Opinion
05-23-01076-CR
11-20-2024
ALTON RASHAD RAY, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Do Not Publish Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b)
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 1 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F22-00464
\ Before Justices Reichek, Nowell, and Carlyle
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ERIN A. NOWELL, JUSTICE
Appellant Alton Rashad Ray pleaded guilty to manslaughter and elected for a jury to determine his punishment. The jury sentenced appellant to fourteen years' confinement and assessed a $10,000 fine. Appellant argues: (1) his guilty plea did not satisfy Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 1.15; (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury to return a guilty verdict of manslaughter; and (3) the trial court erred by not dismissing the case because the State failed to file an affidavit explaining the delay in filing the indictment. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
On August 31, 2022, appellant and his cousin, Tyler Dancer, were hanging out with family and friends. When Dancer decided to leave, he offered appellant and R.H., his fifteen-year-old cousin, a ride home. Before they left, Dancer's wife heard appellant cock a gun and put it in his pocket. Appellant was known to be "into guns," so it was not unusual that he had one with him.
At the time of the shooting, appellant had been on probation for three months, and possession of a firearm violated the terms of his probation.
In the car, Dancer was driving, R.H. was in the front passenger seat, and appellant was in the driver-side backseat. According to appellant, both the gun and his cellphone were in his left pocket. In an attempt to reach his cellphone, he "had to move the gun out of the way," but when he grabbed the gun, "the gun went off."
When Dancer realized what happened, he said, "You shot me." Appellant responded, "No, I didn't." Dancer then lost control of the car and crashed into a house. Appellant tried to render aid to Dancer while R.H. called 911. Appellant panicked, left the scene, and hid the gun. When he returned, he denied shooting Dancer. Instead, he made up a fictional person and told officers the person got into the car, shot Dancer, and ran away.
Dancer died from the single gunshot wound. On September 5, 2019, the State indicted appellant for intentionally and knowingly causing the death of Dancer by shooting him with a firearm. On August 31, 2022, the State reduced the charge to manslaughter and indicted appellant for recklessly causing the death of Dancer by discharging a firearm, a deadly weapon, "in the direction of the deceased while inside of a motor vehicle."
On July 12, 2023, appellant entered an open plea of guilty and judicially confessed to the manslaughter offense. He signed the agreement acknowledging, "I admit and judicially confess that I committed the offense of Manslaughter on May 29, 2019, exactly as alleged in the charging instrument. I affirm that my plea and judicial confession are freely and voluntarily made, and not influenced by any consideration of fear, persuasion, or delusive hope of pardon or parole." He acknowledged his attorney explained the admonitions and warnings to him, he read them, and by signing, he acknowledged his statements and waivers "are knowingly, freely, and voluntarily made with full understanding of the consequences." He judicially confessed to the following and stipulated "the facts are true and correct and constitute the evidence in this case:"
[O]n or about the 29th day of May, 2019, in Dallas County, Texas, I did then and there recklessly cause the death of an individual, TYLER DANCER, hereinafter called deceased, by DISCHARGING A FIREARM IN THE DIRECTION OF DECEASED WHILE INSIDE A MOTOR VEHICLE. . . .
I further judicially confess that I committed the offense with which I stand charged exactly as alleged in the indictment in this case.
During the plea hearing before the court, appellant stated he understood the charges against him, and his attorney explained his constitutional and statutory rights. He understood his right to a jury trial for guilt-innocence but wanted to waive his right and elect a jury for punishment. Appellant entered the guilty plea to manslaughter "freely and voluntarily" and because he was "guilty and for no other reason." The State then introduced appellant's signed judicial confession. Defense counsel stated he believed appellant was mentally competent, and the trial court accepted appellant's plea and found him "guilty of the offense of manslaughter" with an affirmative deadly weapon finding.
The case proceeded to the punishment phase before a jury. After the State rested, and outside the presence of the jury, appellant confirmed he pleaded guilty to the offense of manslaughter but wanted to testify before the jury. He testified he was making the decision voluntarily and understood he was waiving his right not to testify. Appellant testified the shooting was an accident. He did not intentionally try to kill Dancer but that he "unintentionally . . . accidentally did that."
The jury sentenced him to fourteen years' confinement and a $10,000 fine. The trial court signed the judgment on October 6, 2023 and certified appellant's right to appeal.
Validity of Guilty Plea
In his first issue, appellant argues his guilty plea did not satisfy the requirements of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 1.15 because the trial court failed to confirm that the State demonstrated a strong factual basis for his manslaughter plea. Appellant maintains his testimony during the punishment phase that he accidentally shot Dancer proves, at most, that he was criminally negligent, not reckless, in causing Dancer's death. The State responds appellant entered a valid guilty plea to the charged offense and sufficient evidence supports his plea.
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 1.15 requires that sufficient evidence support a guilty plea. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15. The article permits conviction for a felony, based upon a plea, only if (a) the defendant has waived his right to trial in writing, and (b) the State has introduced evidence into the record showing the guilt of the defendant and that evidence has been accepted by the court as the basis for its judgment. Id. The statute dictates that "in no event shall a person charged be convicted upon his plea without sufficient evidence to support the same." Id.; Runnels v. State, No. 05-19-00621-CR, 2021 WL 210752, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas Jan. 21, 2021, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
The entry of a valid guilty plea "has the effect of admitting all material facts alleged in the formal criminal charge." McGill v. State, 200 S.W.3d 325, 330 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (quoting Ex parte Williams, 703 S.W.2d 674, 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc)). The State is also bound by statute to support the plea with sufficient evidence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15; see also Young v. State, 8 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc). Under this "procedural safeguard," there is no requirement that the supporting evidence prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. McGill, 200 S.W.3d at 330. Instead, the supporting evidence must simply embrace every essential element of the offense charged. Stone v. State, 919 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); McGill, 200 S.W.3d at 330.
Here, the indictment charged appellant with recklessly causing the death of Dancer on May 29, 2019 by discharging a firearm, a deadly weapon, "in the direction of the deceased while inside of a motor vehicle." See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.04 (a person commits manslaughter "if he recklessly causes the death of an individual"). At the plea hearing, appellant affirmed his attorney had gone over all the documents with him, and he understood the charges. He voluntarily pleaded guilty, and the State introduced his signed judicial confession that addressed every element of the charged offense. Appellant's judicial confession, standing alone, is sufficient to support his plea. Menefee v. State, 287 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The trial court accepted appellant's guilty plea and found the evidence sufficient to prove appellant's guilt. Appellant never sought to withdraw this guilty plea. Thus, the State provided sufficient evidence supporting appellant's guilty plea. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15.
We reject appellant's argument that the trial court should have reexamined appellant's guilty plea when he testified during the punishment hearing that he "accidentally" shot Dancer. Appellant did not present any such evidence at the July 12, 2023 plea hearing when the issue of guilt was determined. A trial court is not obligated to sua sponte withdraw a guilty plea, even if evidence fairly raises the issue of innocence, after the trial court has fulfilled its initial duty of considering the evidence during the plea hearing. See Aldrich v. State, 104 S.W.3d 890, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (en banc); Williams v. State, 191 S.W.3d 242, 259-60 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, no pet.); Euan v. State, No. 05-16-00252-CR, 2017 WL 1536514, *8 (Tex. App.-Dallas April 27, 2017, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
Here, the trial court fulfilled its initial duty and determined the supporting evidence at the plea hearing embraced every essential element of the charged offense. See Menefee, 287 S.W.3d at 19; Stone, 919 S.W.2d at 427. We overrule appellant's first issue.
Manslaughter Jury Instruction
In his second issue, appellant argues the trial court erred by not instructing the jury to return a guilty verdict for manslaughter. The State responds no such jury instruction was required because the trial court had already determined appellant's guilt before empaneling the jury and error, if any, did not cause appellant egregious harm.
Appellate review of purported jury charge error involves a two-step process. Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). First, we determine whether the jury instruction is erroneous. Id. Second, if error occurred, then an appellate court must analyze the error for harm. Id.
The code of criminal procedure provides that the trial court must "deliver to the jury . . . a written charge distinctly setting forth the law applicable to the case." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.14; Sanchez v. State, 376 S.W.3d 767, 773 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The trial judge is responsible for the accuracy of the charge and accompanying instructions. Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see also Ex parte Smith, 309 S.W.3d 53, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (noting trial court is "required to provide a constitutionally adequate vehicle for the jury to fully consider and give effect" to the charge).
A plea of guilty to a jury is the functional equivalent of a jury verdict of guilty. Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d 220, 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). When a defendant pleads guilty to a jury, the jury need not return any verdict of guilt. Id. The case simply proceeds with a unitary punishment hearing. Id. Here, appellant pleaded guilty before the jury, after the trial court had previously accepted his knowing and voluntary guilty plea supported by a signed judicial confession encompassing all the elements of the offense of manslaughter. The case then proceeded with a unitary punishment hearing.
At the conclusion of evidence, the trial court confirmed it made a finding of appellant's guilt on July 12, 2023 and both the State and appellant's counsel agreed the jury did not need to make a finding of guilt. Neither side objected to the charge, which included the following:
The Defendant, Alton Ray, stands charged by indictment with the offense of Manslaughter. To this charge the defendant has entered a plea of guilty. He has persisted in entering his plea of guilty notwithstanding that the Court, as required by law, has admonished him of the consequences.
It plainly appearing to the Court that the defendant is mentally competent, has been advised of the range of punishment attached to the offense, and that his plea of guilty is made freely and voluntarily, his plea is accepted by the Court.
You are instructed, therefore, to limit your deliberations, under all the law and evidence in this case, to the question of punishment, which is now your duty to assess.
Case law is clear that the jury was not required to return a guilty verdict since appellant's guilt or innocence was no longer at issue. See In re State ex rel. Tharp, 393 S.W.3d 751, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (plea of guilty to jury eliminates guilt as issue to be determined). As such, the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury to return a guilty verdict on manslaughter as it was not "law applicable to the case" for punishment purposes. See Eberhardt v. State, 437 S.W.3d 582, 583 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd) (holding it was not error, much less reversible error, when no such instruction was given). Because there was no error, we need not conduct a harm analysis. Tex.R.App.P. 47.1; Kirsch, 357 S.W.3d at 649. We overrule appellant's second issue.
Dismissal of Indictment
In his final issue, appellant argues the trial court should have dismissed his indictment because the State failed to file an affidavit explaining the delay in presentment of the indictment. The State responds appellant failed to preserve his issue, and alternatively, the indictment was timely presented.
It is well-established that there is no general authority that permits a trial court to dismiss a case without the prosecutor's consent; however, a trial court may dismiss a charging instrument under certain circumstances. State v. Mungia, 119 S.W.3d 814, 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). One such circumstance is a violation of article 32.01 of the code of criminal procedure, which provides:
When a defendant has been detained in custody or held to bail for the defendant's appearance to answer any criminal accusation, the prosecution, unless otherwise ordered by the court, for good cause shown, supported by affidavit, shall be dismissed and the bail discharged, if indictment or information be not presented against the defendant on or before the last day of the next term of the court which is held after the defendant's commitment or admission to bail or on or before the 180th day after the date of commitment or admission to bail, whichever date is later.Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 32.01(a). By operation, article 32.01 prevents citizens from being left in jail or on bail for long periods of time without being indicted. See Schroeder v. State, 307 S.W.3d 578, 579 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2010, pet. ref'd). Importantly, article 32.01 does not create a substantive right that frees a person from prosecution for the commission of an offense. Id. at 580 (citing Ex parte Seidel, 39 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (en banc)). Instead, article 32.01 creates a procedural right to be dismissed from custody under certain circumstances until the grand jury has been presented with an indictment. Id.
In Brooks v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held "[a]rticle 32.01 has no application once an indictment is returned." 990 S.W.2d 278, 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc). Thus, a defendant must seek to dismiss an untimely indictment under article 32.01 before the indictment is returned or error as to the timeliness of the return of the indictment is waived. Id.; see also State v. Dominguez, No. 03-16-00095-CR, 2017 WL 4583210, at *8 n.4 (Tex. App.-Austin Oct. 12, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding appellant waived argument regarding whether State complied with article 32.01 when he failed to raise it in the trial court); Herrera v. State, No. 04-08-00931-CR, 2009 WL 4981327, at *1 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Dec. 23, 2009, pet. ref'd, untimely filed) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding appellant waived complaint about timeliness of indictment by failing to file motion to dismiss before the indictment was returned); Ellsworth v. State, No. 05-98-00493-CR, 2000 WL 136789, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. 8, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (concluding appellant did not assert his right to dismissal under article 32.01 until after the grand jury had returned the indictment; therefore, the issue was moot). Because appellant raised his objection to the timeliness of the indictment for the first time on appeal, we conclude his third issue is waived. Tex.R.App.P. 33.1; Brooks, 990 S.W.2d at 285; Dominguez, 2017 WL 4583210, at *8 n.4; Herrera, 2009 WL 4981327, at *1; Ellsworth, 2000 WL 136789, at *1.
In reaching this conclusion, we reject appellant's argument to the contrary in which he asserts he raises a jurisdictional issue and "[n]oncompliance with the mandatory dismissal requirement in Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 32.01(a) shouldn't be 'a defect, error, or irregularity of form or substance in an indictment' that must be raised" to receive appellant review. Appellant has failed to provide any contrary authority to the well-established case law that article 32.01 arguments may be waived.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
JUDGMENT
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered.