Opinion
Case No. EDCV 14-2009 JC
06-30-2015
ARACELI RAZO, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. SUMMARY
On September 26, 2014, plaintiff Araceli Razo ("plaintiff") filed a Complaint seeking review of the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of plaintiff's application for benefits. The parties have consented to proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, respectively ("Plaintiff's Motion") and ("Defendant's Motion"). The Court has taken both motions under submission without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15; October 2, 2014 Case Management Order ¶ 5.
Based on the record as a whole and the applicable law, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The findings of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") are supported by substantial evidence and are free from material error.
The harmless error rule applies to the review of administrative decisions regarding disability. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115-22 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
II. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
On January 24, 2011, plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits. (Administrative Record ("AR") 11, 162). Plaintiff asserted that she became disabled on January 4, 2010, due to lupus, anemia, high blood pressure, history of chronic DVT, pulmonary embolism. (AR 176). The ALJ examined the medical record and heard testimony from plaintiff (who was represented by counsel) and a vocational expert at hearings on August 2, 2012 and January 28, 2013. (AR 27-45). In addition, the ALJ considered the opinions of Dr. Samuel Landau, an impartial medical expert who reviewed the record medical evidence and answered interrogatories regarding plaintiff's abilities at the request of the ALJ. (AR 19, 525-34).
On February 7, 2013, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled through the date of the decision. (AR 11-22). Specifically, the ALJ found: (1) plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: morbid obesity, chronic thrombophlebitis of the lower extremities, chronic pain due to fibromyalgia, pulmonary embolism times two, systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE), mild iron deficiency anemia, and diabetes mellitus (AR 13-14); (2) plaintiff's impairments, considered singly or in combination, did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment (AR 14-15); (3) plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to perform light work (20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b)) with additional limitations (AR 15); (4) plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a medical biller (AR 21); and (5) plaintiff's allegations regarding her limitations were not entirely credible (AR 17).
The ALJ determined that plaintiff: (i) could occasionally lift and carry 20 pounds, and frequently lift and carry 10 pounds; (ii) could stand and walk for two hours in an eight-hour workday for no more than 15 to 30 minutes at a time; (iii) could sit without limitation as long as plaintiff takes normal breaks; (iv) must be able to elevate her feet six inches above floor level as needed for one to three minutes every hour; (v) could occasionally climb ramps and stairs; (vi) could occasionally stoop and bend, but could not squat, crawl, kneel, run, jump, or operate foot pedals or controls; (vii) could not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; (viii) would need an air conditioned environment with temperature control; (ix) needed to avoid work at heights or balancing, operation of heavy machinery, motorized vehicles, or unprotected machinery; and (x) "should not work or be responsible for safety of others." (AR 15). --------
The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's application for review. (AR 1).
III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Sequential Evaluation Process
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show that the claimant is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The impairment must render the claimant incapable of performing the work the claimant previously performed and incapable of performing any other substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)).
In assessing whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ is to follow a five-step sequential evaluation process:
(1) Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.Stout v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920); see also Molina, 674 F.3d at 1110 (same).
(2) Is the claimant's alleged impairment sufficiently severe to limit the claimant's ability to work? If not, the claimant is not disabled. If so, proceed to step three.
(3) Does the claimant's impairment, or combination of impairments, meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1? If so, the claimant is disabled. If not, proceed to step four.
(4) Does the claimant possess the residual functional capacity to perform claimant's past relevant work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.
(5) Does the claimant's residual functional capacity, when considered with the claimant's age, education, and work experience, allow the claimant to adjust to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.
The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four, and the Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five. Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098); see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (claimant carries initial burden of proving disability).
B. Standard of Review
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), a court may set aside a denial of benefits only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error. Robbins v. Social Security Administration, 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Flaten v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citations and quotations omitted). It is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882 (citing Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183 (9th Cir. 1990)).
To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, a court must "'consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner's] conclusion.'" Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993)). If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the ALJ's conclusion, a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882 (citing Flaten, 44 F.3d at 1457).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The ALJ's Evaluation of the Medical Evidence Is Free of Material Error
1. Pertinent Law
In Social Security cases, courts give varying degrees of deference to medical opinions depending on the type of physician who provided them, namely "treating physicians," "examining physicians," and "nonexamining physicians." Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted). A treating physician's opinion is generally given the most weight, and may be "controlling" if it is "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the claimant's] case record[.]" Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). An examining, but non-treating physician's opinion is entitled to less weight than a treating physician's, but more weight than a nonexamining physician's opinion. See id. (citation omitted).
A treating physician's opinion is not necessarily conclusive, however, as to a claimant's medical condition or disability. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). An ALJ may reject a treating physician's uncontroverted opinion by providing "clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record." Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Where a treating physician's opinion conflicts with another doctor's opinion, an ALJ may reject the treating opinion "by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence." Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 (citation and footnote omitted).
2. The ALJ's Evaluation of the Medical Expert's Opinions Is Free of Material Error
When asked to opine as to whether plaintiff met or equaled a listed impairment, Dr. Landau stated in his response to the ALJ's interrogatories, in part, "I could not find objective evidence in support of [plaintiff's fibromyalgia] diagnosis (such as 11/18 TTP's or 'widespread pain, above & below the waist, & axial pan.'" (AR 533). As plaintiff correctly notes, there is evidence in the record which contradicts Dr. Landau's statement - specifically, treatment notes from Dr. Christine Leehealey, one of plaintiff's treating physicians, which reflect that on objective testing plaintiff had tender points that could support a fibromyalgia diagnosis. (AR 381, 389-90). To the extent the ALJ erred in relying on Dr. Landau's opinions in concluding that plaintiff did not have a listing-level impairment, any such error was harmless. For example, although Dr. Landau said he "could not find objective evidence" supporting plaintiff's fibromyalgia diagnosis, the medical expert nonetheless concluded that "the records are consistent with a diagnosis of fibromyalgia," and based on that conclusion still opined that plaintiff's fibromyalgia did not meet or equal a listed impairment. (AR 533). Plaintiff does not plausibly show that due to such error the ALJ failed adequately to consider a listing that plausibly applies to plaintiff's case. See, e.g., Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 514 (9th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff must present plausible theory as to how an impairment or combination of impairments equals a listed impairment). Moreover, to the extent Dr. Landau, in fact, failed adequately to consider Dr. Leehealey's findings, plaintiff does not show that such findings reflect functional limitations beyond those already accounted for in the ALJ's residual functional capacity assessment for plaintiff.
Accordingly, a remand or reversal on this basis is not warranted.
3. The ALJ Properly Considered the Opinions of Plaintiff's Treating Rheumatologist
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed properly to consider the opinions expressed by plaintiff's treating rheumatologist, Dr. Andre Babajanians, in an August 14, 2012 Lupus Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire - i.e., that plaintiff's impairments and related limitations would generally prevent plaintiff from performing even sedentary work, and would specifically cause plaintiff to be absent from work possibly "[m]ore than four days per month" (collectively "Dr. Babajanians' Opinions"). (AR 507-12). The Court disagrees.
First, the Lupus Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire prepared by Dr. Babajanians contained only check-the-box opinions. (AR 507-12). As the ALJ noted, Dr. Babajanians' Opinions provided very little explanation of the evidence upon which Dr. Babajanians relied to conclude that plaintiff would likely be absent from work "[m]ore than four days per month" or to find the other noted significant physical limitations. The ALJ properly rejected Dr. Babajanians' Opinions on this basis alone. See, e.g., Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1996) ("ALJ [] permissibly rejected [medical evaluations] because they were check-off reports that did not contain any explanation of the bases of their conclusions."); De Guzman v. Astrue, 343 Fed. Appx. 201, 209 (9th Cir. 2009) (ALJ "is free to reject 'check-off reports that d[o] not contain any explanation of the bases of their conclusions.'") (citing id.); see also Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 501 (9th Cir. 1983) (expressing preference for individualized medical opinions over check-off reports).
Second, the ALJ also properly rejected Dr. Babajanians' Opinions, in part, because they were not supported by the physician's own notes or other objective medical evidence in the record as a whole. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005) ("The ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2003) (treating physician's opinion properly rejected where treating physician's treatment notes "provide no basis for the functional restrictions he opined should be imposed on [the claimant]"). For example, as the ALJ noted, plaintiff's treatment records prepared by Dr. Babajanians generally reflect that plaintiff "received routine, conservative, and non-emergency treatment since the alleged onset date." (AR 17; 412-27, 453, 466-68, 480-7, 500-06, 544, 546-47, 550-51, 558, 588-94, 596-98, 613-20, 647-56). Medical records for other physicians in Dr. Babajanians' same medical group document little more, and even specifically show that plaintiff was often instructed to continue on the same medication for her conditions, and return for follow up visits up to eight weeks later, and even on an "as needed" basis." (AR 392-93, 398-400, 403-14, 425-27, 429-65, 469-77, 474-79, 488-99, 542, 552-56, 559-71, 573-87, 599-612, 620-33, 635-47). While plaintiff suggests that the medical evidence actually supports Dr. Babajanians' Opinions (Plaintiff's Motion at 8), this Court will not second-guess the ALJ's reasonable determination to the contrary, even if the evidence could give rise to inferences more favorable to plaintiff. See Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882 (citation omitted).
Third, the ALJ also properly rejected Dr. Babajanians' Opinions to the extent they did not meet the durational requirement - i.e., they "[did] not establish an inability to perform work activity for any twelve month period of time." (AR 16) (citing, inter alia, Exhibit 12F [AR 464]); see 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Burch, 400 F.3d at 679. Dr. Babajanians' Opinions suggest that the physician had only treated plaintiff from approximately August 2011 to August 2012. (AR 507, 512). As discussed above, the medical records do not reflect treatment by Dr. Babajanians for any more than routine medical issues, much less any impairment that could cause the noted disabling limitations for a period of 12 months or greater. The ALJ was not required to provide any further explanation for rejecting Dr. Babajanians' Opinions. See Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984) (An ALJ must provide an explanation only when he rejects "significant probative evidence.") (citation omitted).
Fourth, to the extent, as plaintiff contends (Plaintiff's Motion at 5, 7), the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Babajanians' Opinions as opinions concerning "a matter reserved to the Commissioner," any error was harmless because the remaining reasons identified by the ALJ are independently sufficient to discount the credibility of Dr. Babajanians' Opinions and are supported by substantial evidence, and because the ALJ's finding was irrelevant to the ultimate disability determination. See Sawyer v. Astrue, 303 Fed. Appx. 453, 455 (9th Cir. 2008) (error in ALJ's failure properly to consider medical opinion evidence considered harmless "where the mistake was nonprejudicial to the claimant or irrelevant to the ALJ's ultimate disability conclusion. . . .") (citing Stout, 454 F.3d at 1055).
Finally, to the extent the ALJ rejected Dr. Babajanians' Opinions, his decision is supported by the conflicting opinions of the state-agency examining physician, Dr. Kristof Siciarz - who determined, in part, that plaintiff had fewer limitations than the ALJ (AR 319-23), and the medical expert Dr. Landau, whose residual functional capacity assessment the ALJ essentially adopted. (AR 15, 19, 525-34). The opinions of Dr. Siciarz were supported by the physician's independent examination of plaintiff (AR 320-22), and thus, without more, constituted substantial evidence upon which the ALJ could properly rely to reject Dr. Babajanians' Opinions. See, e.g., Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (examining physician's opinion on its own constituted substantial evidence, because it rested on physician's independent examination of claimant) (citations omitted). Dr. Landau's opinions also constituted substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's decision since they were supported by the other medical evidence in the record as well as Dr. Siciarz's opinions and underlying independent examination. See Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149 (holding that opinions of nontreating or nonexamining doctors may serve as substantial evidence when consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[R]eports of [a] nonexamining advisor need not be discounted and may serve as substantial evidence when they are supported by other evidence in the record and are consistent with it.").
Accordingly, a remand or reversal on this basis is not warranted.
B. The ALJ Properly Evaluated Plaintiff's Credibility
1. Pertinent Law
An ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain or other non-exertional impairment. Orn, 495 F.3d at 635 (citing Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)). "To determine whether a claimant's testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis." Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007). "First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment 'which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.'" Id. (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)).
"Second, if the claimant meets this first test, and there is no evidence of malingering, 'the ALJ can reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.'" Id. at 1036 (citations omitted). "In making a credibility determination, the ALJ 'must specifically identify what testimony is credible and what testimony undermines the claimant's complaints.'" Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The ALJ's credibility findings "must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude the ALJ rejected the claimant's testimony on permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant's testimony." Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004).
To find a claimant not credible, an ALJ must rely either on reasons unrelated to the subjective testimony (e.g., reputation for dishonesty), internal contradictions in the claimant's statements and testimony, or conflicts between the claimant's testimony and the claimant's conduct (e.g., daily activities, work record, unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow prescribed course of treatment). Orn, 495 F.3d at 636; Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883; Burch, 400 F.3d at 680-81; Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 96-7p. Although an ALJ may not disregard a claimant's testimony solely because it is not substantiated affirmatively by objective medical evidence, the lack of medical evidence is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his or her credibility assessment. Burch, 400 F.3d at 681.
Evaluation of credibility and resolution of conflicts in the testimony are solely functions of the Commissioner. Greger, 464 F.3d at 972. Accordingly, if the ALJ's interpretation of the claimant's testimony is reasonable and is supported by substantial evidence, it is not the court's role to "second-guess" it. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
2. Analysis
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ inadequately evaluated the credibility of her subjective complaints. (Plaintiff's Motion at 9-13). The Court disagrees.
First, the ALJ properly discounted the credibility of plaintiff's subjective complaints to the extent they were inconsistent with plaintiff's daily activities. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002) (inconsistency between the claimant's testimony and the claimant's conduct supported rejection of the claimant's credibility); Verduzco v. Apfel,188 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999) (inconsistencies between claimant's testimony and actions cited as a clear and convincing reason for rejecting the claimant's testimony). For example, as the ALJ noted, contrary to plaintiff's allegations of disabling symptoms, at the hearing plaintiff testified that she was able to "do laundry" and "dishes," although plaintiff needs to take her time. (AR 16, 33-34). While plaintiff correctly suggests that a claimant "does not need to be 'utterly incapacitated' in order to be disabled," Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted), this does not mean that an ALJ must find that a claimant's daily activities demonstrate an ability to engage in full-time work (i.e., eight hours a day, five days a week) in order to discount the credibility of conflicting subjective symptom testimony. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113 ("[An] ALJ may discredit a claimant's testimony when the claimant reports participation in everyday activities indicating capacities that are transferable to a work setting . . . [e]ven where those activities suggest some difficulty functioning. . . .") (citations omitted). Here, even though plaintiff stated that she had difficulty functioning, the ALJ properly discounted the credibility of plaintiff's subjective-symptom testimony to the extent plaintiff's daily activities were inconsistent with a "totally debilitating impairment." Id.; see, e.g., Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that the claimant's ability to "take care of her personal needs, prepare easy meals, do light housework and shop for some groceries . . . may be seen as inconsistent with the presence of a condition which would preclude all work activity") (citing Fair, 885 F.2d at 604).
Second, the ALJ properly discounted the credibility of plaintiff's subjective complaints as inconsistent with plaintiff's generally "routine, conservative, and non-emergency treatment" noted above. (AR 17); see, e.g., Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[E]vidence of 'conservative treatment' is sufficient to discount a claimant's testimony regarding severity of an impairment."), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1141 (2008) (citation omitted).
Third, the ALJ properly discounted the credibility of plaintiff's subjective complaints based on plaintiff's "unexplained or inadequately explained failure . . . to follow [her] prescribed course of treatment." Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see SSR 96-7p at *8 ("[Claimant's] statements may be less credible if the level or frequency of treatment is inconsistent with the level of complaints, or if the medical reports or records show that the individual is not following the treatment as prescribed and there are no good reasons for this failure."); see, e.g., Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114 (ALJ properly discounted plaintiff's credibility based on infrequency of treatment where plaintiff's resistance to treatment was based on personal preference rather than the result of plaintiff's mental impairment); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999) (In assessing credibility, ALJ properly considered doctor's failure to prescribe and claimant's failure to request any serious medical treatment for supposedly excruciating pain). Here, as the ALJ noted, the record reflects that despite repeated and emphatic warnings by several physicians that plaintiff needed to follow the "healthy diet" and exercise plan they prescribed, there are multiple notes in the record that plaintiff consistently failed to do so. (See, e.g., AR 577 ["Pt eats whatever without any concern re calorie intake and the type of food" and "[doctor's] concern re healthy diet and routine exercise explained in detail to the Pt"]; AR 582, 592, 606, 628, 651 ["Problem List" includes "noncompliance [by plaintiff] with dietary regimen" and "lack of exercise"]; AR 601, 623, 637 ["Pt does not comply with healthy and appropriate diet [¶] [and] also does not exercise [on] consistent basis"]).
Finally, the ALJ properly discredited plaintiff's testimony due, in part, to the absence of supporting objective medical evidence. Burch, 400 F.3d at 681; Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857 ("While subjective pain testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, the medical evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of the claimant's pain and its disabling effects.") (citation omitted). For example, as the ALJ noted, contrary to plaintiff's testimony that she has joint pain all over her body, the report of Dr. Siciarz's consultative examination indicated that plaintiff's range of motion in her back, shoulders, wrists, hands, hips, knees, and ankles were well within normal limits. (AR 16) (citing Exhibit 2F at 3-4 [AR 321-22]). Moreover, as the ALJ also noted, Dr. Siciarz's report does not reflect evidence of disuse muscle atrophy that would be expected given plaintiff's alleged level of inactivity. (AR 16) (citing Exhibit 2F [AR 319-23]); see Meanel, 172 F.3d at 1114 (ALJ properly discredited plaintiff's testimony where there was no evidence of muscular atrophy or other physical sign usually seen in an "inactive, totally incapacitated individual").
Accordingly, a remand or reversal on this basis is not warranted.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. DATED: June 30, 2015
/s/_________
Honorable Jacqueline Chooljian
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE