ยง

Realty Marts Intern., Inc. v. Barlow

348 So. 2d 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)
Realty Marts Intern., Inc. v. Barlow

3 Citing cases

  1. Sheldon Greene & Associates, Inc. v. Rosinda Investments, N.V.

    475 So. 2d 925 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 24 times
    Holding that liability for the brokers' commission may be based on the simple fact that the seller and buyer were brought together by the broker

    Realty Marts, Inc. v. Barlow, 312 So.2d 544, 545 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). See Realty Marts International, Inc. v. Barlow, 348 So.2d 63 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). See generally 12 Am.Jur.2d Brokers ยง 232 (1964).

  2. Fearick v. Smugglers Cove, Inc.

    379 So. 2d 400 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 20 times
    Holding that the complaint stated a valid cause of action against two individuals who were directors at the time of the corporation's dissolution, in their capacities as trustees, for property owned by the dissolved corporation pursuant to sections 607.144, 607.297 and 607.301

    A broker was found to be the procuring cause in a case factually similar to the instant case. Realty Marts, Inc. v. Barlow, 312 So.2d 544 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Realty Marts, Inc. v. Barlow, 348 So.2d 63 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). There, as here, the broker found a customer who was ready, willing and able to purchase and showed him the property.

  3. Nicholson v. Underwood

    349 So. 2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)

    Appellant, defendant in the trial court, seeks relief from an adverse final judgment entered following a non-jury trial, by which it was determined and held that appellee was entitled to receive a real estate commission from appellant by virtue of appellee having been the procuring cause of the transaction. The evidence in this case is subject to the same interpretation as that discussed by this Court in Realty Marts, Inc. v. Barlow, 312 So.2d 544 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), and Realty Marts, International, Inc. v. Barlow, 348 So.2d 63 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Finding as we do that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the findings of the learned trial judge, sitting as trier of the facts, we affirm. Another point, inferentially addressed by appellant, deserves our attention. During the trial appellee called as a witness one of the purchasers of appellant's property whose testimony was not favorable to appellee and in many respects substantiated the contentions of appellant.