Opinion
22-CV-3044 (CS)
07-13-2022
MICHELLE B. SURDAK READ, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF RAMAPO POLICE DEPT.; P.O. BUCKLY, #541; P.O. FURGUSON, #547; A.D.A. VERONICA PHILLIPS, Defendants.
ORDER OF SERVICE
CATHY SEIBEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated her constitutional rights. By order dated April 15, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis, that is, without prepayment of fees.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims raised. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits - to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
DISCUSSION
A. Town of Ramapo Police Department
Plaintiff's claims against the Town of Ramapo Police Department must be dismissed because, under New York law, municipal agencies or departments lack the capacity to be sued. See Omnipoint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Town of LaGrange, 658 F.Supp.2d 539, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“In New York, agencies of a municipality are not suable entities.”); Hall v. City of White Plains, 185 F.Supp.2d 293, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Under New York law, departments which are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and cannot sue or be sued.”); see also N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 2 (“The term ‘municipal corporation,' as used in this chapter, includes only a county, town, city and village.”). Claims against the Town of Ramapo Police Department therefore can be brought only against the Town of Ramapo.
The Court declines at this stage, however, to substitute the Town of Ramapo as a defendant in place of the Police Department because the allegations of the amended complaint do not state a claim against the Town of Ramapo. When a plaintiff sues a town or other municipality under Section 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality's employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff's rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects' a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes' a person ‘to be subjected' to such deprivation.”) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). In other words, to state a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997).
Plaintiff asserts claims against Town of Ramapo police officers but does not plead any facts showing that a policy, custom, or practice of the Town of Ramapo caused the alleged violation of her rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against the Town of Ramapo Police Department are dismissed.
B. Assistant District Attorney Veronica Phillips
Prosecutors are immune from civil suits for damages for acts committed within the scope of their official duties where the challenged activities are “‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.'” Giraldo v. Kessler, 694 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993) (absolute immunity is analyzed under a “functional approach” that “looks to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). In addition, prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit for acts that may be administrative obligations but are “directly connected with the conduct of a trial.” Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 344 (2009). Here, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Phillips are based on her use of photographs during Grand Jury proceedings. A prosecutor's submission of documents during Grand Jury proceedings is a function intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. See Anilao v. Spota, 27 F.4th 855, 864-66 (2d Cir. 2022). Plaintiff's claims against ADA Phillips are therefore dismissed because the claims seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(iii).
C. Police Officers Buckley and Ferguson
Plaintiff's claims against Police Officers Buckley and Ferguson proceed. Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis, she is entitled to rely on the Court and the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service. Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process . . . in in forma pauperis cases.”); Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(3) (the court must order the Marshals Service to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis)).
Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires that a summons be served within 90 days of the date the complaint is filed, Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis and could not have served summonses and the complaint until the Court reviewed the complaint and ordered that summonses be issued. The Court therefore extends the time to serve until 90 days after the date summonses are issued.
To allow Plaintiff to effect service on Defendants Buckley and Ferguson through the U.S. Marshals Service, the Clerk of Court is instructed to fill out a U.S. Marshals Service Process Receipt and Return form (USM-285 form) for each of these Defendants. The Clerk of Court is further instructed to issue summonses and deliver to the Marshals Service all of the paperwork necessary for the Marshals Service to effect service upon Defendants.
If the complaint is not served within 90 days after the date the summonses are issued, Plaintiff should request an extension of time for service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it is the plaintiff's responsibility to request an extension of time for service). Plaintiff must notify the Court in writing if her address changes, and the Court may dismiss the action if Plaintiff fails to do so.
CONCLUSION
The Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims against the Town of Ramapo Police Department because it lacks the capacity to be sued. The Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims against ADA Phillips based on prosecutorial immunity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff, together with an information package. The Clerk of Court is further instructed to issue summonses for Police Officers Buckley and Ferguson, complete the USM-285 forms with the addresses for these defendants, and deliver to the U.S. Marshals Service all documents necessary to effect service.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.