We recite only the facts pertinent to an understanding of the present appeal. In re MCA, Inc., Shareholders Litig., Del. Ch., 598 A.2d 687 (1991) (MCA I); In Re MCA, Inc., Shareholders Litig., Del. Ch., 1993 WL 43024 (Feb. 16, 1993) (MCA II); aff'd, Del. Supr., 633 A.2d 370 (1993); Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 9th Cir., 50 F.3d 644 (1995) ( Epstein I), rev'd, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996); Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 9th Cir., 126 F.3d 1235 (1997) ( Epstein II), withdrawn and superseded on rehearing by Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 9th Cir., 179 F.3d 641 (1999) ( Epstein III), cert. denied 528 U.S. 1004 (1999); In re MCA, Inc. Shareholders Litig., Del. Ch., 774 A.2d 272 (2001). On September 25, 1990, The Wall Street Journal reported that Matsushita Electric Industrial Company ("Matsushita"), was negotiating a potential acquisition of MCA, Inc. ("MCA").

Nor has he made an attempt to justify an order allowing him to intervene, pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 24, in order to challenge the Bradley litigation settlement assuming, arguendo, that this Court had the authority to grant such relief (which it does not).See In re MCA, Inc. S'holders Litig., 774 A.2d 272, 276-78 (Del. Ch. 2000) (denying motion to intervene in order to challenge settlement approved by the court seven years prior to the attempted intervention). Second, to the extent the proposed amendment is grounded in the Court's authority to provide relief from judgment under Court of Chancery Rule 60(b), Plaintiff has failed to set forth any basis upon which this Court could provide relief from a judgment entered by the Superior Court.

Id. at *9. Id. at *9-10; see also In re MCA, Inc., 774 A.2d 272, 278 (Del. Ch. 2000) (rejecting a belated Rule 60(b) motion where the movant "could have moved to vacate" promptly in Delaware but chose "for purely strategic reasons, to pursue a collateral attack in federal court"), aff'd sub nom. MCA, Inc. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 785 A.2d 625 (Del. 2001).

The Court will only grant relief if Defendants prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence.Mullin v. Ascetta, 2021 WL 5710899, at *4 (Del. Super. Dec. 2, 2021) (quoting In re MCA, Inc., 774 A.2d 272, 280 (Del. Ch. 2000)) (internal quotations omitted). Id.; see Smith v. Williams, 2007 WL 2193748, at *1 (Del. Super. July 27, 2007) ("Thus 'fraud on the court' is typically confined to the more serious, but fortunately rare, cases involving a corruption of the judicial process itself, such as bribery of a judge or juror, improper influence exerted on the court by an attorney, or involvement of an attorney as an officer of the court in the perpetuation of fraud.").

Credit Lyonnais, 1996 WL 757274, at *1. In re MCA, Inc., 774 A.2d 272, 280 (Del. Ch. 2000) (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2870, at 418-19 (1995)). Id. at 280.

Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 60(b)(3).In re MCA, Inc., 774 A.2d 272, 280 (Del. Ch. 2000)).Id.

See Great Am. Leasing Corp., 2003 WL 22389464, at *1. See, e.g., id. (finding nine-month delay untimely under Rule 24); CAPM Corp. v. Protegrity, Inc., 2001 WL 1360122, at *10-11 (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 2001) (finding four-month delay untimely under Rule 24); see also In re MCA, Inc., 774 A.2d 272, 276-78 (Del. Ch. 2000) (finding seven-year delay untimely under Rule 24), aff'd sub nom. MCA, Inc. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 785 A.2d 625 (Del. 2001). When analyzing a delay under Rule 24, "[a] key factor is whether the potential intervenor 'was in a position to seek intervention at an earlier stage in the case.'"

Defendants submit that despite the parties' and the Court's lack of focus on the statute of limitations issue, the Court's holding necessarily implies that the statute of limitations has run. RGC Int'l Investors, LDC v. Greka Energy Corp., 2001 WL 312454, at *8 n.34 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 2001) (quoting In re MCA, Inc., 774 A.2d 272, 279 n.25 (Del. Ch. 2000)). Defendants' argument must be rejected because the vesting of a right under a contract and the accrual of a claim for statute of limitations purposes are not inextricably tied together. Although the June 30 Decision interchangeably uses the words "vest" and "accrue," as well as "right" and "cause of action," no matter the word choice, the Court was only making one determination, i.e., when Branin's contingent contractual right was confirmed.

Furthermore, the claim in the present case is in the form of an independent action for relief based on fraud upon the court, which is not a Rule 60(b) motion, as it based on the inherent power of the court not on the text of a rule. .774 A.2d 272 (Del.Ch.2000). In MCA, a shareholders' class action suit arising from the acquisition of a corporation was filed in Delaware.