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holding defendant was seized when officer activated her emergency lights
Summary of this case from State v. ScottOpinion
Def. I.D. No. 0002005366
Submitted: June 26, 2001
Donald Bucklin, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice.
John M. Sandy, Esquire, Stumpf, Vickers Sandy
Dear Counsel:
This is an appeal by the State of Delaware ("State") of the January 2, 2001 decision of the Court of Common Pleas granting defendant Franklin Roberts' ("Roberts") motion to suppress evidence based on an improper stop that resulted in Roberts' arrest.
After the ruling, the State declared that the suppressed evidence was essential to its case and that it could not proceed without it. The State asserted its intention to appeal, and the appeal was certified in open court in accordance with 10 Del. C. § 9902(b) and (c). The trial court dismissed the complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the trial court's ruling is affirmed.
These sections read:
(b) When any order is entered before a trial in any court suppressing or excluding substantial and material evidence, the court, upon certification by the Attorney General that the evidence is essential to the prosecution of the case, shall dismiss the complaint, indictment or information or any count thereof to the proof of which the evidence suppressed or excluded is essential. Upon ordering the complaint, indictment or information or any count thereof dismissed pursuant to the Attorney General's certification, the reasons of the dismissal shall be set forth in the order entered upon the record.
(c) The State shall have an absolute right of appeal to an appellate court from an order entered pursuant to subsection (b) of this section and if the appellate court upon review of the order suppressing evidence shall reverse the dismissal, the defendant may be subjected to trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
While on routine patrol at approximately 1:30 a.m. on February 3, 2000, Trooper Deborah Jester of the Delaware State Police ("Trooper Jester") noticed Roberts' car stopped alongside of northbound highway Route 13 and pulled up behind the car to offer any needed assistance to the occupant of the car. Trooper Jester testified that Roberts' car lights were on, that the car was simply idling on the shoulder of the highway, and that the car had not been parked there as she passed by that spot several moments earlier. As it was evening and the area was not illuminated, Trooper Jester turned on several of the patrol car's lights, including the flashing emergency lights. After approaching Roberts' vehicle, she began to suspect Roberts was intoxicated. Roberts was subsequently charged with Driving Under the Influence in violation of 21 Del. C. § 4177(a).
The exact configuration and types of lights on a Delaware state police car could not be ascertained from the record. However, it is clear that in addition to the patrol car's headlights and taillights being on, "the lights normally associate[d] with being stopped by a police officer" were activated. Trooper Jester was unsure of whether her "takedown light," which she described as "basically a big spotlight," was illuminated.
At the suppression hearing, Trooper Jester was not sure whether she activated the lights before or after she stopped her patrol car, but for the purposes of the analysis of the stop the distinction is not important.
Trooper Jester testified that at the time she approached the vehicle she had no reason to believe any violations of the law had occurred. The sole question before this Court, therefore, is whether the activation of the emergency lights constituted an improper seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. An improper seizure has occurred if there is neither probable cause nor reasonable articulable suspicion to provide the grounds for a seizure. Downs v. State, Del. Supr., 570 A.2d 1142, 1145 (1990).
DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review
The applicable standard of review for appeals from the Court of Common Pleas to the Superior Court is de novo for legal determinations and "clearly erroneous" for findings of fact. State v. High, Del. Super., C.A. No. 90-09-0243, Toliver, J. (Mar. 7, 1995) (Mem. Op.) at 3. If the factual findings of the court below are "sufficiently supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive process, they must be accepted notwithstanding the fact that the Superior Court may have reached opposite conclusions." Id. B. Applicable Law
"On a motion to suppress, the Defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged search or seizure violated his Fourth Amendment rights." State v. Thomason, Del. Super., No. IN92-07-0022-0025, Goldstein, J., (March 14, 1994) (Order) at 5. See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 n. 1 (1978). The Supreme Court of the United States has defined a police seizure as "a show of authority" which goads the defendant to an intended stop. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625 (1991); Terri v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n. 16 (1968).
In the case before the Court, Roberts argues that the activation of the officer's flashing emergency lights constituted a seizure, since he was not free to leave. The State argues that the officer had no intention of arresting Roberts since the stop was purely a caretaker stop. The State argues, rather, that the activation of the lights did not amount to a stop since the officer only activated them to alert the driver of the parked car that there was a police officer behind him and to add to the safety of the officer. The State counters that a balancing approach of the individual's rights and the safety of the officer performing a community caretaking role should weigh in the favor of protecting the officer, since officers have a dual role as investigators of crimes and community caretakers.
The statute, 21 Del. C. § 4103(b), which makes it a violation to not stop for a police command reads in part:
(b) Any driver who, having received a visual or audible signal from a police officer identifiable by uniform, by motor vehicle or by a clearly discernible police signal to bring the driver's vehicle to a stop, operates the vehicle in disregard of the signal or interferes with or endangers the operation of the police vehicle or who increases speed or extinguishes the vehicle's lights and attempts to flee or elude the police officer shall be fined for the first offense . . . or imprisoned . . . or both.
To repeat, the primary inquiry is whether using flashing emergency lights in this manner is a sufficient show of authority indicative of a seizure. Delaware law establishes that it is.
As explained in State v. Arterbridge, Del. Super., Cr. A. Nos. 94-08-0845-0846, Barron, J., (Dec. 7, 1995) (Mem. Op.), the Court examined whether a defendant was seized while seated in a stopped vehicle. The Court stated at pages 7-8:
An officer effects a "seizure" only when the officer restricts the liberty of a citizen by some show of authority or by means of physical force. [Citation omitted.] Such police conduct must convey to a reasonable person that he or she is not free to leave. [Citations omitted.] The Court makes this decision by objectively viewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the incident at that time. [Citation omitted.]
The Court must consider whether patrolman Robinson displayed his power under the facts of this case in any manner that caused the defendant to yield to his control. Such methods include: blocking the defendant's vehicle from leaving, flashing emergency lights, or several officers surrounding the vehicle. [Citations and footnotes omitted.] If the officer employed any of the above means, then a seizure occurred under the Fourth Amendment. The officer would then need to justify seizing the defendant. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, the Court considered the use of flashing emergency lights to constitute objective evidence of a seizure.
In State v. Quarles, Del. Super., Cr.A. Nos. IN95-09-0677, et seq., Alford, J., (December 16, 1996) at 5-6, this Court, citing to State v. Arterbridge, supra, once again noted:
Factors which are indicative of a show of authority include blocking a defendant from leaving, flashing emergency lights, or several officers surrounding a defendant. Where any of the aforementioned means are employed a seizure occurs under the Fourth Amendment. [Citations omitted and emphasis added.]
Similarly, in State v. Thomason, Del. Super., Cr.A. Nos. IN92-07-0022-0025, Goldstein, J. (March 14, 1994), the Court noted that in determining if a seizure implicating the Fourth Amendment has occurred, the Court must examine the circumstances surrounding the incident, and factors which may be considered include the display of emergency lights.
In this case, Roberts would have been in violation of the law had he left once the officer activated the emergency lights. Thus, under these circumstances and following the law as set forth above, Roberts was seized once Trooper Jester activated her emergency lights.
The State argues that the court below should have employed the community caretaking functions doctrine, and, in doing so, should have found that there was not a seizure. The use of this doctrine would allow for the Court to conclude that there was no seizure; instead, the officer, in performing her job, was merely assisting a disabled motorist.
The courts of this state have not employed this doctrine where objective evidence establishes a seizure and where there is no objective evidence that the seized person was in need of police assistance. See State v. Arterbridge, supra; State v. Quarles, supra; State v. Thomason, supra. See also Barrett v. Commonwealth, Va. Supr., 462 S.E.2d 109 (1995) (Virginia Supreme Court declined to apply the doctrine where there was no objective evidence the driver needed police assistance). Thus, this is not a situation where the doctrine should apply.
The prevailing law of this state mandates the conclusion that I have reached in this case. The decision of the Court below was legally correct.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Common Pleas suppressing evidence acquired from Trooper Jester's stop of Roberts' vehicle must be upheld.
IT IS SO ORDERED.