Chertkof, 280 Md. at 5-6, 371 A.2d at 127; see, e.g., Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway Transp. Dist., 23 Cal.3d 180, 185, 588 P.2d 1261, 1263, 151 Cal.Rptr. 837, 839 (1979); Standard Co. of New Orleans v. Elliott Constr. Co., 363 So.2d 671, 675 (La. 1978); REA Express v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 447 S.W.2d 721, 727 (Tex.Civ.App. 1969). This Court has not previously considered the question whether participation as a party in a judicial proceeding constitutes a waiver of the right to arbitrate issues raised and/or decided in that proceeding.
The Federal Arbitration Act is the law of New York and also the law of Texas with respect to any "contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce,' as defined in that act. The federal act has been held to be substantive rather than procedural, and equally applicable in state and federal courts, even though the contract provides that any dispute should be settled by arbitration under the laws of a particular state. REA Express v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 447 S.W.2d 721 (Tex.CivApp., Houston (14th Dist.) 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Huntington Corporation v. Inwood Construction Co., 348 S.W.2d 442 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The Texas General Arbitration Act, Vernon's Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. arts. 224 to 238 (Supp.
No state court agreed until the 1960's. See, e.g., REA Express v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 447 S.W.2d 721, 726 (Tex.Civ.App. 1969) (stating that the FAA applies but noting that it had been waived in the case at hand); cf. Rubewa Products Co. v. Watson's Quality Turkey Products, Inc., 242 A.2d 609, 613 (D.C. 1968) (same). This Court waited until 1984 to conclude over a strong dissent by JUSTICE O'CONNOR, that § 2 extends to the states.
"The Federal Arbitration Act, declaring arbitration agreement [sic] affecting [interstate] commerce or maritime affairs to be valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, is a declaration of national law equally applicable in state or federal courts."Main v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, 67 Cal.App.3d 19, 25, 136 Cal.Rptr. 378, 381 (1977), quoting REA Express v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 447 S.W.2d 721 (Tex.Civ.App. 1969). See also, Safeway Stores v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., 83 Cal.App.3d 430, 147 Cal.Rptr. 835 (1978); Butchers Union Local 532 v. Farmers Markets, 67 Cal.App.3d 905, 909-912, 136 Cal.Rptr. 894, 897-98 (1977).
402, 404-407 (2d Cir. 1959); American Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville Jefferson County Air Bd. 269 F.2d 811, 815-816 (6th Cir. 1959); Main v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith Inc., 67 Cal.App.3d 19, 136 Cal. Rptr. 378, 381 (1977); West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. MultiLine Indus., 231 Ga. 329, 201 S.E.2d 452, 453 (1973); Pathman Constr. Co. v. Knox County Hosp. Ass'n, 164 Ind. App. 121, 326 N.E.2d 844, 851 (1975); Skewes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 250 Kan. 574, 829 P.2d 874, 878-879 (1992); In re J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Dow Chem. Co., 25 N.Y.2d 576, 307 N.Y.S.2d 660, 664, 255 N.E.2d 774, 778, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 939, 90 S.Ct. 1844, 26 L.Ed.2d 272 (1970); Cooper v. Computer Credit Sys., Inc., 40 A.D.2d 692, 336 N.Y.S.2d 380, 381 (1972); Aerojet-General Corp. v. Non-Ferrous Metal Ref., Ltd., 37 A.D.2d 531, 322 N.Y.S.2d 33, 34 (1971); Miller v. Puritan Fashions Corp., 516 S.W.2d 234, 238 (Tex.Civ.App. 1974); Mamlin v. Susan Thomas, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Tex.Civ. App. 1973); REA Express v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 447 S.W.2d 721, 726 (Tex.Civ.App. 1969); Pinkis v. Network Cinema Corp., 9 Wn. App. 337, 512 P.2d 751, 755 (1973). Neither the Alabanzas nor the HCRC, see supra note 3, cite any contrary authority.
See, e.g., Pullman, Inc. v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 304 A.2d 334 (Del.Super. Ct. 1973). The majority rule, however, appears to be that the act does apply and requires a state court to enforce an arbitration clause despite a contrary state law or policy. See, e.g., Main v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, Inc., 67 Cal.App.3d 19, 136 Cal.Rptr. 378 (1977); REA Express v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 447 S.W.2d 721 (Tex.Civ.App. 1969); West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Multi-Line Indus., Inc., 231 Ga. 329, 201 S.E.2d 452 (1973); Fite Warmath Constr. Co. v. MYS Corp., 559 S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1977). Plaintiff cites Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 98 L.Ed. 168, 74 S.Ct. 182 (1953), where the Supreme Court refused to enforce an arbitration clause when the dispute arose under the federal securities act.
See also Lane-Tahoe, Inc. v. Kindred Constr. Co., 91 Nev. 385, 536 P.2d 491; 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 41 at 235 ("The offensive in instituting proceedings for arbitration lies with the aggrieved party."); Reasor, Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 12 Drake L.Rev. 119, 125 ("All that either party need do to initiate arbitration is send the other written notice of Demand for Arbitration, and file two copies with the referee, the American Arbitration Association."). The following decisions, dealing with waiver under the particular facts, do not announce a different rule: Necchi Sewing Machine Sales Corp. v. Carl, 260 F. Supp. 665 (S.D.N.Y.) (waiver not found); Sucrest Corp. v. Chimo Shipping Ltd., 236 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y.) (waiver); Mayron's Bake Shops, Inc. v. Arrow Stores, Inc., 149 Conn. 149, 176 A.2d 574; REA Express v. Missouri P.R.R., 447 S.W.2d 721 (Tex.Civ.App.). The insured here commenced suit instead of initiating arbitration.
August 27, 1979. See REA Express v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 447 S.W.2d 721, 726 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston (14th Dist.) 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Plaintiff's dispute over the construction of the contracts arises from the provision of each regarding the method of computation of the monthly bills from Roman Forest to East Montgomery.
Ordinarily, notice is a question of fact which is to be determined by the trier of fact; it becomes a question of law only where there is no room for ordinary minds to differ as to the proper conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. Exxon Corp. v. Raetzer, 533 S.W.2d 842 (Tex.Civ.App. Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n. r. e.); REA Express v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 447 S.W.2d 721 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston (14th Dist.) 1969, writ ref'd n. r. e.). See also Zavala County v. E.D.K. Ranches, Inc., 544 S.W.2d 484 (Tex.Civ.App. San Antonio 1976, no writ); Fayetteville Independent School District v. Crowley, 528 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.Civ.App. Austin 1975, writ ref'd n. r. e.); Seguin Independent School District v. Blumberg, 402 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Civ.App. San Antonio 1966, writ ref'd n. r. e.).
Other cases, however, indicate that if the delay is excessive or if the party seeking arbitration utilizes judicial discovery procedures not available in arbitration, prior to moving for dismissal of the suit and enforcing his right to arbitration, he was waived this right. American Locomotive Co. v. Chemical Research Corp., 171 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1948), Cert. denied, 336 U.S. 909, 69 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed. 1074 (1949); Carcich v. Roderi A/B Nordie, supra; Empresa Maritima de Transportes, S. A. v. Transatlantic Pacific Corp., 200 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); REA Express v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 447 S.W.2d 721 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston (14th Dist.) 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). While these latter cases do not involve employment contracts, the federal policies regarding arbitration expressed therein are applicable to the facts before us. We hold that the three year, eight month lapse between the date appellee received notice of appellant's claim through the filing of this suit and the date appellee filed its motion to dismiss and compel arbitration is an unreasonable delay and prejudicial per se. Appellee's contention that the delay was necessitated by the fact that negotiations were then in progress between the NFLPA and the NFLPRA for a new contract which would be retroactive to February 1, 1974 is without merit.