Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:05cv56-LG-JMR.
September 11, 2006
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on the Motion [32-1] of Defendants George Payne Jr. ("Payne"), Dianne G. Riley ("Riley") and Phil Taylor ("Taylor") for Summary Judgment which is accompanied by a Memorandum in Support [33-1]. The Court being fully advised in the premises, and after carefully considering the pleadings filed as a matter of record, along with the applicable law, finds that the Defendants' Motion [32-1] for Summary Judgment is well taken and should be granted.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Lekeith M. Rawls ("Rawls") filed this pro se suit on February 3, 2005, alleging violations of his constitutional rights by Defendants Payne, Riley and Taylor while incarcerated at the Harrison County Adult Detention Center ("HCADC"). Specifically, Rawls' Complaint and Amended Complaints assert that Defendants' negligence in administration and supervision of the staff at the HCADC resulted in an attack carried out on him by gang members housed in various sections of the facility. See Complaint and Amended Complaints. Payne is the Sheriff of Harrison County, Mississippi, Riley serves as the Warden of the HCADC and Taylor is a Captain at the HCADC. Rawls, a resident of B-block, maintains that on September 25, 2004, he was assaulted by ten to fifteen gang members belonging to the Vicelord organization who were residents of D and F blocks. See Amended Complaint filed April 15, 2005. Rawls claims the gang members gained entry into his block by a block trustee who secured the opening of the various block doors. Id. Rawls claims to have sustained various injuries resulting from the attack including scratches, bruises, busted lip, and a sprained ankle. See Complaint.
On June 8, 2005, Defendants filed their Answer, Defenses, and Affirmative Defenses denying the allegations in Rawls' Complaint and Amended Complaints. Additionally, Defendants propounded written discovery to Rawls consisting of Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions, and Requests for Production of Documents. On June 27, 2005, Rawls timely responded to Defendants' discovery requests. Rawls also propounded discovery requests which Defendants timely responded to on June 29, 2005. Defendants maintain that on August 1, 2005, Rawls propounded an identical set of discovery requests resulting in Defendants filing a Motion for a Protective Order from the Court. See Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement Names for the Defendants Described as John Does in Plaintiff's Complaint and Amended Complaint [36-1]. The Court issued a Protective Order [28-1] and later issued an order [38-1] denying Rawls' Motion to Substitute Parties.
Rawls seeks judgment against the Defendants in the sum of Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($2,500,000) for both physical and emotional damages resulting from the alleged constitutional violations.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "The mere existence of a factual dispute does not by itself preclude the granting of summary judgment." St. Amant v. Benoit, 806 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (5th Cir. 1987). "The requirement is that there be no genuine issue ofmaterial fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In other words, "[o]nly disputes over the facts that might effect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. at 248. Furthermore, it is well settled in this circuit that "[b]are bones allegations are insufficient to withstand summary judgment because the opposing party must counter factual allegations by the moving party with specific, factual disputes; mere general allegations are not a sufficient response.'" Howard v. City of Greenwood, 783 F.2d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir. 1986) ( quoting Nicholas Acoustics Specialty Co. v. H M Constr. Co., 695 F.2d 839, 845 (5th Cir. 1983)). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion. See Howard v. City of Greenwood, 783 F.2d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir. 1986). To survive summary judgment, the non-movant must demonstrate the existence of a disputed issue of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). To avoid the entry of summary judgment, the non-moving party must bring forth significant probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact. See Howard, 783 F.2d at 1315.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another of federally protected rights. Therefore, section 1983 affords a remedy to those who suffer, as a result of state action, deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and the Laws of the United States. White v. Thomas, 660 F. 2d 680,693 (5th Cir. 1981). A plaintiff cannot succeed merely by showing any deprivation of his rights. Section 1983 was intended to protect rights protected by federal law. Karmi-Panahi v. Los Angles Police Dept., 839 F. 2d 621 (9th Cir. 1988); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1985).
ANALYSIS
In their Motion for Summary Judgment [32-1], Defendants contend that the Rawls' assertions, even if true, would only amount to single, episodic acts and can not support liability under section 1983. Defendants further contend that because the municipality for which they work maintains no custom or policy of depriving individuals of their constitutional rights, a claim of municipal liability under section 1983 must also fail. Defendants also argue that Rawls' individual capacity claims are not only subject to a qualified immunity defense, but that Rawls also fails to allege facts supporting a finding that Defendants' conduct was not objectively reasonable under the circumstances.Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, liability may be imposed upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another of federally protected rights. It neither provides a general remedy for the alleged tort of state officials, nor opens the federal courthouse doors to relieve complaints of all who suffer injury at the hands of the state or its officers. Municipal liability under section 1983 requires proof of three elements: a policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose "moving force" is the policy or custom. Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Monell and later decisions reject municipal liability predicated on respondeat superior, because the text of section 1983 will not bear such reading. Board of Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997).
A suit against a governmental agent or officer in his official capacity is a suit against the office that the employee holds and not against the actual employee. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). The three requirements for municipal liability outlined in Piotrowski are necessary in order to distinguish between individual violations by local employees and those that can be fairly attributed to conduct by the governmental entity itself. See Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578-79. "The unconstitutional conduct [alleged by the plaintiff] must be directly attributable to the municipality through some sort of official action or imprimatur; isolated unconstitutional actions by municipal employees will almost never trigger liability." Id. at 578. See Bennet v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 768 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1984).
The three requirements for municipal liability detailed above are necessary in order to distinguish between isolated violations committed by local employees and those violations which may be committed by the government itself. Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578. Therefore, municipalities may not be held liable for acts of lower level employees, but may be held liable for constitutional violations committed pursuant to an official policy or custom. Id. at 578. In addition, not only must the plaintiff establish that a policy or custom of the municipality was the "moving force" behind the alleged violation of a constitutional right; he must also establish that the municipality was "deliberately indifferent" to the known consequences of the policy. Id. at 580. The Fifth Circuit has noted that the plaintiff bears an "extremely heavy burden" in establishing both the municipality's deliberate indifference and a causal link between the alleged custom and the alleged constitutional violation. Peters v. City of Biloxi, 57 F.Supp. 2d 366, 376 (S.D. Miss. 1999). See Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 798 (5th Cir. 1998); Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 580 (Stating that these two requirements "must not be diluted.").
In the present case, Rawls' main allegation is that Defendants are liable under section 1983, through their authority as the Sheriff of Harrison County, Warden of HCADC, and Captain at the HCADC. Rawls argues the Defendants are liable for the injuries he sustained during an attack by fellow inmates due to inadequate staffing, training, and supervision at the HCADC. The Court notes that Plaintiff's official capacity claim against Defendants are, in reality, a claim against the office which they occupied at the time of the alleged incidents and, ultimately, Harrison County. To the extent the Rawls brings this action against Defendants in their official capacities, he must establish a constitutional violation and in addition must satisfy the test for official capacity liability. This test requires the plaintiff to establish three things: first, that the Sheriff's office and the HCADC had an official policy, practice or custom which would subject it to section 1983 liability; second, that the official policy is linked to the constitutional violation(s); and third that the official policy reflects the Sheriff's office and the HCADC's deliberate indifference to that injury. See Lawson v. Dallas County, 286 F.3d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 2002).
Rawls' Complaint and Amended Complaints assert that Defendants' negligence in administration and supervision of the staff at the HCADC resulted in an attack carried out on him by gang members housed in various sections of the facility. See Complaint and Amended Complaints. Rawls, a resident of B-block, maintains that on September 25, 2004, he was assaulted by ten to fifteen gang members belonging to the Vicelord organization who were residents of D and F blocks. See Amended Complaint filed April 15, 2005. Rawls claims the gang members gained entry into his block by a block trustee who secured the opening of the various block doors. Id. Rawls avers that Defendants negligence, inadequate staffing and training allowed for these gang members to enter his block and assault him. The Court rejects this argument. Monell and later decisions reject municipal liability predicated on respondeat superior, because the text of section 1983 will not bear such reading. Board of Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997).
Rawls' claims against the Defendants in their official capacities and for their alleged failure to protect him fail. At best, Rawls' claims amount to isolated incidents of negligent conduct, which, by itself, are insufficient to support the instant official capacity claims against Defendants. The Court finds that such bare allegations, without more, are simply insufficient to support a claim that there existed a policy or custom which was the moving force behind any alleged constitutional violation. The Fifth Circuit has held that a "state jail official's liability for episodic acts or omissions cannot attach unless the official had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm . . . but responded with deliberate indifference to that risk." Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996). In other words, for liability to attach to a jail official, a plaintiff must show that the official had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate, but responded with deliberate indifference to that risk. Id. at 649. Rawls has not offered any evidence that would create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Defendants possessed subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm, or that Defendants responded with deliberate indifference to that risk. Deliberate indifference is the subjective intent to cause harm, and it cannot be inferred from a jail official's failure to act reasonably. It is not the same as negligence. Id. at 648. "Negligent conduct by a prison official cannot be the basis for a due process claim." Id. at 646. At most, the Defendants' conduct constitutes negligence that does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. The record reflects that the Defendants had no subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to Rawls. Not only were the Defendants uninvolved in the altercation between the inmates, but when the Defendant's staff became aware of the altercation, they responded quickly. See Report of Elaine Lege attached as Exhibit "A-1" to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Accordingly, the Court finds that Rawls fails to show the existence of an official policy or custom resulting in any violation of his constitutional rights.
With regard to the individual capacity claims raised against Defendants, the Court finds that they are entitled to qualified immunity. In assessing a claim of qualified immunity, the determination must first be made as to whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Siegert v. Gilly, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991). If a violation of a right has been alleged, then it must be determined whether the defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable. Even if the conduct violates a constitutional right, qualified immunity is applicable if the conduct was objectively reasonable. Hare, 135 F.3d at 327. In the case at hand, the Court finds that Rawls has presented no evidence sufficient to allege a violation of a clearly established constitutional right or any unreasonable conduct on the part of the Defendants. The altercation was between Rawls and other inmates. By Rawls' own admission it was a block trustee that was responsible for the other inmates gaining access to his block. See Amended Complaint filed April 15, 2005. Rawls also fails to provide any evidence that the actions of the Defendants were objectively unreasonable. As stated previously, the Defendants were not involved in the altercation between the inmates. Furthermore, when the Defendants' staff was alerted that a fight involving Rawls and other inmates was occurring, they responded and ended the confrontation swiftly. See Report of Elaine Lege attached as Exhibit "A-1" to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The officers then immediately conducted an investigation as to who was involved in the fight and to what extent. Id. Rawls presents no evidence that the Defendants' actions surrounding his altercation with the other inmates was objectively unreasonable. Thus, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
The Defendants argue that in order for Rawls to be entitled to any emotional or mental injuries, he must show the existence of a physical injury. The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that a physical injury, suffered while in custody, must be shown in order for a prisoner to commence a federal civil action for mental or emotional injuries. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). If a plaintiff fails to show a physical injury, § 1997e(e) bars recovery for mental and emotional damages. See Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999). In determining whether a prisoner has sustained a necessary physical injury to support a claim for mental or emotional suffering, the "injury must be more than de minimis, but need not be significant." Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997). Rawls complains of various injuries resulting from the attack including scratches, bruises, a busted lip, and a sprained ankle. See Complaint. Other than complaining of these injuries, Rawls offers no proof that he actually suffered any physical harm. Additionally, a review of Rawls' medical records indicate that he did not seek treatment for these alleged injuries. Even if Rawls was able to prove the existence of a physical injury, the Court finds that the injuries Rawls complains of are de minimus such that recovery for emotional or mental damages is precluded by the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
Defendants next argue that to the extent that Rawls' Complaint and Amended Complaints could be construed to allege claims under state law, these claims are barred by the provisions of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1, et seq. Under that act, a governmental entity is not liable to any claimant who, at the claim arises, is an inmate of any detention center, jail, workhouse, penal farm, penitentiary or other such institution regardless of whether the claimant is or is not an inmate when the actual claim is filed. Rawls was incarcerated at HCADC during the time period that the alleged events occurred. Thus, any claims Rawls raises under Mississippi State Law are barred by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.
CONCLUSION
Based on the forgoing analysis, this Court is of the opinion that Rawls has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating any genuine issues of material fact which would preclude summary judgment on his section 1983 claim. Therefore, this Court finds the Defendants' Motion [32-1] for Summary Judgment should be granted, and that all claims against the Defendants should be dismissed with prejudice, both in their individual and official capacities.
In accordance with the Rules of this Court, any party, within ten days after being served a copy of this recommendation, may serve and file written objections to the recommendations, with a copy to the District Judge, the U.S. Magistrate Judge, and the opposing party. The District Judge at that time may accept, reject or modify in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, or may receive further evidence or recommit the matter to this Court with instructions. Failure to timely file written objections to proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report will bar an aggrieved party, except on the grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal unobjected to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court. Douglass v. United States Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1425 (5th Cir. 1996).