Opinion
C.A.No. 00A-05-007-JOH
Argued: February 27, 2002 Submitted: March 5, 2002
Decided: March 20, 2002
Appellee's Application for Attorney's Fees — GRANTED
J. R. Julian, Esq., J. R. Julian, P.A., Wilmington, DE.
Michael I. Silverman, Esq., Silverman McDonald, Wilmington, DE.
Counsel:
In this workers' compensation dispute, Bell Atlantic requested the Court to conduct a hearing on James Hall's application for attorney's fees. Bell Atlantic is entitled to such a hearing and it was held on February 22, 2002. In addition to Hall's prior fee submission, a supplement has been provided reflecting time spent in preparing for and attending the hearing.
General Motors Corp. v. Cox, 304 A.2d 55 (Del.Supr. 1973).
When considering what are reasonable counsel fees to be awarded, the Court has a list of criteria to weigh:
"[R]easonable counsel fees should be evaluated upon the basis of the factors and formula set forth in the Delaware Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility, DR. 2-106(B) as follows:
"`. . . Factors to be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
"`(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
"`(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
"`(3) The fees customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
"`(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
"`(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
"`(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
"`(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
"`(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.'"
Id. at 57 citing Husband S. v. Wife S., 294 A.2d 89, 93 (Del. 1972).
In addition, the Court must examine the employer's ability to pay. Counsel applying for fees must do so by affidavit and indicate any other sources of payment.
Id.
Hall's counsel has fulfilled that obligation. He originally sought $14,152.50 representing 62.9 hours at $225 per hour. The additional time reflected in the latest affidavit is 5.1 hours.
Bell Atlantic's dispute with the fee application is severalfold. One, no dates for the services were identified; two, it was not identified w ho did the work which was itemized; three, various services are separated which should be bundled; and four, counsel's hourly rate is too high.
DISCUSSION
1. Time spent, novelty and difficulty issues and skill of practitioner. While this Court has rendered two separate opinions involving these parties, Hall's counsel seeks fees only for the first. That decision was appealed and this Court's opinion was affirmed. In short, Hall succeeded in both courts. There were no novel or difficult issues in this matter. Nevertheless, the time spent on the matter in this Court and the briefing in the Supreme Court, 62.9 hours, is not excessive. Hall's counsel has been practicing law for over eleven years and has devoted much of that time to personal injury work in this Court and to workers' compensation cases. All the time listed was spent by Hall's counsel. He does not seek reimbursement for any other persons or for any expenses. The Court does not find, in this case, a problem with counsel not specifying the dates the services were performed.
Bell Atlantic-Delaware, Inc. v. Hall, Del.Super., C.A. No. 00A-05-007, Herlihy, J. (February 5, 2001).
Bell Atlantic-Delaware, Inc. v. Hall, Del.Supr., No. 107, 2001 (August 9, 2001).
DiGiacomo v. Bd. of Public Education, 507 A.2d 542 (Del.Supr. 1986).
2. Fees customarily charged. Counsel seeks an hourly rate of $225. The range of fee awards over a decade approved by this Court go from $150 per hour in 1990 to $200 per hour in 1996 to $300 per hour in 1998. Bell Atlantic has provided the Court with another fee application reflecting different time spent and an hourly rate ($200). The Court does not find Hall's counsel's fees to be unreasonable and an hourly rate of $225 is awarded.
Riley Stoker Co. v. Cirasole, Del.Super., C.A. No. 89A-JA-1, Barron J. (April 3 1990).
Pollard v. The Placers, Inc., Del.Super., C.A. No. 95A-09, 021, Cooch, J. (August 9, 1996).
Kelley v. ILC of Dover, Inc., Del.Super., C.A. No. 97A-03-004, Ridgely, P.J. (December 1, 1998).
3. Amount of fee and result obtained. Counsel seeks $15,300 (68 hours, including hearing preparation and attendance time x $225 per hour). He succeeded before the Board, in this Court and again before the Supreme Court. The time spent w as worth it to his client.
4. Experience and reputation of counsel. Counsel has been practicing law for over eleven years, as previously noted. He has developed expertise in the personal injury field and a fine reputation.
5. Other compensation. Counsel does not seek any other fee, such as contingent success fee. There has been no other remuneration.
6. Employer's ability to pay. There is no doubt or issue about Bell Atlantic's ability to pay.
7. Other factors. The Court has carefully examined counsel's application. While some of the items could be "bundled," as Bell Atlantic contends, their separation does not equate to inflating time spent. The major blocks of time relate to the briefs in this Court and the Supreme Court, whether preparing Hall's or reviewing Bell Atlantic's. The additional time in connection with the fee hearing is appropriate. Counsel came prepared with cases and was prepared in his argument.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, the Court finds that the time listed in the original application of 62.9 hours and the 5.1 hours in the supplemental application are appropriate. The Court awards counsel $15,300 in fees. Accordingly, the James H all's application for attorney's fees is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.