The court's decision not to expound further on this issue with a separate interrogatory was hardly an abuse of discretion. See Reagan v. Sinclair Refining Co., 319 F.2d 363, 366 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 956, 84 S.Ct. 975, 11 L.Ed.2d 974 (1964). As to the second requested interrogatory, we are unable to understand how an affirmative answer to it would have excused Consolidated from liability.
There was no abuse of discretion in this case. Reagin v. Sinclair Refining Company, 319 F.2d 363, 364 (5 Cir. 1963); Miller's Nat. Ins. Co., Chicago, Ill. v. Wichita Flour M. Co., 257 F.2d 93, 100, 76 A.I.R.2d 385 (10 Cir. 1958). We have carefully considered all of the contentions of the appellants and find no merit in them.
We have considered Pennsylvania's complaints regarding the district court's refusal to submit additional issues inquiring of "scope of employment" and "Texas employee". The issues and instructions upon which the court submitted the case to the jury completely and adequately presented all matters raised by Pennsylvania. As the requested issues would have duplicated and overlapped those used, the court quite properly refused the additional issues preferred by Pennsylvania. Reagan v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 319 F.2d 363, 366 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 956, 84 S.Ct. 975, 11 L.Ed.2d 974 (1964). Affirmed.
"Hardly anywhere does the inherent nature of an adversary trial commit so much to the careful, but wide and flexible, discretion of the Judge. See Reagan v. Sinclair Refining Co., 5 Cir., 1963, 319 F.2d 363."
Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35, 82 S.Ct. 1119, 1122, 8 L.Ed.2d 313 (1962) (Emphasis supplied.) See also Krizak v. W.C. Brooks Sons, 320 F.2d 37, 42 (CA 4, 1963); Reagan v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 319 F.2d 363, 364-365 (CA 5, 1963); cert. denied, 376 U.S. 956, 84 S.Ct. 975, 11 L.Ed.2d 974 (1964); Rhynard v. Filori, 315 F.2d 176, 178 (CA 8, 1963); Cohen v. Western Hotels, Inc., 276 F.2d 26, 27 (CA 9, 1960); Harris v. Afran Transp. Co., 252 F.2d 536 (CA 3, 1958); E.L. Farmer Co. v. Hooks, 239 F.2d 547, 553 (CA 10, 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 911, 77 S.Ct. 699, 1 L. Ed.2d 665 (1957); Schillie v. Atchison, T. S.F. Ry., 222 F.2d 810, 814 (CA 8, 1955). III) Claim of inadequate and improper instructions.
Hardly anywhere does the inherent nature of an adversary trial commit so much to the careful, but wide and flexible, discretion of the Judge. See Reagan v. Sinclair Refining Co., 5 Cir., 1963, 319 F.2d 363. The second complaint oddly enough relates to the use of another form required under the Longshoremen's Act as between the stevedoring company, the employer, and the injured employee.
It is for this reason that the qualification of an expert witness and the limitations imposed on his testimony are left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Salem v. United States Lines, 370 U.S. 31, 35, 82 S.Ct. 1119, 8 L.Ed.2d 313 (1962); Reagan v. Sinclair Refining Co., 319 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 956, 84 S.Ct. 975, 11 L.Ed.2d 974 (1964); Harvey's Inc., v. A. C. Electric Co., 207 A.2d 660 (D.C.App. 1965). As the Supreme Court said in Salem, "the trial judge has broad discretion in the matter of the admission or exclusion of expert evidence, and his action is to be sustained unless manifestly erroneous."
The receipt of opinion or conclusion evidence and the extent to which it will be received are matters resting largely in the discretion of the court. Sherry v. Asing, 56 Haw. 135, 531 P.2d 648 (1975); Reagan v. Sinclair Refining Co., 319 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1963); cert. denied, 376 U.S. 956 (1964); Joseph A. Bass Co. v. United States, 340 F.2d 842 (8th Cir. 1965); Thomas v. Cagwin, 43 Ill. App.2d 336, 193 N.E.2d 233 (1963); Batten v. South Seattle Water Co., 65 Wn.2d 547, 398 P.2d 719 (1965). The foundation for opinion evidence is also a matter within the discretion of the trial court.
The trial court has wide discretion in rejecting opinion testimony and its action will not be reviewed except for abuse. Urquhart v. Barnes, 335 S.W.2d 666 (Tex.Civ.App., 1960, no writ hist.), and whether or not a person offered as an expert possesses the required qualifications is also within the discretion of the trial judge. His ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of abuse. Rhinetubes, Inc., v. Norddeutscher Lloyd, 335 S.W.2d 269 (Tex.Civ.App., 1960, ref., n.r.e.); Reagan v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 319 F.2d 363 (5th Cir., 1963). Whether Wallace was called upon to testify as an expert, or merely to give his opinion as a used car dealer, is immaterial for plaintiff has failed to show abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in ruling on the excluded question and answer.