Opinion
Civil Action 22-1751
08-18-2023
SAMEECH RAWLS, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL GUYTON, MR. GIBBS, ROBERT GILMORE, CAPTAIN DURCO, and . MR. CUMBERLEDGE, Defendants.
ECF No. 8
Hardy, District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
LISAPUPO LENIHAN, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. RECOMMENDATION
The Court respectfully recommends that the Complaint be dismissed with prejudice as to all Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), because it fails to state a claim and is malicious.
II. REPORT
A. Factual Background and Procedural History
Plaintiff, Sameech Rawls, commenced this civil action on December 8, 2022, by filing a Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 1). The Court denied the Motion (ECF No.3) and Plaintiff refiled the Motion for IFP on January 10, 2023 (ECF No. 4). Again, the Court denied the Motion on March 6, 2023 (ECF No. 6). Plaintiff paid the entire filing fee and filed the Complaint on March 17, 2023 (ECF Nos. 7 & 8).
Plaintiff names Defendants in their personal and official capacities and alleges four claims stemming from two incidents at SCI Greene:
1. Fall from Top Bunk
Plaintiff alleges that on September 18, 2014, he fell out of a top bunk. Complaint. ECF No. 8 ¶ 1. He claims that he should have been assigned a bottom bunk because of his organic brain damage and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Id. The fall resulted in a “near fatal contusion,” a seizure and concussion. Id. ¶ 2. He was transported to an outside hospital, where he claims he was insufficiently treated for neck, spinal, and concussion-related injuries. Id. Plaintiff now has permanent lower back, hip, and left leg injuries, in addition to an epileptic condition that may result in periodic gran mal seizures. Id. ¶ 3.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Guyton, Cumberledge, and Durco were deliberately indifferent to the prison's policy regarding care, custody, and control, in failing to secure the bunk with a safety rail that “most likely would” have prevented the fall. Id. ¶ 4.
Plaintiff's grievance No. 532800 complained of a substantial risk of serious bodily injury from a defective bunk. Id. ¶ 5. The response to the grievance instructed that the bunk beds complied with manufacturer standards. Id. Plaintiff was placed in a handicapped cell to prevent further injury. Id. ¶ 6. The cell included a low-level bunk with an adjustable safety rail. Id.
2. Sexual Assault, Blackmail, Retaliation by Defendant Gibbs
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Gibbs obtained information about Plaintiff from reading the injury report stemming from Plaintiff's fall. Perhaps acting in retaliation, Plaintiff posits that Gibbs took advantage of Plaintiff's “mental and physical vulnerability.” Id. ¶ 11. On or about October 3, 2015, when Plaintiff was on kitchen detail, Gibbs sexually assaulted Plaintiff during a routine “pat” search. Id. ¶ 7. Gibbs stood behind Plaintiff, ordered him to extend his arms and spread his legs. Id. Following the pat search, Gibbs unfastened Plaintiff's pants, and grabbed, squeezed, and fondled Plaintiff's genitals. Id. Gibbs pressed his body against Plaintiff's, and Plaintiff felt Gibbs's erection on Plaintiff's buttocks. Id. Gibbs “began grinding his penis against Plaintiff's butt” and whispered, “Stop resisting” when Plaintiff attempted to pull away multiple times. The incident lasted approximately 60 seconds. Id.
Gibbs then blackmailed Plaintiff, threatening to remove him from kitchen employment if Plaintiff did not “keep quiet” about the assault. Id. Gibbs told Plaintiff that if he did not speak of the assault, Gibbs would arrange for Plaintiff to receive temporary sick leave with pay in addition to supplemental income. Id.
Plaintiff filed an inmate grievance (No. 591156) and has been subsequently “gradually, methodically - with malice aforethought - stripped of his humanity and dignity, treated as an oddity and/or someone's property.” Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff speaks of “further acts of torture [that] exist” when he “is compelled to face his tormentor [Mr. Gibbs] each and every day ....” Id. ¶ 12.
Following a four-month investigation into the grievance, a misconduct report (No. B855151) was served on Plaintiff, charging him with “Lying to an Employee.” Id. ¶ 10. The report, which Plaintiff contends is in retaliation for filing the grievance, stated that Plaintiff's allegations of sexual assault were “unfounded, false, and without factual basis.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that SCI Greene's policies and investigative procedures protected Defendant Gibbs at the expense of Plaintiff's “destroyed . . . state and peace of mind.” Id. ¶ 11.
Plaintiff alleges four counts against the Defendants including violations of equal protection and due process pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; violation of equal protection based on unlawful discrimination against a prison inmate pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985; neglect to prevent his fall from the top bunk and his sexual assault pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1986; and intentional infliction of emotional distress and cruel and unusual punishment in sanctioning torture.
Identical Civil Action: Rawls v. Gibbs, et al., 2:16-cv-1438
The action currently before the Court is nearly identical to a previous lawsuit filed by Plaintiff at Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-01438. In fact, the Statement of Facts and Legal Claims in the Complaint at bar (ECF No. 8 pp. 6-14) appear to be a photocopy of the Facts and Legal Claims in the Complaint at Civil Action No. 16-1438 (ECF No. 7 pp. 5-13).
In the 2016 Civil Action, Defendants filed a partial Motion to Dismiss, which was granted in part and denied in part. (ECF Nos. 82, 95, 96.) The Court permitted Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim to proceed against Defendants Guyton and Gilmore. The Court also granted Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint addressing deficiencies relative to, inter alia, a failure to train or supervise claim against Defendants Guyton and Gilmore and a claim against Defendant Durco for fostering an environment that encouraged sexual assaults vis-a-vis inappropriate pat-down searches by Defendant Gibbs in October 2015. Plaintiff failed to file a second amended complaint, and, pursuant to an Order entered on September 3, 2020, the failure to train/supervise claim against Defendants Guyton and Gilmore and the claim against Defendant Durco alleging liability on his part for the inappropriate patdown searches by Defendant Gibbs were dismissed with prejudice. (ECF No. 98.)
The Court granted summary judgment concerning the remaining claims: (1) the Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Guyton and Gilmore for their alleged failure to comply with Plaintiff's existing lower bunk medical restriction and (2) an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Gibbs for sexual assault that occurred vis-a-vis inappropriate pat-down searches in October 2015. (ECF. No. 128.) The Court of Appeals dismissed Plaintiff's subsequent appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction on October 17, 2022 (ECF No. 148). In Plaintiff's Complaint at bar, he acknowledges that he filed the prior case at Civil Action No. 16-1438 and that it was dismissed because he missed the filing deadline “due to COVID restrictions.” ECF No. 8 p.7. Plaintiff appears to suggest that he files the Complaint at bar because he missed the appeal deadline. Plaintiff's duplicative Complaint at bar, however, must be dismissed because it fails to state a claim and is malicious pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
B. Legal Standards
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub.L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity (28 U.S.C. § 1915A). The Court is required to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking redress from governmental officers or employees.
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). However, before dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 113-14 (3d Cir. 2002).
In reviewing a pro se plaintiff's complaint, the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to the pro se plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007); Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2008). A complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above a speculative level.” Id. at 555. The court need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Additionally, a civil rights claim “must contain specific allegations of fact which indicate a deprivation of constitutional rights; allegations which are nothing more than broad, simple and conclusory statements are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.” Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir. 1987).
Finally, a court must employ less stringent standards when considering pro se pleadings than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). In a § 1983 action, the court must “apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.” Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). See also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.”) (citing Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1993)). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996).
C. Analysis
Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata
The principle of res judicata bars claims that were brought, or could have been brought, in a previous action. In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008). The doctrine applies where there has been a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit which involves the same parties or their privies and a subsequent suit concerning the same causes of action. Id. “Although res judicata is an affirmative defense for a defendant to plead, dismissal for failure to state a claim may be appropriate when it is obvious, either from the fact of the pleading or from other court records, that an affirmative defense such as res judicata will necessarily defeat the claim.” Taylor v. Visinsky, 534 Fed.Appx. 110, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007).
As discussed at length above, this civil action is Plaintiff's second attempt to bring the same claims against the same parties as alleged in his Complaint at Civil Action No. 16-1438. First, the dismissal of some of Plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim is a judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata. See, e.g., Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981) (“The dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a ‘judgment on the merits'” for purposes of res judicata). Moreover, the disposal of his remaining claims on summary judgment also constitutes a final judgment on the merits. See Hubicki v. ACF Indus., Inc., 484 F.2d 519, 524 (3d Cir. 1973), cited in, McLaughlin v. Bd. Of Trustees of the Nat'l Elevator Indus. Health Ben. Plan, Civ. No. 16-3121, 2016 WL 5955530, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 13, 2016). In addition, the fact Plaintiff attempted to appeal the prior action “does not affect the finality of the judgment for purposes of res judicata.” Huron Holding Co. v. Lincoln Mine Operating Co., 312 U.S. 183, 189 (1941) (appeal does not “detract from ... decisiveness and finality” of judgment).
Therefore, Plaintiff's civil action at bar should be dismissed for failure to state a claim because it is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Any attempt to amend would be futile as a matter of law.
Plaintiff's Claims are Time-Barred
In addition, it is apparent from the face of the Complaint that Plaintiff's claims are time-barred. Like the doctrine of res judicata, a court may consider a limitations defense before the filing of an answer where it is clear from the face of the Complaint that the action is time-barred. See Bohus v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 784 F.3d 918, 923 n.2 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Third Circuit Rule” permits the raising of a limitations defense in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion). Here, Plaintiff initiated the instant civil action in December 2022, over two years after he allegedly fell off the top bunk in 2014 and over two years after he was allegedly sexually assaulted in 2015. This civil action therefore appears to have been untimely filed beyond the applicable statute of limitations. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2) (providing a two-year statute of limitations); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-68, 276-77 (1985) (forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to § 1983 actions).
Therefore, Plaintiff's civil action should be dismissed for failure to state a claim because it is time barred. Any attempt to amend would be futile as a matter of law.
Plaintiff's Claims are Malicious
“[A] complaint is malicious where it is abusive of the judicial process and merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims.” Hurst v. Counselman, 436 Fed.Appx. 58, 59 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1993)). “[A] court may look to its own records to determine whether a pleading repeats prior claims.” Crisafi, 655 F.2d at 1309 (citing Van Meter v. Morgan, 518 F.2d 366 (8th Cir. 1975) (affirming dismissal based on finding by district court that a prior complaint, then pending, was based on same conduct by same defendant); Duhart v. Carlson, 469 F.2d 471 (10th Cir. 1972) (approving trial court's dismissal of a complaint, prior to service of process, on the ground that the plaintiffs sought to relitigate issues already litigated)). In addition, when considering whether an action is malicious, a court “‘must, in accordance with the definition of the term ‘malicious,' engage in a subjective inquiry into the litigant's motivations at the time of the filing of the lawsuit to determine whether the action is an attempt to vex, injure or harass the defendant.'”) Hurst, 436 Fed.Appx. at 59 (quoting Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1030, 1086 (3d Cir. 1995)).
Here, because the Plaintiff photocopied the Fact and Legal Claim sections from his prior 2016 civil action onto the Complaint at bar, the Plaintiff would have understood that he was filing a duplicative action that would result in harassment of the same Defendants. In addition, it appears that he may have filed the Complaint at bar because he missed the appeal deadline in the prior action. As a result of these motives, Plaintiff is subjecting Defendants to vexatious legal proceedings. Therefore, Plaintiff's civil action should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) because it is malicious. Any attempt to amend would be futile as a matter of law.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is respectfully recommended that the Complaint (ECF No. 8) be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) because it fails to state a claim and is malicious.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and Recommendation to file objections. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.