A general rule applicable to other types of civil proceedings is that an adjudication by a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties is final and conclusive not only as to the matters actually determined but also as to every other matter which the parties might have litigated as an incident thereto, though not actually litigated and adjudicated. Re: Settlement of the Estate of Frederick F. McIntosh, Sr., 144 W. Va. 583, pt. 1 syl., 109 S.E.2d 153; In Re: The Estate of Amanda Nicholas, 144 W. Va. 116, pt. 1 syl., 107 S.E.2d 53. Perhaps in time, by statutory enactment or by appellate court decision, there may be devised some means of curtailing the seemingly endless succession of habeas corpus proceedings a prisoner may maintain, generally at public expense, with the consequent great burden imposed upon courts and upon members of the bar who are appointed by courts to represent indigent prisoners in such proceedings. The record discloses clearly that no timely application was made by or in behalf of the relator for a transcript of the proceedings of his criminal trial for appellate purposes.

197, pt. 5 syl., 80 S.E. 121; Pomeroy National Bank v. Huntington National Bank, 72 W. Va. 534, pt. 2 syl., 79 S.E. 662; Biern et al. v. Ray et al., 49 W. Va. 129, 38 S.E. 530; Sayre's Admr. v. Harpold et al., 33 W. Va. 553, pt. 1 syl., 11 S.E. 16; McCoy v. McCoy, Admr., etc., 29 W. Va. 794, 2 S.E. 809; Corruthers et al. v. Sargent et al., 20 W. Va. 351, pt. 1 syl.; Stores Building Corporation v. Conover et al., 204 Va. 457, 132 S.E.2d 458; 50 C.J.S., Judgments, Section 593b, page 13, and Section 657, page 102. Where in both actions, the parties are the same or in privity, and the causes of action are the same, an adjudication in the former action by a court having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter is final and conclusive as to matters actually determined and also as to other matters which the parties, under the pleadings, might properly have litigated. State ex rel. Queen v. Sawyers, 148 W. Va. 130, 135, 133 S.E.2d 257, 261; Re: Settlement of Estate of McIntosh, Sr., 144 W. Va. 583, pt. 1 syl., 109 S.E.2d 153; In Re: Estate of Nicholas, Deceased, 144 W. Va. 116, pt. 1 syl., 107 S.E.2d 53, 82 A.L.R.2d 868; Alderson v. Horse Creek Coal Land Co. et al., 81 W. Va. 411, pt. 1 syl., 94 S.E. 716; Sayre's Admr. v. Harpold, 33 W. Va. 553, pt. 1 syl., 11 S.E. 16. "More than one right of action may arise between the same persons, respecting one and the same thing or transaction." Findley v. Coal Coke Railway Co., 76 W. Va. 747, 751, 87 S.E. 198, 200.

The defendants contend that the adjudications of the circuit court in the two delinquent tax suits are final and conclusive as to the "forfeiture" of the two blocks of real estate in question, their irredeemability, and the right of the state to sell; and that such final adjudications by the trial court are conclusive and binding, not only as to matters actually adjudicated but as to all other matters which might properly have been litigated in such suits. In that connection the defendants rely on a well settled principle of law stated in State ex rel. Queen et al. v. Sawyers, 148 W. Va. 130, 133 S.E.2d 257, 261; In re Settlement of the Estate of Frederick F. McIntosh, Sr., 144 W. Va. 583, pt. 1 syl., 109 S.E.2d 153; In re: The Estate of Amanda Nicholas, Deceased, 144 W. Va. 116, pt. 1 syl., 107 S.E.2d 53. We cannot perceive wherein that legal principle is applicable.

The findings of fact by a commissioner of accounts, approved by the county court and upheld by the circuit court, will not be disturbed by this court unless against the preponderance of the evidence or plainly wrong. In re McIntosh's Estate, 144 W. Va. 583, pt. 2 syl., 109 S.E.2d 153; In re: Estate of H. B. Hauer, 135 W. Va. 488, pt. 1 syl., 63 S.E.2d 853. See also Fields v. West, 83 W. Va. 128, pt. 3 syl., 97 S.E. 597; Dearing v. Selvey, 50 W. Va. 4, pt. 1 syl., 40 S.E. 478; Leach v. Buckner, 19 W. Va. 36, pt. 1 syl. Conversely, of course, such a finding will be reversed if against the preponderance of the evidence or plainly wrong.

Richey at Syl. Pt. 4 (citing Syl. Pt. 1, Sayre's Adm'r v. Harpold, 11 S.E. 16 (W. Va. 1890); Syl. Pt. 1, In re McIntosh's Estate, 109 S.E.2d 153 (W. Va. 1959); Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources v. Cline, 406 S.E.2d 749 (W. Va. 1991)). This holding compels the opposite conclusion from the dicta in Jordache: that a West Virginia trial court decision pending appeal is nevertheless a final judgment for res judicata and collateral estoppel purposes.

Res judicata generally applies when there is a final judgment on the merits which precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were decided or the issues that could have been decided in the earlier action. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 414, 66 L.Ed.2d 308, 313 (1980); In re Mcintosh's Estate, 144 W. Va. 583, 109 S.E.2d 153 (1959). A claim is barred by res judicata when the prior action involves identical claims and the same parties or their privies.

An adjudication by a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties is final and conclusive . . . It is not essential that the matter should have been formally put in issue in a former suit, but it is sufficient that the status of the suit was such that the parties might have had the matter disposed of on its merits.In re McIntosh's Estate, 144 W. Va. 583, 109 S.E.2d 153, 158 (1959) (quoting Sayre's Adm'r v. Harpold, 33 W. Va. 553, 11 S.E. 16 (1890) (emphasis in original)). McIntosh's Estate holds that a matter is barred only if the first adjudication could validly decide the case on the merits.

The court found that because Chalifoux’s claim for damages "could have been asserted and litigated" in the injunctive action, it was barred by res judicata. The court observed that the damages Chalifoux asserted in the instant action were "raised and discussed, though no formal cause of action … was brought" in the injunctive action and concluded that such a claim was barred because res judicata applies not only to matters " ‘actually determined, but as to every other matter which the parties might have litigated as incident thereto[.]’ " (citing Syl. Pt. 1, In re Est. of McIntosh, 144 W. Va. 583, 109 S.E.2d 153 (1959)). This appeal of both the 2018 and 2021 orders followed.

Syl. Pt. 3, in part, Downing, 193 W.Va. at 78, 454 S.E.2d 372 (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, In re McIntosh's Estate, 144 W.Va. 583, 109 S.E.2d 153 (1959)). Petitioner appealed the family court's orders in the parties' divorce case, and the family court's orders were upheld.

Syllabus point one of Sayre's has been carried forward to the present day, without change, since its formulation 131 years ago. Syl. Pt. 1, In re Estate of McIntosh , 144 W. Va. 583, 109 S.E.2d 153 (1959) ; Syl. Pt. 1, Conley , 171 W. Va. at 586, 301 S.E.2d at 217 ; Syl. Pt. 3, Slider v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 210 W. Va. 476, 557 S.E.2d 883 (2001) ; Syl. Pt. 4, Lloyd's, Inc. v. Lloyd , 225 W. Va. 377, 693 S.E.2d 451 (2010) ; Syl. Pt. 2, Bison , ––– W. Va. at ––––, 854 S.E.2d at 213–14. We note that the final sentence of the syllabus point in Sayre's , "[a]n erroneous ruling of the court will not prevent the matter from being res judicata [,]" was dicta, because in Sayre's and every successive case, either the relevant ruling in the first case was not appealed (Sayre's , Conley , Lloyd's , Bison ), the first case was settled (McIntosh ), or there was no prior ruling from the first case at issue in the second (Slider ).