Ray v. Hutchison

14 Citing cases

  1. State v. Womack

    591 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 40 times
    Upholding the use of a common-law writ of certiorari to review a pre-trial action of a juvenile court

    There is no indication that the defendant actually subpoenaed the witness; and there is nothing in said opinion to indicate that the decision is based upon the failure of the accused to establish the materiality of the testimony of the witness. Also, the right of unlimited cross examination is not recognized in the Federal Courts (Federal Rules of Evidence, 611[b]), whereas it is recognized in Tennessee ( Ray v. Hutchison, 17 Tenn. App. 477, 685 S.W.2d 948 (1933)). In United States v. Wilkins, supra, the trial judge did state in his opinion:

  2. Anderson v. Peters

    22 Tenn. App. 563 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939)   Cited 7 times
    In Anderson v. Peters, 22 Tenn. App. 563, 124 S.W.2d 717, 720 (1938), the Tennessee Court of Appeals offered the following observation concerning liability under the doctrine of attractive nuisance: "To call the thing from which the injury results an `attractive nuisance' does not solve the question.

    This thought runs through all our cases, both those affirming, and those denying, liability under the attractive nuisance doctrine. Whirley v. Whiteman, 38 Tenn. (1 Head.), 610; Bates v. Railway Co., 90 Tenn. 36, 15 S.W. 1069, 25 Am. St. Rep., 665; East Tennessee W.N.C.R. Co. v. Cargille, 105 Tenn. 628, 59 S.W. 141; Burke v. Ellis, 105 Tenn. 702, 58 S.W. 855; Stone Company v. Pugh, 115 Tenn. 688, 91 S.W. 199, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.), 804, 12 Am. St. Rep., 881; Cooper v. Overton, 102 Tenn. 211, 222, 52 S.W. 183, 45 L.R.A., 591, 73 Am. St. Rep., 864; Louisville N.R. Co. v. Ray, 124 Tenn. 16, 134 S.W. 858, Ann. Cas., 1912D, 910; Doyle v. Chattanooga, 128 Tenn. 433, 161 S.W. 997, Ann. Cas., 1915C, 283; Kelley v. Tennessee Electric Power Co., 7 Tenn. App. 555; DuPont Rayon Co. v. Roberson, 12 Tenn. App. 261; City of Memphis v. Trice, Adm'r, 13 Tenn. App. 607; Ray v. Hutchison, 17 Tenn. App. 477, 68 S.W.2d 948; McCay v. Du Pont Rayon Co., 20 Tenn. App. 157, 96 S.W.2d 177. Speaking of the attractive nuisance doctrine this court in Ray v. Hutchison, 17 Tenn. App. 477, 484, 68 S.W.2d 948, said:

  3. McCay v. Du Pont Rayon Co.

    20 Tenn. App. 157 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936)   Cited 3 times

    mit, rather than extend, the application of the attractive nuisance doctrine is evident from an examination of the cases reported since the opinion in Whirley v. Whiteman, supra; Bates v. Railway Co., 90 Tenn. 36, 15 S.W. 1069, 25 Am. St. Rep., 665; Cooper v. Overton, 102 Tenn. 211, 52 S.W. 183, 45 L.R.A., 591, 73 Am. St. Rep., 864; East Tennessee W.N.C.R. Co. v. Cargille, 105 Tenn. 628, 59 S.W. 141; Burke v. Ellis, 105 Tenn. 702, 58 S.W. 855; Foster-Herbert Cut Stone Co. v. Pugh, 115 Tenn. 688, 91 S.W. 199, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.), 804, 112 Am. St. Rep., 881; Louisville N.R. Co. v. Ray, supra; Doyle v. Chattanooga, 128 Tenn. 433, 161 S.W. 997, 1000, Ann. Cas., 1915C, 283; Benson, Adm'r, v. Howard-Park Brick Co., 6 Tenn. Civ. App. 497; Verran v. Town of Greeneville, 4 Tenn. App. 422; Kelley v. Tennessee Electric Power Co., 7 Tenn. App. 555; Nashville Railway Light Co. v. Williams, 11 Tenn. App. 1; DuPont Rayon Co. v. Roberson, 12 Tenn. App. 261; City of Memphis v. Trice, 13 Tenn. App. 607; Ray v. Hutchison, 17 Tenn. App. 477, 68 S.W.2d 948. We are of the opinion that the duty owing by defendant Du Pont Rayon Company to plaintiff's intestate was substantially the same as a municipal corporation would owe to a child under like circumstances.

  4. Mead v. Parker

    340 F.2d 157 (6th Cir. 1965)   Cited 3 times

    "[O]ne who has that on his own premises, or who creates a condition on the premises of another, or in a public place, which may reasonably be apprehended to be a source of danger to children of tender years, is under a duty to take such precautions as a reasonably prudent person would take to prevent injury to such children whom he knows to be accustomed to resort there, or who may, by reason of something there which may be expected to attract them, come there to play." Ray v. Hutchison, 17 Tenn. App. 477, 484, 68 S.W.2d 948, 953. It appears to be well established under the law of Tennessee that the question of whether the doctrine of attractive nuisance applies in a given case is for the court and not for the jury to determine.

  5. Mead v. Parker

    221 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Tenn. 1963)   Cited 4 times

    The doctrine contemplates the guarding against some danger which is neither common nor obvious. Ray v. Hutchison (1934), 17 Tenn. App. 477, 68 S.W.2d 948. The owner of property which may be attractive to children who are too young to understand and avoid ordinary dangers is entitled to rely on their parents' or guardians' either keeping such children away from such property or forbidding the children's encountering such property unless they are properly accompanied.

  6. Metropolitan Government of Nashville v. Counts

    541 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. 1976)   Cited 14 times

    It is well established that the attractive nuisance doctrine does not apply to situations in which the condition causing the harm is one involving a common and obvious danger. Pardue v. City of Sweetwater, 54 Tenn. App. 286, 390 S.W.2d 683 (1965); Ray v. Hutchison, 17 Tenn. App. 477, 68 S.W.2d 948 (1933). The danger of drowning incident to an ordinary pond or other body of water not characterized by an unusual or hidden danger is one so common and obvious that we must assume that it was recognized and appreciated by the ten-year-old child in this case.

  7. Birdsong v. City of Chattanooga

    204 Tenn. 264 (Tenn. 1958)   Cited 8 times

    Then in City of Memphis v. Trice, supra, the doctrine was thoroughly examined by Heiskell, J., in another pond case and there was no liability. Then in Ray v. Hutchison, 17 Tenn. App. 477, 485, 68 S.W.2d 948, opinion by Faw, J., the doctrine was thoroughly briefed insofar as Tennessee is concerned. The question was again dealt with in Russell v. City of Chattanooga, 38 Tenn. App. 670, 279 S.W.2d 270.

  8. Neal, Admr. v. Home Builders, Inc.

    232 Ind. 160 (Ind. 1953)   Cited 102 times
    In Neal, 111 N.E.2d at 291, the Indiana Supreme Court approvingly quoted a Kentucky case which held that a moving rail car was not a dangerous instrumentality.

    It has been held that "wooden horses" and mortar boards are simple appliances in common use by carpenters and others, and are not inherently dangerous instrumentalities within the attractive nuisance doctrine. Ray v. Hutchison (1933), 17 Tenn. App. 477, 68 S.W.2d 948, 954. A stationary barn ladder which came apart causing injury to an employee was held not to be a "dangerous instrumentality" in McVey v. Gerrald (1937), 172 Md. 595, 192 A. 789, 793.

  9. Esquibel v. Denver

    151 P.2d 757 (Colo. 1944)   Cited 12 times
    In Esquibel v. Denver, 112 Colo. 546, 151 P.2d 757, on eleven-year-old girl sought damages for injuries suffered while playing on unfenced lots where old automobile bodies and parts had been piled in an unstable heap. Prior to the time the automobile parts were placed on the lots, children in the neighborhood, including this girl, had been using the lots as a playground.

    Hence, he is not bound to anticipate their presence and make provision for their safety." Most of the foregoing paragraph is also quoted with approval in Ray v. Hutchison, 17 Tenn. App. 477, 68 S.W.2d 948. In the instant case the nuisance — created by a trespasser — was common and not extraordinarily attractive.

  10. Mayo v. Shine

    392 S.W.3d 61 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 12 times
    Finding that the probative value of the evidence, that a patient returned to the same doctor after allegedly suffering harm as a result of the doctor's negligence, was outweighed by the potential for prejudice

    Tennessee has long recognized the “English rule” which permits the scope of cross-examination to exceed the scope of the witness's direct examination. See Sands v. Southern Ry., 108 Tenn. 1, 9, 64 S.W. 478, 480 (1901); Ray v. Hutchison, 17 Tenn.App. 477, 483, 68 S.W.2d 948, 952 (1933). Thus, litigants may prove elements of their own case during the cross-examination of their opponent's witnesses.