Opinion
No. 16-72847
03-14-2019
GABRIEL RAZCON-GAMEZ, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Agency No. A092-659-321 MEMORANDUM On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted March 5, 2019 Phoenix, Arizona Before: IKUTA and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and BLOCK, District Judge.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The Honorable Frederic Block, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation. --------
Gabriel Razcon-Gamez petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reopen. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that Razcon-Gamez's motion to reopen was untimely. The 90-day deadline for motions to reopen deportation proceedings established by regulation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), was promulgated in April 1996 and made effective July 1, 1996, see Executive Office for Immigration Review; Motions and Appeals in Immigration Proceedings, 61 Fed. Reg. 18,900 (Apr. 29, 1996). It is therefore not impermissibly retroactive as to Razcon-Gamez, who was placed in exclusion proceedings in August 1996.
The regulation establishing the deadline for motions to reopen to apply for relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) specifies that "[a]n alien under a final order of deportation, exclusion, or removal that became final prior to March 22, 1999 may move to reopen proceedings for the sole purpose of seeking protection under § 1208.16(c)," so long as the motion to reopen is filed by June 21, 1999. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(b)(2). Because Razcon-Gamez filed his motion to reopen after June 21, 1999, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that it was untimely.
The BIA's determination that Razcon-Gamez had not demonstrated a change in country conditions material to his claim for relief under CAT because his evidence was not sufficiently individualized, see Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 2010), was supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the exception to the time bar for filing a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), was not applicable to Razcon-Gamez's motion to reopen.