Ray v. Scripture

4 Citing cases

  1. Cate v. Cate

    112 A. 826 (N.H. 1921)

    Possession once taken continues until there is an entry in opposition thereto. Largey v. Taylor, 75 N.H. 211, 213; Boynton v. Hodgdon, 59 N.H. 247; Wallace v. Goodall, 18 N.H. 439, 449. While the possession must be something more than the mortgagee's original technical seizin, even when reinforced by a momentary entry under process (Ray v. Scripture, 67 N.H. 260, 262), it does not follow that the required continued possession may not be found as a fact upon proof of the entry under process, when nothing more is shown. In such a state of the evidence the lawful possession shown to have once existed may be found to continue until the contrary appears.

  2. Largey v. Taylor

    75 N.H. 211 (N.H. 1909)   Cited 2 times
    Concluding that "the possession acquired by the mortgagee by the entry of her agent continued until there was an entry in opposition"

    Fletcher v. Cary, 103 Mass. 475; Lemon v. Porter, 5 Gray 318; Bennett v. Conant, 10 Cush. 163. But in this state, by the general understanding of the meaning of the statute, the presumed possession following upon the mere entry is insufficient to sustain a foreclosure, if such possession has been interrupted by the subsequent entry and occupation of the mortgagor or any one claiming under him, without actual recognition of or submission to the mortgagee's foreclosing possession. Bartlett v. Sanborn, 64 N.H. 70; Ray v. Scripture, 67 N.H. 260. But the possession acquired by the mortgagee by the entry of her agent continued until there was an entry in opposition.

  3. Walker v. Chessman

    70 A. 248 (N.H. 1908)   Cited 3 times

    The mortgage subsisted after the judgment as before, and could only be foreclosed by the defendant's possession continued for a year (P. S. c. 139, s. 14); and his possession would be held, not under the judgment, but under and by virtue of the mortgages. Couch v. Stevens, 37 N.H. 169; Hall v. Hall, 46 N.H. 240, 243; Ray v. Scripture, 67 N.H. 260. The mortgages vested in him "the seizin as well as the title of the demanded premises" (Perkins v. Eaton, 64 N.H. 359, 360), and when he elected, as he had a right to do, to treat Thomas, who was in the actual occupancy of the land, as a disseisor, his subsequent possession was in accordance with the right granted to him by the mortgagors. He acquired no new right of possession by the judgment, any more than he would if he had taken peaceable possession under the statute.

  4. Ross v. Leavitt

    50 A. 110 (N.H. 1900)   Cited 1 times

    This fact was not shown by the record, but was open for determination whenever controversy should arise. Bartlett v. Sanborn, 64 N.H. 70; Ray v. Scripture, 67 N.H. 260. The conclusion is that the plaintiffs are entitled to redeem. Case discharged.