Opinion
ID No. 0011005284
Submitted: July 5, 2001
Decided: November 30, 2001
Donald Roberts, Esquire Department of Justice
Dear Counsel:
The Court has before it defendant's motion to suppress a statement provided by the defendant on November 6, 2000 while in the custody of the Newark Police Department. A copy of the videotaped interview was provided to the Court and the parties agree the video accurately depicted what occurred on November 6, 2000 and additional evidence was not necessary to decide the motion. For the reasons that follow, the defendant's motion is denied.
The Court found the affidavit of Lieutenant Poley was not relevant to the issues in this motion and thus it was not considered in making this ruling.
The arrest affidavit in the Court's file reflects on November 6, 2000 the Newark Police responded to an apartment at 249 E. Main Street when neighbors reported hearing a female voice yelling for help. Upon entering the apartment, the police found the defendant wearing only underwear and the victim indicated that the defendant had attempted sexual advances. The defendant was placed under arrest and subsequently charged with Attempted Rape First Degree, Unlawful Imprisonment Second Degree, Assault Third Degree, Criminal Trespass Second Degree and Unlawful Sexual Contact Third Degree.
The defendant was indicted on December 4, 2000 for similar offenses except the Unlawful Sexual Contact was raised to First Degree.
After being transported to Newark Police Department headquarters, the defendant was placed in an interview room and was subsequently interviewed by Officer Corcoran. At the initial stages of the interview and prior to any substantive questioning of the defendant, Officer Corcoran reviewed with the defendant his rights as set forth in Miranda. What did not occur after those rights were reviewed with the defendant was a specific waiver of those rights by the defendant nor a specific affirmation of his willingness to speak with the officer understanding the rights he would be waiving. It is the lack of a verbalized waiver that now forms the basis of the defendant's motion.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Whether a defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights is not determined by the application of specific language by the officer or the use of a formalized form. Instead the Court is required to review the totality of the circumstances under which the rights were given to determine if the State has met its burden of establishing a valid and knowing waiver by the defendant.
Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 1185, 1195 (1992).
This judicial inquiry has been explained by the Delaware Supreme Court as a two part inquiry:
First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the "totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation" reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.
Marine at 1195-1196(quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986)).
The first part of the above inquiry is uncontested. There is no claim, nor is one evident in the videotape, of any intimidation, coercion or deception by the officer. If anything, it is the officer's frankness in answering the defendant's questions immediately after reading his Miranda rights that appears to have diverted the officer's attention to obtaining a formal waiver. But in any event, the interview was professionally conducted.
The second inquiry focuses on the issue at hand i.e. was there an uncoerced choice with the requisite level of comprehension to establish a waiver. There are several factors that lead to the Court's determination that these prerequisites have been met. First, after each right stated by the officer, there is an affirmative acknowledgment by the defendant of his understanding of that right. Second, while the defendant is not a native citizen, he is an intelligent individual, educated at the University of Delaware with some obvious appreciation of the criminal justice system. He questions the officer about his arrest status, the nature of the charges, the failure of the officer to give him Miranda warnings at the scene and consistently throughout the interview questions the officer as to the basis of his detention. Mr. Afeworki was not a shrinking violet frozen by the intimidation of an experienced officer. Instead he was an active participant in the interview questioning many of the assertions made by the officer. Third, during the interview the defendant acknowledged that he was voluntarily speaking with the officer by stating "I'm willing to talk with you" and there is no indication throughout the tape of any hesitation or reluctance by the defendant to participate in the interview. Finally, at the end of the tape the defendant affirmatively acknowledges that the officer provided the Miranda warnings and his understanding of those rights by exercising them. The defendant stated "you told me my rights, you told me I have the right to remain silent" and then after inquiring of the officer how long they had been talking stated "that is enough" and terminated the interview.
When the Court reviews all of these facts together, it is confident that the defendant was not only advised of his Miranda rights but that he understood these rights and voluntarily decided to participate in the interview in full appreciation of the constitutional rights available to him. The technical failure of the officer to obtain a verbal waiver is not a critical flaw that alone requires the Court to suppress the statement. Therefore, the defendant's motion to suppress is hereby DENIED.
Sincerely yours,
Judge William C. Carpenter, Jr.