Opinion
03-07-2024
Aronson Mayefsky & Sloan, LLP, New York (Nina S. Gross of counsel), for appellant. Cohen Clair Lans Greifer & Simpson, LLP, New York (Bernard E. Clair of counsel), for respondent.
Aronson Mayefsky & Sloan, LLP, New York (Nina S. Gross of counsel), for appellant. Cohen Clair Lans Greifer & Simpson, LLP, New York (Bernard E. Clair of counsel), for respondent.
Oing, J.P., Moulton, Kapnick, Mendez, Shulman, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Kelly O’Neill Levy, J.), entered May 3, 2023, which, to the extent appealed from, granted defendant wife’s motion for pendente lite counsel fees, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and defendant’s motion for counsel fees denied.
Under the circumstances of this case, the court improperly awarded counsel fees to the wife (Domestic Relations Law § 237). Assuming the wife is the less monied spouse, the presumption of entitlement to counsel fees is rebuttable, and the disparity in the parties’ incomes, even as of the date of the wife’s motion, is not so great that the wife was unable to obtain and pay for adequate representation (Murray v. Rashid, 211 A.D.3d 481, 482, 180 N.Y.S.3d 16 [1st Dept. 2022], lv dismissed 39 N.Y.3d 1176, 191 N.Y.S.3d 621, 212 N.E.3d 852 [2023]; see Roddy v. Roddy, 161 A.D.3d 441, 442, 76 N.Y.S.3d 141 [1st Dept. 2018]). Although the husband’s financial picture was evidently more complicated than the wife’s, there was no finding by the court that the husband engaged in dilatory practices (see Gallen v. Gallen, 183 A.D.3d 425, 426, 123 N.Y.S.3d 579 [1st Dept. 2020]), nor do we find otherwise upon the record before us.