Because of the fluctuating nature of the weather, however, the weather on any particular day in the past is not the type of fact normally subject to judicial notice. See generally Read v. Benedict, 200 Ga. App. 4, 8 (3) ( 406 S.E.2d 488) (1991). Assuming that the weather conditions on the date of the shootings had any relevancy to Weems' guilt or innocence, he should have produced evidence in that regard, rather than requesting that the trial court take judicial notice thereof.
Hibbard v. McMillan , 284 Ga. App. 753, 756 (2), 645 S.E.2d 356 (2007) (emphasis in original; citations omitted). See also Read v. Benedict , 200 Ga. App. 4, 9 (4), 406 S.E.2d 488 (1991). While the doctrine is generally applied in the context of overpayment between the parties to a lawsuit, that does not mean that the doctrine "can never apply in a case involving a payment to a third party."
See also Larkins, Ga. Contracts Law and Litigation § 10.18. We note that in Read v. Benedict, 200 Ga.App. 4, 9(4), 406 S.E.2d 488 (1991), this Court held, without citation to any authority, that the voluntary payment doctrine did not apply “so as to preclude the award of damages in a suit grounded in tort when the alleged voluntary payment involved was to a third party not involved in a suit for the purpose of satisfying a claim caused ....” (Emphasis in original.) Pretermitting whether Read is a correct statement of law in the tort context, it is not binding in this contract case.
See Hinton v. Institutional Investors Trust, 133 Ga.App. 364, 367–368(3), 211 S.E.2d 169 (1974). Read v. Benedict, 200 Ga.App. 4, 406 S.E.2d 488 (1991), does not require a different result. There, we affirmed a trial court's grant of a partial directed verdict on an interest claim because we found “no competent evidence of record sufficient to enable the jury to calculate the applicable prime rate and, thus appellant's interest claim with reasonable certainty.”
Allianz, supra, 214 Ga. App. at 667; Transport, supra, 187 Ga. App. at 363 (3); Hartford, supra, 28 Ga. App. at 655. See also Ga. Power, supra, 161 Ga. App. at 642-643 (1) (voluntary payment doctrine applied to bar party's recovery of damages in tort where party did not show inapplicability of doctrine); compare Read v. Benedict, 200 Ga. App. 4, 9 (4) ( 406 SE2d 488) (1991) (voluntary payment doctrine did not preclude award of damages in suit grounded in tort when wife made payment to third party not involved in suit for the purpose of satisfying claim caused by malpractice). 2.
Martin v. Williams, 215 Ga. App. 649, 651 (2) ( 451 SE2d 822) (1994). See Read v. Benedict, 200 Ga. App. 4, 7 (2) ( 406 SE2d 488) (1991). We also find, however, that Tookes failed to produce any evidence that Murray acted with the specific intent to cause harm, as required to support a claim for unlimited punitive damages.
In this sense, conscious indifference to consequences means an intentional disregard of the rights of another, knowingly or wilfully. Read v. Benedict, 200 Ga. App. 4, 7 (2) ( 406 SE2d 488) (1991). When, in cases concerning punitive damages,
See, e.g., Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Folsom, 256 Ga. 400, 406 ( 349 SE2d 368) (1986) (whether excess payment of cash value of life insurance policies could be refunded held subject to weighing of the equities by the trier of fact); Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Radiotherapy of Ga., 252 Ga. App. 543, 547 (1) ( 557 SE2d 59) (2001) (insurer could not recover payments allegedly made in excess of that allowed by Medicare); Yeazel v. Burger King Corp., 241 Ga.App. 90, 97-99 (3) ( 526 SE2d 112) (1999) (voluntary payment doctrine barred tenant from recovering any alleged rent overpayments made during pendency of lawsuit); Ins. Co. of North America v. Kyla, Inc., 193 Ga.App. 555, 556 ( 388 SE2d 530) (1989) ($100,000 excess of settlement payment over alleged policy limit was voluntary payment which insurer could not recover). See Read v. Benedict, 200 Ga. App. 4, 9 (4) ( 406 SE2d 488) (1991) (OCGA § 13-1-13 "does not apply to a three-cornered transaction culminating in a tort claim for damages") (citation omitted; emphasis in original). Id.
As a pro se litigant who was not an attorney, Demido was not entitled to recover attorney fees ( JarAllah v. American Culinary Federation, Inc., 242 Ga. App. 595, 596 ( 529 S.E.2d 919) (2000)), and we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's conclusion that there was a bona fide controversy between the parties which precluded the award of other expenses. Read v. Benedict, 200 Ga. App. 4, 6 ( 406 S.E.2d 488) (1991); Sams v. Video Display Corp., 255 Ga. App. 478, 482 ( 566 S.E.2d 28) (2002). 2. For the same reasons set forth in division 1, supra, Interland employees, Wilson and Covington, as individuals, were properly granted summary judgment on all counts and claims for damages on which Interland was granted summary judgment.
Ga. L. 1987, pp. 917-919, § 5.Read v. Benedict, 200 Ga. App. 4, 7(2) ( 406 S.E.2d 488) (1991); Petrolane Gas Svc. v. Eusery, 193 Ga. App. 860, 862(1) ( 389 S.E.2d 355) (1989). See, e.g., Crosby, supra ("the controlling question for the appellate court is whether there was any evidence to support the award").