Raynes Associates Ltd. Partnership v. State Division of Housing & Community Renewal

3 Citing cases

  1. Gilman v. New York State Division of Housing & Community Renewal

    290 A.D.2d 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)   Cited 6 times

    Thus, this is the same evidence that should have been submitted to the District Rent Administrator for inclusion in the administrative record in 1994. The mysterious solicitation of evidence in a matter that has apparently been decided, abandoned or otherwise resolved by the Division of Housing and Community Renewal is disturbing but not without precedent (see,Matter of Raynes Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. State Div. of Hous. and Community Renewal, 142 Misc.2d 90, 92-93 [Rubin, J.]). Nor is this the first time that a court has pointed out the economic harm that accrues when administrative delay operates to the peculiar prejudice of one of the parties (see, Matter of Mahoney v. New York State Div. of Hous. Community Renewal, 293 A.D.2d 329; Matter of Bloom v. Division of Hous. and Community Renewal, 138 Misc.2d 523, 529 [Rubin, J.]). In the context of the instant appeal, it is the landlord that defaulted and the tenant that sought timely resolution of the proceedings by her resort to the extraordinary remedy of mandamus.

  2. Kibel v. State of New York Division of Housing & Community Renewal

    187 A.D.2d 338 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)   Cited 5 times

    This decision disposes of the issue raised by the PAR and is in literal compliance with Supreme Court's earlier judgment, entered October 17, 1990, directing DHCR to "render a determination", but it does little to expedite the ultimate resolution of the matter. We are in agreement with Supreme Court to the extent that we can discern no valid reason why it should have taken DHCR over four years (as of the date of the judgment appealed from) to render a final decision, and Supreme Court's disposition of the merits is not without precedent (Matter of Raynes Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v State Div. of Hous. Community Renewal, 137 Misc.2d 484, on renewal 142 Misc.2d 90 [Rubin, J.]). However, for reasons of comity and judicial economy as well as adherence to the requirement for administrative finality (Matter of Bloom v Division of Hous. Community Renewal, 138 Misc.2d 523, 527-528 [Rubin, J.]), we feel the better course is generally to direct the agency to render a final determination within a reasonable and definite time period (Matter of 140 W. 57th St. Corp. v State Div. of Hous. Community Renewal, 130 A.D.2d 237, 244).

  3. Sohn v. Calderon

    162 A.D.2d 331 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)

    Therefore, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, they should not have been entertained by the courts in the first instance (compare, People v. Port Distrib. Corp., 114 A.D.2d 259, 265; Eli Haddad Corp. v. Cal Redmond Studio, 102 A.D.2d 730). The question of concurrent jurisdiction is secondary for, as the Court of Appeals has observed: "Though the agency's jurisdiction is not exclusive, the court postpones its action until it has received the agency's views" (Capital Tel. Co. v. Pattersonville Tel. Co., 56 N.Y.2d 11, 22). The better practice would have been to withhold judicial determination of this matter in the exercise of discretion pending resolution of the proceedings before the administrative agency (Eli Haddad Corp. v. Cal Redmond Studio, supra; see also, Matter of Raynes Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. State Div. of Hous. Community Renewal, 142 Misc.2d 90).