Opinion
Def. ID# 87S00607DI
Date Submitted: November 16, 2000.
Date Filed: December 13, 2000.
Dear Mr. Bodkins:
Pending before the Court is the motion of defendant Allen R. Bodkins ("defendant") for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61"). Relief is denied for the reasons set forth below.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 14, 1987, defendant was indicted on charges of burglary in the second degree; attempted unlawful sexual intercourse in the first degree; and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony. On October 20, 1987, defendant pled guilty to the charge of attempted unlawful sexual intercourse in the first degree; the State of Delaware ("the State") nolle prossed the remaining charges. On March 31, 1988, defendant was sentenced, effective July 5, 1987, to imprisonment for the balance of his natural life.
In a motion dated February 21, 1990, defendant sought postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 61. Defendant asserted trial counsel was ineffective as the ground for relief. More specifically, he alleged trial counsel duped him into signing a plea agreement by means of mental coercion. By letter dated April 18, 1990, the Court denied the motion, ruling that a review of the plea colloquy established defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea.
Defendant filed an appeal therefrom. However, the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal because he failed to file proof of service of the notice of appeal upon the State. Bodkins v. State, Del. Supr., No. 162, 1990, Christie, C.J. (June 6, 1990).
Defendant filed with this Court, on January 7, 1992, a letter which the Court interpreted as a motion to withdraw defendant's guilty plea. In a letter dated January 14, 1992, the Court denied the motion because it was filed more than four years from the date of the plea and because defendant did not set forth any compelling reasons why he should be allowed to withdraw the plea.
On October 6, 2000, defendant filed another motion for reduction of sentence. In a letter dated October 18, 2000, the Court denied the motion because it was untimely filed and stated as follows:
A review of the plea colloquy shows that you voluntarily entered your guilty plea and that you fully understood the Court proceedings that day.
On November 8, 2000, defendant filed the pending Rule 61 motion. In that motion, he asserts several grounds for relief. They are that his plea was coerced; there was no witness present in Court; he was on medication which prevented him from knowing what he was doing; and his trial counsel was ineffective in that trial counsel knew defendant was not "in the right sense of mind but he kept on going".
DISCUSSION
The Court does not examine the merits of a Rule 61 motion unless the motion meets the procedural requisites of the rule. Consequently, I set forth below the applicable provisions of Rule 61 pertaining to procedural bars.
(i) Bars to relief. (1) Time limitation. A motion for postconviction relief may not be filed more than three years after the judgment of conviction is final or, if it asserts a retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of conviction is final, more than three years after the right is first recognized by the Supreme Court of Delaware or by the United States Supreme Court.
(2) Repetitive motion. Any ground for relief that was not asserted in a prior postconviction proceeding, as required by subdivision (b)(2) of this rule, is thereafter barred, unless consideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice.
(3) Procedural default. Any ground for relief that was not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, as required by the rules of this court, is thereafter barred, unless the movant shows:
(A) Cause for relief from the procedural default and
(B) Prejudice from violation of the movant's rights.
(4) Former adjudication. Any ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is thereafter barred, unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice.
(5) Bars inapplicable. The bars to relief in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of this subdivision shall not apply to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction.
The procedural bars preclude a consideration of defendant's motion. First, the motion is time-barred because it was not filed within three years of the date of his conviction. Rule 61(i)(1) Bover v. State, Del. Supr., 562 A.2d 1186 (1989). Furthermore, the claims are barred because they are repetitive. Rule 61(i)(2). The claims also are barred because these grounds for relief were not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, and defendant has not made any attempt to show cause for relief from the procedural default and prejudice from violation of the defendant's rights. Defendant has failed to show that the bars of Rule 61(i)(1), (2) and (3) might not apply either because the Court lacked jurisdiction or because he has a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because o: a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction. Rule 61(i)(5). Finally, these claims are barred because they have been formally adjudicated and defendant has not asserted any reason why they bear reconsideration in the interest of justice. Rule 61(i)(4).
Because these claims are procedurally barred, I summarily dismiss them.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's postconviction relief motion is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours, Richard F. Stokes
cc: Prothonotary's Office Department of Justice Karl Haller, Esquire