Moreover, in judging substantiality, a comparison of the size of the gains to the taxpayer's net income rather than to the taxpayer's gross receipts is “the more valid comparison.” Real Estate Corp. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 610, 614 (1961), affd. 301 F.2d 423 (10th Cir. 1962). We therefore hold that the proceeds of petitioners, silver waste sales were substantial.

The relative amounts of income from the taxpayer's regular business and from the property transaction in question can be significant in certain cases. Real Estate Corporation v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 610, 613-614 (1961), affd. 301 F.2d 423 (CA10 1962). The foregoing factors have no independent significance; they are merely factors to help us decide, on the basis of the record as a whole, whether Cottle held the Four-Plexes primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business in 1977.

7502, the Court has refused to be guided by the circumstances which caused Congress to make it applicable to tax returns. Before section 7502 was made applicable to tax returns in 1966, it had long been settled that a return was ‘filed’ so as to start the running of the statute of limitations only when it was actually received by the IRS. Phinney v. Bank of the Southwest National Assn., Houston, 335 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1964); W. H. Hill Co. v. Commissioner, 64 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1933), affg. 22 B.T.A. 1351 (1931), cert. denied 290 U.S. 691 (1933); O'Bryan Brothers, 42 B.T.A. 18 (1940), affd. 127 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied 317 U.S. 647 (1942); see Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 187 (1957); Lucia v. United States, 474 F.2d 565, 570 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Thompson, 262 F.Supp. 340, 342 (S.D. Tex. 1966); cf. United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 76 (1916); Real Estate Corp. v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 423, 428-429 (10th Cir. 1962), affg. 35 T.C. 610 (1961), cert. denied 371 U.S. 822 (1962); Edward Barron Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 93 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1937), affg. 34 B.T.A. 1256 (1936); Poynor v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1936), affg. a Memorandum Opinion of this Court; Lewis-Hall Iron Works v. Blair, 23 F.2d 972, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1928), cert. denied 277 U.S. 592 (1928); Frank A. Gray, 16 T.C. 262, 266 (1951). As a result of such interpretation, the Commissioner had a full 3-year period in which to examine a taxpayer's return and carefully prepare a notice of deficiency, if necessary.

The relative amounts of income from the taxpayer's regular business and from the property transactions can be significant in certain cases. Real Estate Corporation, 35 T.C. 610 (1961), affd. 301 F.2d 423 (C.A. 10, 1962), certiorari denied 371 U.S. 822 (1962), rehearing denied 371 U.S. 917 (1962). The regularity and consistency of the taxpayer's activity can also be helpful.

It is established that a person may be both a dealer and an investor. Real Estate Corporation, 35 T.C. 610 (1961), affd. 301 F.2d 423 (C.A. 10, 1962); Charles B. Mieg, 32 T.C. 1314 (1959). As noted above, the facts indicate that the property was not sold for 4 years.

It is established that a person may be both a dealer and an investor. Real Estate Corporation, 35 T.C. 610 (1961), affd. 301 F.2d 423 (C.A. 10, 1962); Charles B. Mieg, 32 T.C. 1314 (1959). As noted above, the facts indicate that the property was not sold for 4 years.

See Recordak Corporation v. United States, 325 F.2d 460 (Ct. Cl); American Can Co. v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 604 (C.A. 2), affirming on this point 37 T.C. 198, certiorari denied 375 U.S. 993; Greene-Haldeman v. Commissioner, supra; Bauschard v. Commissioner, supra; Rollingwood v. Commissioner, supra; Municipal Bond Corporation, 41 T.C. 20; R.E. Moorhead & Son, Inc., 40 T.C. 704; Estate of Peter Finder, 37 T.C. 411; Real Estate Corporation, 35 T.C. 610, affd. 301 F.2d 423 (C.A. 10), certiorari denied 371 U.S. 822; Joseph A. Harrah, 30 T.C. 1236; S.E.C. Corporation v. United States, supra. Congress did not intend to grant nonrecognition to sales in the ordinary course of business.

The word ‘primarily’ as used in the statutory provision that the property be held primarily for sale to customers has been construed as meaning ‘substantial’ or ‘essential’ rather than as ‘principal’ or ‘chief.’ Rollingwood Corporation v. Commissioner, supra; Real Estate Corporation, 35 T.C. 610; Joseph A. Harrah, supra; American Can Co., 37 T.C. 198; and S.E.C. Corporation v. United States, (S.D.N.Y.) 140 F.Supp. 717, affd. (C.A. 2) 241 F.2d 416, certiorari denied 354 U.S. 909. Property may be held for a dual purpose. If one of such purposes is to sell to customers in the ordinary course of business, the sales may fail to qualify for capital gains treatment.

Moreover, the statutory requirement that the property be held ‘primarily’ for sale to customers has been construed so as to treat the word ‘primarily’ as meaning ‘substantial’ or ‘essential’ rather than as ‘principal’ or ‘chief.’ See Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, supra at 266; S.E.C. Corporation v. United States, 140 F.Supp. 717, 719 (S.D. N.Y.), affirmed 241 F.2d 416 (C.A. 2), certiorari denied 354 U.S.909; Real Estate Corporation, 35 T.C. 610, 615; Joseph A. Harrah, 30 T.C. 1236, 1241. And, finally, property may be held with a dual purpose; and if one of such purposes is to sell it to customers in the ordinary course of business the sales may fail to qualify for capital gains treatment under section 117(j).