This principle as a rule of constitutional and statutory construction, then generally conceded, has been recognized ever since. Ex parte Hennen, 13 Peters 230, 259; Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419; Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 315.

In short, Humphrey's Executor and Wiener involved structurally distinguishable entities and do not serve as appropriate support for the removed members' claim. Indeed, the Supreme Court's decisions in Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 21 S.Ct. 842, 45 L.Ed. 1162 (1901), and In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 10 L.Ed. 225 (1839), are more clearly on point and control this case. In Reagan the Court held that the commissioners of Indian Territory, inferior officers who performed entirely judicial functions — like justices of the peace — were removable at will in the absence of a congressionally fixed term. 182 U.S. at 426-427, 21 S.Ct. at 845.

(a) The Presidential review is inherently judicial. The statute provides for the removal of officers of the Army for causes specified which affect their good name, standing, and honor. If the officer is found inefficient, he can no longer remain on the active list, and if his inefficiency is found to be due to his own misconduct, neglect, or avoidable habits, then he is to be separated from the Army absolutely, discharged "without honor" and without pay. Where such is the case, in accordance with a fundamental principle of our law, the proceedings are judicial. Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 542; Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 425; Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311-314; Kalbfus v. Siddons, 42 App.D.C. 310, 318. Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, and Street v. United States, 133 U.S. 299, relied upon by counsel on the other side, support him at no point, but proceed in recognition of the principles of law relied upon by us. The statute which constituted the law of the case in Reaves v. Ainsworth was one which authorized the President to establish a system of examination for promotion, not removal from office for specified cause.

Collins , 141 S. Ct. at 1783 n.18 (citing Wiener , 357 U.S. at 353, 355–56, 78 S.Ct. 1275 ). The agency officials in Reagan v. United States , 182 U.S. 419, 21 S.Ct. 842, 45 L.Ed. 1162 (1901), "[held] office neither for life nor for any specified time," which meant that the Court had no cause to interpret any term-of-office provision. Id. at 426, 21 S.Ct. 842.

Respondents' federal constitutional claim depends on their having had a property right in continued employment. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-578 [ 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2708-10, 33 L.Ed.2d 548] (1972); Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 425 [ 21 S.Ct. 842, 845, 45 L.Ed.2d 1162] (1901). If they did, the State could not deprive them of this property without due process.

Respondents' federal constitutional claim depends on their having had a property right in continued employment. Board of Regents v Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-578 [ 92 S Ct 2701; 33 L Ed 2d 548] (1972); Reagan v United States, 182 U.S. 419, 425 [ 45 L Ed 1162; 21 S Ct 842] (1901). If they did, the State could not deprive them of this property without due process.

Appointments to hold during the pleasure of the appointing power may be terminated at any time and without notice; appointments to continue "during good behavior," or for a fixed term of years, cannot be terminated except for cause, and the authorities are generally to the effect that in the latter cases the office holder is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard. (2 Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., sec. 473; Mechem on Public Officers, p. 454; In the Matter of Carter, supra; Coleman v. Glenn, 103 Ga. 458 [68 Am. St. Rep. 608, 30 S.E. 297]; Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 227 [10 L.Ed. 138, see, also, Rose's U.S. Notes]; Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419 [45 L.Ed. 1162, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 842].) There are cases holding that the right to remove "for cause," with no right of appeal or review, where the statute does not specify the particular causes, leaves the determination of the cause and its sufficiency to the removing power, which may act summarily and without according a hearing to the officer.

But we have previously stated that all officers protected by a for-cause removal provision and later subject to termination are entitled to “notice and [a] hearing” in the “courts,” as without such review “the appointing power” otherwise “could remove at pleasure or for such cause as [only] it deemed sufficient.” Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 425, 21 S.Ct. 842, 45 L.Ed. 1162 (1901); Shurtleff, 189 U.S., at 314, 23 S.Ct. 535; cf. Humphrey's Executor, supra (entertaining civil suit challenging removal). But cf. Bowsher, supra, at 729, 106 S.Ct. 3181.

Respondents' federal constitutional claim depends on their having had a property right in continued employment.Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-578 (1972); Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 425 (1901). If they did, the State could not deprive them of this property without due process.

The Court has stated: "The inquiry is therefore whether there were any causes of removal prescribed by law . . . . If there were, then the rule would apply that where causes of removal are specified by constitution or statute, as also where the term of office is for a fixed period, notice and hearing are essential. If there were not, the appointing power could remove at pleasure or for such cause as it deemed sufficient." Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 425 (1901); Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 314 (1903). The Court has thus made clear that Congress may limit the total discretion of the Executive in firing an employee, by providing that terminations be for cause, and only for cause, and, if it does so, notice and a hearing are "essential."