Before embarking on a review of the SRO's determinations, it must be acknowledged that the SRO's 33–page, single-spaced opinion carefully and exhaustively addresses Plaintiff's claims, and is fully “deserving [of] the ordinary level of deference granted to such final state administrative decisions.” R.B. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 15 F.Supp.3d 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (citing K.L. ex rel. M.L. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 530 Fed.Appx. 81, 85 (2d Cir.2013)), aff'd,589 Fed.Appx. 572 (2d Cir.2014). “In determining whether an IEP complies with the IDEA, courts make a two-part inquiry that is, first, procedural, and second, substantive.

Because the Court concludes that Brewster offered M. a FAPE for 2013–14, it need not reach Plaintiffs' claim regarding the appropriateness of their unilateral private school placement. R.B. v. New York City Dep't. of Educ., 15 F.Supp.3d 421, 437 (S.D.N.Y.2014) ; see also SRO Decision at 28. “Regardless of the adequacy of that [private] school, the [Defendant] need not reimburse Plaintiffs for tuition.”

Following an independent review, the Court finds, as did the IHO and SRO, “that the IEP was procedurally adequate.” R.B. v. New York City Dep't. of Educ., 15 F.Supp.3d 421, 434 (S.D.N.Y.2014) ; T.G. ex rel. R.P. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 973 F.Supp.2d 320, 342 (S.D.N.Y.2013). “[A]ny deficiencies ... did not impede [S.'s] right to a FAPE, did not significantly impede the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision-making process, and did not cause a deprivation of educational benefits,” D.A.B. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 973 F.Supp.2d 344, 361 (S.D.N.Y.2013).

Unsatisfied with those IEPs, the Parents enrolled D.B. in a private school that specializes in educating children with autism and commenced a state administrative proceeding before an Impartial Hearing Officer ("IHO"), seeking tuition reimbursement pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C). The Parents previously (but unsuccessfully) have sought reimbursement every year since 2009. See, e.g., R.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 15 F. Supp. 3d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff'd sub nom. R.B. ex rel. D.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 603 F. App'x 36, 38-40 (2d Cir. 2015) (affirming decision of SRO for 2011-2012 school year). The IHO held a hearing over six days in October and November 2014. On January 23, 2015, the IHO found that IEPs for both school years were insufficient because (1) the recommended vocational and transition services were deficient; (2) the Department did not give the Parents the requisite written notice for the 2013-2014 year, (3) the long-term and short-term goals specified in the IEPs were insufficiently measurable, (4) the IEPs were impermissibly predetermined, (5) the recommended classroom student to educator ratio would not allow D.B. to progress in social interactions, (6) the teaching methodology in such classrooms would be ineffective for D.B., and (7) the recommended school sites were ill-equipped to execute the IEPs' requirements. The IHO found that the Parents cooperated with the Department throughout the IEP development pr

See R.B. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., 15 F.Supp.3d 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (rejecting “[t]he bulk of Plaintiffs' arguments regarding the inadequacy of the SRO decision, [which] are either conclusory or coterminous with their other arguments.”). In any event, and as SRO II explained, the May and June 2018 CSEs had access to D.P.'s Aimsweb scores as to math and only had access to D.P.'s Lexile scores in the Read 180 program - not any Aimsweb reading scores, (SRO II Decision at 13) - as well as the information contained in Markey-Jones's teacher reports, (see id. at 16-17), and the resulting June 2018 IEP accurately reflected D.P.'s reading and writing abilities as shown in those materials, (id. at 18).

To the extent that Cruz challenges the actual capability of the D75 Horan School to implement the IEPs, the Court defers to the SRO's well-reasoned and particularly thorough decision, which relied on testimony from DOE witnesses that the D75 Horan School could have implemented the IEPs as written. SRO Dec. at 35-41; see J.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 95 F.Supp.3d 592, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (courts generally should defer to well-reasoned decision of an SRO where the decisions of an IHO and an SRO conflict); R.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 15 F.Supp.3d 421, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (affirming well-reasoned decision of SRO which denied parent's prospective challenge regarding assigned public school's ability to implement IEP), aff'd, 603 Fed.Appx. 36 (2d Cir. 2015). Thus, the DOE did not deny the Student a FAPE in the 2020-2021 and 2021-2022 school years.

The Court is skeptical because “the late issuance of the SRO Decision” does not necessarily “impact . . . the substantive recommendations of the IEP or the parent's ability to participate in the IEP process.” R.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 15 F.Supp.3d 421, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). What's more, Plaintiff provides no authority for the proposition that these other delays by the DOE excuse or justify her delay in filing a timely appeal.

Yet, in this instance, those failures do not rise to the level of a FAPE violation.See R.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 15 F.Supp.3d 421, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[T]he absence of one single measure should not itself render an IEP invalid, so long as the CSE team otherwise has sufficient information about the student to determine the student's educational needs.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

Notably, the Parents were unsuccessful in obtaining reimbursement for the 2011-2012 school year after both the administrative officers, the District Court, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found no denial of a FAPE. See R.B. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 15 F. Supp. 3d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff'd, 603 F. App'x 36 (2d Cir. 2015). The instant appeal concerns challenges to the IEPs for the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 school years.

Thus, the ALJ's delay was not a denial of a FAPE because the delay did not "result in the loss of educational opportunity, or seriously infringe the parents' opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process." L.M., 556 F.3d at 909; see R.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 15 F. Supp. 3d 421, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that "[e]ven if the tardiness of the [state agency] decision constituted a procedural violation . . . that procedural violation did not result in the denial of a FAPE" because "the late issuance of the [state agency] Decision could have no impact on the substantive recommendations of the IEP or the parent's ability to participate in the IEP process"). The Court notes that Plaintiff's second due process complaint was filed on September 3, 2013 and concerned parental participation in the creation of Student's IEP for the 2013-2014 academic year.