Opinion
Def. ID# 0201013631
January 29, 2003
Adam D. Gelof, Esquire
Karl Haller, Esquire
Memorandum Opinion — Motion for Postconviction Relief
Gentlemen:
This is my decision on defendant Walter D. Williams' motion for postconviction relief. Williams pled guilty to charges of Reckless Endangering in the First Degree, Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, Resisting Arrest, Disregarding a Police Officer's Signal and Driving a Vehicle While License is Suspended or Revoked. As to the charge of Reckless Endangering in the First Degree, Williams was sentenced to five years at supervision level V, suspended after serving one year at supervision level V for six months at supervision level IV Work Release, followed by three years and six months at supervision level III. Williams is to be held at supervision level V until space is available at supervision level IV Work Release. As to the charge of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, Williams was sentenced to six months at supervision level V, suspended after serving 30 days at supervision level V for five months at supervision level II. As to the charge of Resisting Arrest, Williams was sentenced to one year at supervision level V, suspended for one year at supervision level II. As to the charge of Disregarding a Police Officer's Signal, Williams was sentenced to six months at supervision level V, suspended for six months at supervision level II. As to the charge of Driving a Vehicle While License is Suspended or Revoked, Williams was ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $500.00.
Defendant Walter D. Williams is hereinafter referred to as "Williams."
Williams filed his motion for postconviction relief on September 10, 2002. Williams sets forth three grounds for relief. One, Williams argues that his due process rights were violated and that his legal counsel was ineffective. Two, Williams argues that his sentence exceeds what he agreed to in his plea agreement. Three, Williams argues that he was tricked into taking a guilty plea. Williams took no direct appeal to the Supreme Court. This is Williams' first motion for postconviction relief and it was filed in a timely manner. Therefore, there are no procedural bars to Williams' motion for postconviction relief.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
A. Regarding Williams' ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he must meet the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington. In the context of a guilty plea challenge, Strickland requires a defendant to show that: (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) counsel's actions were so prejudicial that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. I note that during the taking of Williams' guilty plea that Williams, when asked if he was satisfied with his attorney's representation of him, said, "Yes." Williams argues that his legal counsel was ineffective because he allegedly failed to make the "appropriate motions that would have proven his innocense," including an evidentiary hearing, motion to suppress, Rule 16 discovery and preliminary hearing. To the extent that this argument raises Williams' due process rights, Williams waived that claim by pleading guilty. Moreover, Williams' argument is, in large part, factually incorrect. Williams was scheduled for a preliminary hearing, but waived it for a copy of the police report. Williams' attorney also requested and received discovery from the State. Williams has not articulated how the failure to file the various motions and/or request an evidentiary hearing would have made a difference. As such, his allegations are baseless.
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
State v. Casto, 375 A.2d 444, 449 (Del. 1977).
B. Williams argues that his legal counsel was ineffective for failing to interview various witnesses who would prove, according to Williams, that Williams was not the driver of the vehicle. In response to this allegation, Williams' lawyer stated that he and an investigator went to the crime scene and interviewed two witnesses. Williams' response to this was to submit a written list of witnesses who, presumably, would testify that Williams was not the driver of the vehicle. However, Williams did state what these witnesses would say, nor did he submit affidavits from them. Williams allegations are particularly interesting given the information in the affidavit of probable cause. It states that Delaware State Police Officer Chad Harmon stopped Williams, who was driving his own Ford Explorer, and a passenger, Jervis Harris, after observing Williams driving erratically on State Route 24. It does not mention the people that Williams lists as witnesses as being present. If these witnesses were in a position to testify that someone else was driving the Ford Explorer, then it seems odd that they were not listed in the affidavit of probable cause as being present at the scene. Given that Williams has not told me what these witnesses would say, I can only conclude that Williams' allegations are baseless.
C. Williams argues that I refused to allow him to dismiss Haller and retain his own attorney. I reviewed the file and found no such request as ever having been made by Williams.
D. Williams argued that Haller told him to request a presentence investigation and that this was wrong because the presentence investigation resulted in a sentence greater than what the State requested in the plea agreement. The record of the guilty plea reflects that both the State and Williams requested a presentence investigation. It also reflects that Williams was made aware of what the maximum possible penalties were for each of the offenses that he was pleading guilty to. While Williams' sentence was greater than what the State recommended in the plea agreement, it was less than the maximum possible sentence. Thus, Williams has no cause to complain. Whether or not the Court accepts the recommended plea, or orders a presentence investigation, are matters left to the discretion of the sentencing judge. So long as the sentence complies with all the applicable requirements, as did Williams' sentence in this case, then Williams has no basis to complain.
F. Williams argues that Haller did not correspond with or interview him prior to the "proceedings and court date." This is factually incorrect. Haller sent Williams a three-page letter explaining the criminal process to him on June 4, 2002. Haller met with the Williams, as well as the prosecutor, at a case review on July 3, 2002. This meeting included a complete review and reading of the police report. Haller and Williams met and discussed the case again on July 8, 2002. Later that day, Haller and an investigator went to the crime scene and interviewed witnesses and took photos. Williams has not explained what would have accomplished by having more meetings. Williams defense, while hardly credible, is simply that he was not the driver of the Ford Explorer. However, as I said before, this hardly seems plausible and was apparently considered and dismissed by Haller as such. It is, quite frankly, not possible to reconcile Williams' position now with his admission during the plea colloquy that he committed the crimes that he pled guilty to.
2. Plea Agreement
Williams argues that the State did not comply with the terms of the plea agreement. This is because both the State and Williams requested a presentence investigation. In any event, as I said earlier, the sentencing judge is not bound by the parties' recommendation as to what the sentence should be.
3. Coerced Plea
Williams argues that he was coerced into taking a guilty plea. However, the plea colloquy does not reflect this. The applicable portion is excerpted as follows:
THE COURT: Do you understand you are waiving those rights by pleading guilty?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Do you understand there will not be a trial because you are pleading guilty?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Did anybody force you to take this plea?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: Did anybody coerce you into taking this plea?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: Did anybody make any threats against you to take this plea?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: Did anybody promise you anything in exchange for this plea?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: Did you actually commit the five offenses you are pleading guilty to?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
Williams is bound by the sworn statements that he made during the taking of the plea. For the reasons set forth above, Williams' motion for postconviction relief is denied.
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629 (1997).
IT IS SO ORDERED.