are unemployment compensation statutes intended to protect employees from the evils associated with unemployment. Realty Mortgage Sales Co. v. Oklahoma Employment Sec. Comm'n, 1945 OK 268, ¶ 10, 169 P.2d 761. Morillo v. Director of Employment Sec., see note 1 at 413, supra; Nielsen v. Employment Security Dept. of Washington, see note 18, supra; South Central Bell v. Louisiana Dept. of Labor, see note 18, supra; ATT Information Sys., Inc. v. Arizona Dept. of Econ. Sec., see note 18, supra.

Each is performing his allotted function in the joint enterprise." Realty Mortg. Sales Co. v. Oklahoma Employment Security Commission, 197 Okl. 308, 169 P.2d 761, 764-5 (Okla. 1946). Regardless of the label or rationale relied upon, in the majority of jurisdictions called upon to deal with this question, the same result has been reached, namely, that real estate salesmen, working on a commission basis, are not within the kind of employment which is "covered" by the unemployment or social security acts. Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 746 (1953).

See 81 C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare § 102. We have heretofore considered the master and servant principles in the unemployment compensation cases of Realty Mortgage and Sales Co. v. Oklahoma Employment Security Commission, 197 Okla. 308, 169 P.2d 761; Brenner v. State, 201 Okla. 70, 201 P.2d 236, and Perma-Stone Oklahoma City Co. v. Oklahoma Employment Security Commission, Okla., 278 P.2d 543. In the Realty case we did recognize the two interpretive concepts, but stated that a determination was not necessary under the facts therein presented.

"`Wages' means all remuneration payable for services from whatever source, including commissions and bonuses and the cash value of all remuneration payable in any medium other than cash. * * *" saying that even though wages are defined to include remuneration from any source, including commissions and bonuses, the Act when it refers to employment nonetheless means employment in a true sense, citing Realty Mortgage Sales Co. v. Oklahoma Employment Security Commission, 197 Okla. 308, 169 P.2d 761. The question here is not a novel one, having heretofore arisen numerous times in the various states under statutes quite similar to those in Wyoming.

On appeal to this court, Osage presents the single proposition that "A `free agent' who uses a finance plan to underwrite his own personal sales is not an employee". Under this proposition, Osage relies principally upon Realty Mortgage and Sales Co. v. Oklahoma Employment Security Commission, 197 Okla. 308, 169 P.2d 761. In that case, this court held in effect that under the particular facts shown to exist, certain real estate salesmen whose status was in question occupied the position of joint venturers, and not employees, in relation to the corporate real estate broker which had paid under protest some unemployment compensation contributions on their earnings.

"`The cases discussing the law of independent contractors are almost without number, and usually an argument is easily obtained on the question whether in a given situation, the person in question is a servant or an independent contractor; but when the numerous judicial pronouncements are reduced to their decisive substance it is found that the hub of the entire controversy is whether the employer had the right to control, or purported or attempted to control, the manner of the doing of the thing, by the alleged servant, which resulted in the injury. If he did have that right, or exercised it regardless of his right to exercise it, then the relationship is that of master and servant, regardless of what any existing written contract may set forth on its face; if he did not have the right, and did not exercise such right, but had only the right to demand specified results, the relationship is that of independent contractor and contractee.'" In the case of Realty Mtg. Sales Co. v. Oklahoma Employment Security Commission, 197 Okla. 308, 169 P.2d 761, 762, those elements were pointed out which must exist to establish the relationship as one of employment. The syllabus in that case is as follows: