Ray's Liquors, Inc. v. Newland

10 Citing cases

  1. Millenium Club, Inc. v. Avila

    809 N.E.2d 906 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 8 times

    According to the Minors, every court to consider an action similar to the Club's fraud action against the Minors has rejected such an action on public policy grounds. See, e.g., Sanctuary, Inc. v. Smith, 733 P.2d 839, 840 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the "strict regulatory policy expressed" in the statute would be "rendered less than strict if private clubs could pass on the costs of `unknowing' violations to minors in suits for fraud" and allowing the club to recover the penalties imposed for the violation would undermine the legislature's policy of imposing an absolute duty upon the club); Ray's Liquors, Inc. v. Newland, 367 N.E.2d 982, 983-985 (Ill. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that a liquor store's fraud action against a minor was barred by public policy because, under the Illinois statutes, the liability of the store was not excused by its mistake as to the validity of the minor's identification and "the intended purpose of the Liquor Control Act would be thwarted if licensees in the liquor industry were permitted to pass on the costs which accrue to them as a result of a violation of liquor control laws by a sale to the minor who misrepresents his age"). The parties also discuss three trial court decisions.

  2. Burys v. First Bank

    543 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 6 times

    When a plaintiff pleads a claim in the circuit court, but fails to argue it on appeal, such conduct amounts to a waiver of that claim. (See Ray's Liquors, Inc. v. Newland (1977), 52 Ill. App.3d 680, 681, 367 N.E.2d 982, 983-84.) Burys has failed to argue the claims he pled in the circuit court in any of his briefs.

  3. Sanctuary, Inc. v. Smith

    12 Kan. App. 2d 38 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 5 times
    Holding that the "strict regulatory policy expressed" in the statute would be "rendered less than strict if private clubs could pass on the costs of `unknowing' violations to minors in suits for fraud" and allowing the club to recover the penalties imposed for the violation would undermine the legislature's policy of imposing an absolute duty upon the club

    The regulatory provisions of K.S.A. 41-2615 would be rendered less than strict if private clubs could pass on the costs of "unknowing" violations to minors in suits for fraud. See Faces, Inc. v. Kennedy, 185 N.J.Super. 113, 121, 447 A.2d 592 (1981), aff'd, 185 N.J.Super. 77, 447 A.2d 572 (1982) (public policy bars suit in fraud by club against minor to recover damages for loss of profits due to license suspension); Ray's Liquors, Inc. v. Newland, 52 Ill.App.3d 680, 10 Ill.Dec. 373, 367 N.E.2d 982 (1977) (public policy bars suit in fraud by club against minor to recover damages to reputation and costs of litigating license suspension).        The decision about how best to curtail alcohol consumption by minors rests with the legislature, not with the courts.

  4. Stach v. Sears, Roebuck Co.

    429 N.E.2d 1242 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 23 times

    However, Sears' statement has not been pursued by argument or citation of pertinent authority. A mere statement of an issue without support of either citation or argument amounts to a waiver of the issue on appeal. ( Flynn v. Vancil (1968), 41 Ill.2d 236, 242 N.E.2d 237; Ray's Liquors, Inc. v. Newland (1977), 52 Ill. App.3d 680, 367 N.E.2d 982; see also Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) (73 Ill.2d R. 341(e)(7).) Accordingly, the foregoing issue is deemed waived.

  5. B W Liquors v. Ill. Liquor Control Com

    421 N.E.2d 396 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 3 times

    This provision was among the amendments added to the statute in 1973. In Ray's Liquor, Inc. v. Newland (1977), 52 Ill. App.3d 680, 367 N.E.2d 982, the court addressed a similar issue. It noted that the portion of the statute preceding this paragraph had remained substantially unchanged from prior statutes.

  6. Gary-Wheaton Bk. v. Village of Lombard

    404 N.E.2d 1115 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 1 times

    The cross-appeal is dismissed not only for the reasons set forth in the appellant's motion but also for the reason that appellees, in contravention of Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7), have waived this issue by failing to discuss it in their argument. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110A, par. 341(e)(7); Ray's Liquors, Inc. v. Newland (1977), 52 Ill. App.3d 680, 681. We affirm the order of the circuit court of Du Page County entered June 1, 1979.

  7. Hassett Storage v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs

    69 Ill. App. 3d 972 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 35 times
    In Hassert Storage v. Board of Election Commissioners, 69 Ill. App. 3d 972 (1st Dist. 1979), the plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to comply with the competitive bidding statute requirements in granting a contract for the storage and cartage of election equipment.

    (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 341(e)(7); Svec v. Allstate Insurance Co. (1977), 53 Ill. App.3d 1033, 369 N.E.2d 205; Ray's Liquors, Inc. v. Newland (1977), 52 Ill. App.3d 680, 367 N.E.2d 982.) Since there is no allegation in the complaint regarding any duty owed to Hassett by Empire, there can be no cause of action against Empire.

  8. Worcester Main South Inc. v. Delgado, No

    No. 20000469 (Mass. Cmmw. Apr. 25, 2002)

    See Sanctuary, Inc. v. Smith. 733 P.2d 839, 840 (Kan.Ct.App. 1987) (stating that "since the purpose of the law is to regulate by placing strict liabilities on the [licensed liquor vendor], fraud, as a matter of law. does not lie as a cause of action in this particular matter" (citation omitted)); Faces, Inc. v. Kennedy, 447 A.2d 592. 596-97 (N.J.Super.Ct.LawDiv. 1981) (holding that the proximate cause of the licensed liquor vendor's suspended license and lost profits was its own failure to procure a written representation of patron's ages); Ray's Liquors, Inc. v. Newland, 367 N.E.2d 982, 984-85 (Ill.App.Ct. 1977) (barring a liquor store's action against a minor on the basis of public policy). As outlined above, the burden imposed by sister states falls heavily upon vendors and mandates that they require acceptable identification from patrons in order to ensure vendees are of legal age to purchase alcohol.

  9. OSJ, Inc. v. Work

    180 Misc. 2d 804 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999)   Cited 2 times
    Finding that a bar's defense of an administrative proceeding by state liquor authority to revoke its liquor license did not render the bar a “public applicant or permittee” for purposes of New York Civil Rights Law § 76–a

    Although this is a case of first impression in New York, several other states have decided similar cases regarding licensed vendors of alcoholic beverages commencing private civil actions against underage drinkers who misrepresented their age and obtained alcoholic beverages. See, Sanctuary, Inc. v. Smith, 12 Kan.App.2d 38, 733 P.2d 839 (1987); Faces, Inc. v. Kennedy, 185 N.J.Super. 113, 447 A.2d 592 (1981); Ray's Liquors, Inc. v. Newland, 52 Ill.App.3d 680, 10 Ill.Dec. 373, 367 N.E.2d 982 (1977). While not determinative here, the analyses employed in reaching the results therein, that public policy and legislative intent precluded such actions, are probative on the similar question in this case given the common public policy goals and direction taken by the respective state legislatures.

  10. OSJ, Inc. v. Work

    180 Misc. 2d 804 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999)

    Although this is a case of first impression in New York, several other states have decided similar cases regarding licensed vendors of alcoholic beverages commencing private civil actions against underage drinkers who misrepresented their age and obtained alcoholic beverages. See, Sanctuary, Inc. v. Smith, 12 Kan. App. 2d 38 (1987); Faces Inc. v. Kennedy, 185 N.J. Super. 113 (1981); Ray's Liquors, Inc. v. Newland, 52 Ill. App.3d 680 (1977). While not determinative here, the analyses employed in reaching the results therein, that public policy and legislative intent precluded such actions, are probative on the similar question in this case given the common public policy goals and direction taken by the respective state legislatures.