Opinion
5:19-CV-161 (TES)
08-08-2023
JOHN STEPHEN RAVAN, Plaintiff, v. Corporal ALTHEA ADDISON JACKSON, et al., Defendants.
ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION
THOMAS Q. LANGSTAFF, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Following remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, this matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Summit Food Group, Thomas, and Wheeler (Doc. 208), and Plaintiff's Motion to Amend (Doc. 213). Briefing of the Motions has concluded, and the Court enters this Order and Recommendation thereto.
Background and Procedural History
Plaintiff was previously detained at the Houston County Detention Center (“HCDC”) in Georgia. While Plaintiff was detained there, Plaintiff alleges that the medical team at HCDC changed Plaintiff's medication without proper testing, which allegedly resulted in Plaintiff contracting Stevens Johnson Syndrome/Toxic Epidermal Necrology, a serious, painful, and potentially life-threatening illness. Thereafter, the medical team allegedly failed to provide constitutionally adequate medical treatment to Plaintiff. Plaintiff also alleges that HCDC officers denied him medical treatment despite Plaintiff visibly bleeding from sores in his mouth, and sores on his body and legs, because the HCDC officers failed to provide him with grievances to seek medical treatment. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied kosher meals altogether, or on other occasions, that his kosher meals were improperly prepared and tampered with.
On April 25, 2019, proceeding pro se, Plaintiff brought the above-styled action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the Court screened Plaintiff's claims and ordered as follows: Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Freeman and Jackson (collectively “Officer Defendants”) for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, as well as Plaintiff's First Amendment and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) claims against Defendants Summit Food Group (“Summit”), Thomas, and Wheeler (collectively “Food Service Defendants”), could proceed for further factual development. (Doc. 72).
As to the Officer Defendants, the Court found, in relevant part, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged a serious medical need, that the Officer Defendants were subjectively aware of his medical needs because Plaintiff submitted multiple grievances seeking medical treatment and multiple nurses allegedly informed the Officer Defendants of the heightened risks associated with Plaintiff's medical condition, and that the Officer Defendants denied him medical attention. Id. at 10.
As to the Food Service Defendants, in relevant part, Plaintiff's claims against the Food Service Defendants could proceed relating to the alleged contamination of Plaintiff's kosher meals under the First Amendment, and Plaintiff's allegations regarding the contamination of his kosher diet were likewise sufficient to proceed against the Food Service Defendants as to his RLUIPA claims. Id. at 10-12.
However, in relevant part, the Court recommended the dismissal of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against Defendants Southern Correctional Medicine (“Southern Correctional”), Broome,Cox, Sprague, Vaughn, and Wrobel. For clarity, the Court refers to Defendants Broome, Cox, Sprague, Vaughn, and Wrobel as the “individual Medical Defendants”. The individual Medical Defendants together with Defendant Southern Correctional are referred to as the “Medical Defendants”.
Defendant Broome's pre-service Answer states that Defendant Broome is incorrectly named “Broom” on the docket. (Doc. 32, p. 1). Accordingly, the Clerk is DIRECTED to make this change to Defendant Broome's name on the docket.
Defendant Wrobel's pre-service Answer states that Defendant Wrobel is incorrectly named “Rohl” on the docket. (Doc. 35, p. 1). Accordingly, the Clerk is DIRECTED to make this change to Defendant Wrobel's name on the docket.
As to Defendant Southern Correctional, it was not clear to the Court that Plaintiff intended to name Defendant Southern Correctional as a Defendant, and to the extent that Plaintiff asserted claims against Defendant Southern Correctional based on the allegations against Defendant Wrobel, a doctor employed by Defendant Southern Correctional, then the claims against Defendant Southern Correctional should be dismissed for failure to state a claim because Plaintiff only alleged that Defendant Wrobel and his employees had, at most, acted negligently, and Defendant Wrobel and his employees were likewise entitled to dismissal. Id. at 9-10. As to Defendants Broome, Cox, Sprague, and Vaughn, Plaintiff failed to link those Defendants to any alleged constitutional violations, and to the extent that they were Defendant Wrobel's employees, Plaintiff likewise failed to state a claim against Defendants Broome, Cox, Sprague, and Vaughn for the same reason that Plaintiff failed to state claims against Defendants Southern Correctional and Wrobel. Id. at 13. The District Judge adopted the undersigned's Recommendation. (Doc. 96). The Medical Defendants were dismissed, and Plaintiff's claims against the Officer Defendants and the Food Service Defendants proceeded for further factual development. Id.
The Court also found that Plaintiff failed to link former defendants Turner and Wingfield to any alleged constitutional violations. (Doc. 72, p. 13). In its Opinion, the Eleventh Circuit included former defendants Turner and Wingfield in its definition of the Medical Defendants. (Doc. 201, p. 3 n.3). However, Plaintiff does not seek to amend his claims to include former defendants Turner and Wingfield. (Docs. 213, p. 7 n.1; 213-1, pp. 4-6).
Subsequently, the Food Service Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, and the Officer Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docs. 97, 105). The District Judge adopted the undersigned's Recommendation and granted the Officer Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and the Food Service Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (Docs. 174, 183). In relevant part, after judgment was entered, but dated before judgment was entered, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend, which the Court denied as moot. (Docs. 187, 189). Plaintiff filed an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. (Doc. 194).
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit appointed counsel for Plaintiff. (Doc. 201, p. 3 n.1). When it issued its Opinion, in relevant part, the Eleventh Circuit “vacate[d] the dismissal” of the Medical Defendants and remanded for consideration of whether Plaintiff should be given leave to amend; reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff's First Amendment claims against Defendants Thomas and Wheeler; reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim against Defendant Summit; and, reversed the grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claims against the Officer Defendants for denying grievance forms to Plaintiff. Id. at 25.
The Court notes that the “ruling[]” of the Eleventh Circuit “vacat[ing] the dismissal” of the Medical Defendants is in tension with the body of the opinion issued by the Eleventh Circuit. Specifically, at no time did the Eleventh Circuit find that the dismissal of the Medical Defendants, which occurred at the initial screening phase, was inappropriate or in error. Rather, the body of the opinion addresses this Court's denial as moot of Plaintiff's Motion to Amend as to the Medical Defendants, which Motion was filed after judgment was entered by the Court, but predated the entry of judgment because Plaintiff effectively filed it prior to the entry of judgment under the “prison mailbox rule.” (See Doc. 201, pp. 9-10, 9 n.6, 11 (discussion of third part), 23 (“Given our rulings here, this case is no longer moot. So we vacate the decision denying the motion to amend as moot, and we remand for consideration of whether [Plaintiff] is entitled to leave to amend.” (emphasis added))).
Following the May 19, 2023 remand from the Eleventh Circuit, counsel for Plaintiff filed petitions for admission to plead and practice pro hac vice and notices of appearance. (Docs. 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 210, 211).
On June 2, 2023, the Food Service Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 208), to which Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 212), after which the Food Service Defendants filed a Reply (Doc. 214).
On June 6, 2023, the Court provided Plaintiff with an opportunity to file a motion to amend as to the Medical Defendants. (Doc. 209). On June 23, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend (Doc. 213), to which the Food Service Defendants filed a Response (Doc. 215), after which Plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. 218). The Medical Defendantsalso filed a Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend (Doc. 216), to which Plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. 219).
The Eleventh Circuit did not include Defendant Southern Correctional in its definition of “Medical Defendants.” (Doc. 201, p. 3 n.3). Plaintiff's Motion to Amend and proposed amended complaint include Defendant Southern Correctional as part of the Medical Defendants. (Docs. 213, p. 2; 213-1, pp. 4-5). In addressing Plaintiff's Motion to Amend and proposed amended complaint, the Court includes Defendant Southern Correctional in the collective Medical Defendants.
The Officer Defendants did not file responses to either the Food Service Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend.
The Court proceeds as follows: First, the Court issues an Order addressing Plaintiff's Motion to Amend and, finding that amendment is appropriate thereto, the Court deems Plaintiff's operative Complaint to be amended by his proposed amended complaint, and proceeds to screen Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A(a). Second, finding that Plaintiff's claims survive initial screening, orders that service be made on Defendants. Third, the Court makes a Recommendation as to the Food Service Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
ORDER
1. Motion to Amend
In relevant part, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded this matter to this Court for this Court to consider whether Plaintiff should be granted leave to amend as to the Medical Defendants. (Doc. 201, pp. 11, 23, 25). Consistent with that mandate, this Court provided Plaintiff with the opportunity to file a motion to amend as to the Medical Defendants. (Doc. 209). Thereafter, Plaintiff timely filed a Motion to Amend, in which Plaintiff seeks to amend his operative Complaint not just as to the Medical Defendants, but also as to the Food Service Defendants and the Officer Defendants, and Plaintiff seeks to add state law medical malpractice claims against the Medical Defendants. (Doc. 213). Plaintiff also submits a proposed amended complaint with supporting exhibits. (Doc. 213-1).
In response, the Food Service Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Motion to Amend should be denied because it is made in bad faith as a “fourth bite at the apple,” which causes undue prejudice to Defendants; that amending a complaint following appeal is unreasonable; that Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint is futile because it does not meet the Ashcroft v. Iqbal pleading standard, and the proposed amended complaint does not properly plead Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim; and that Plaintiff's Motion to Amend should be denied because of undue delay in seeking to amend. (Doc. 215).
For their part, the Medical Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Motion to Amend should be denied because Plaintiff fails to state claims of deliberate indifference against the Medical Defendants; the proposed amended complaint fails to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; the Court should deny leave to amend based on futility, because Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint would be properly dismissed or immediately subject to summary judgment for Defendants; and, because the proposed amended complaint is futile, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law medical malpractice claims. (Doc. 216).
A. Standards
Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part, as follows:
(1) Amending as a Matter of Course
A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within:
(A) 21 days after serving it, or
(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is
required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.
(2) Other Amendments
In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.
B. Analysis
The Court provides analysis of Plaintiff's Motion to Amend separately as to the groups of Defendants as follows: First, the Court addresses Plaintiff's Motion to Amend as to the Food Service Defendants and the Officer Defendants. Second, the Court addresses Plaintiff's Motion to Amend as to the Medical Defendants.
i. The Food Service Defendants and the Officer Defendants
On December 30, 2019, after being ordered to recast his original Complaint, Plaintiff filed his Recast Complaint.(Docs. 46, 66). On March 4, 2020, the Officer Defendants filed their Answer. (Doc. 85). On April 3, 2020, the Food Service Defendants filed a 12(b) Motion. (Doc. 97). Thus, because more than twenty-one (21) days have passed since the Officer Defendants filed a responsive pleading and the Food Service Defendants filed their 12(b) Motion, Plaintiff needs leave from the Court to amend further as to the Food Service Defendants and the Officer Defendants.
While Plaintiff did file a pre-judgment Motion to Amend his Recast Complaint (Doc. 175), the district judge initially denied it as moot, but subsequently vacated that Order before ultimately entering judgment against Plaintiff without addressing the Motion to Amend (Docs. 179, 183). As a result, Plaintiff does not appear to have amended his Recast Complaint.
Although the decision to grant or deny a motion to amend a complaint is within the court's discretion, “a justifying reason must be apparent for denial of a motion to amend.” Moore v. Baker, 989 F.2d 1129, 1131 (11th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). This Court may consider factors “such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment, etc.[]” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). “[U]nless there is a substantial reason to deny leave to amend, the discretion of the district court is not broad enough to permit denial.” Thomas v. Town of Davie, 847 F.2d 771, 773 (11th Cir. 1988) (alteration in original) (quoting Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Invest. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 (Former 5th Cir. 1981)) (addressing leave to amend in the context of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) without leave to amend and leave to amend after judgment of dismissal under Rule 59(e)). For the reasons which follow, the Court finds that leave to amend should be granted as to the Food Service Defendants and the Officer Defendants.
First, the Officer Defendants did not file a response to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend. Thus, it does not appear that the Officer Defendants object to Plaintiff being granted leave to amend.
Second, Plaintiff does not appear to be seeking leave to amend in bad faith. Rather, now represented by counsel, Plaintiff seeks to assert clearer factual allegations, the result of which will permit Defendants to more precisely respond to Plaintiff's claims. Further, Plaintiff does not appear to be raising frivolous claims, as the Court discusses in its initial screening, infra.
Third, Plaintiff does not appear to be attempting to harass Defendants. Rather, Plaintiff seeks to assert “perfectly legitimate” constitutional claims, which claims may or may not be meritorious, and the assertion of which does not amount to harassment. Hall v. Merola, 67 F.4th 1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 2023).
Fourth, Plaintiff did not delay his request to amend, as he timely sought leave to amend within the time permitted by this Court's Order. To be sure, the Food Service Defendants assert that this matter has already been litigated for over four years, and as a result, Plaintiff has delayed requesting leave to amend. However, the “lengthy nature of litigation, without any other evidence of prejudice to the defendants or bad faith on the part of the plaintiff[], does not justify denying the plaintiff[] the opportunity to amend [the] complaint.” Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citing Floyd v. E. Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1490 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding no evidence of prejudice based only on the length of the litigation, which had lasted more than three years)).
Further, while this matter has been pending for over four years, more than nine months passed between the time Plaintiff filed his original Complaint and when the Court directed service on Defendants. (Docs. 1, 72). Notably, before the Court screened the Complaint pursuant to its obligations under the PLRA, the Medical Defendants filed a pre-service Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 44). This Court's Recommendation to deny the Medical Defendants' pre-service Motion to Dismiss was adopted by the district judge over a month later. (Docs. 46, 65). Approximately thirteen (13) months passed between the time the Court directed service on Defendants and the time judgment was entered against Plaintiff. (Docs. 72, 184). Thereafter, this matter was on appeal at the Eleventh Circuit for two years and nearly two months. (Docs. 194, 202). In sum, the Court finds that the duration of the litigation does not support denying leave to amend.
To the extent that the Food Service Defendants argue that amendment post-appeal would be unreasonable, while it is true that the Eleventh Circuit did not expressly state that the Court must consider whether to grant Plaintiff leave to amend as to the Food Service Defendants, neither did the Eleventh Circuit expressly state that the Court should not, or could not, consider such a request regarding the Food Service Defendants.
As the Court views it, the Food Service Defendants are returned to this case at the pre-trial stage when dispositive motions may still be filed. The Court is unaware of any reason that amendment post-remand is inappropriate, except as it relates to the consideration of the factors discussed, supra. There is no Federal Rule of Civil Procedure which either explicitly states that post-remand amendment is not appropriate, or a Rule which implies that such amendment is not appropriate. Neither is there binding precedent which expressly prohibits it. Further, under Rule 59(e), amendment is even permitted following the entry of judgment. Sheffler v. Americold Realty Tr., 2023 WL 3918491 at *2 (11th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted) (the Eleventh Circuit's “earliest binding precedent provides that the ‘same' liberal amendment standard [under Rule 15] also applies to a Rule 59(e) motion seeking leave to file an amended complaint.”). As a result, the Court finds that all of the relevant factors favor granting Plaintiff leave to amend as to the Food Service Defendants and the Officer Defendants.
ii. The Medical Defendants
To the extent that the Medical Defendants argue that Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint would be properly dismissed or immediately subject to summary judgment, they do so by proffering alleged facts which are not before the Court at this time. Because the Medical Defendants were dismissed at the initial screening phase, there has been no discovery as to the Medical Defendants.
Further, as to the Medical Defendants, where a case “has more than one defendant, and not all have filed responsive pleadings, the plaintiff may amend the complaint as a matter of course with regard to those defendants that have yet to answer.” Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Brewer-Giorgio v. Producers Video, Inc., 216 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010)); see also Coventry First, LLC v. McCarty, 605 F.3d 865, 869, 869 n.1 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing Williams, 477 F.3d at 1291, and noting that Rule 15 was amended effective December 1, 2009 such that motions to dismiss are included within the twenty-one (21) day time period under Rule 15(a)).
The Medical Defendants have not filed a responsive pleading or a Rule 12(b) motion in this matter. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to amend as to the Medical Defendants without leave of the Court or written consent of the Medical Defendants. Also, because Plaintiff is entitled to amend as to the Medical Defendants, he is also entitled to amend to add state law medical malpractice claims.
If Defendants are later found to be entitled to dismissal or judgment on Plaintiff's federal claims, the Court may decide at that time whether to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over any surviving state law claims.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Amend (Doc. 213). Further, the Court DEEMS Plaintiff's operative Complaint to be amended by Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint (Doc. 213-1) such that Plaintiff's operative Complaint is now Doc. 213-1.
2. Preliminary Screening of the Proposed Amended Complaint
As the Court previously noted when screening Plaintiff's operative Complaint (Doc. 72), in accordance with the PLRA, the district courts are obligated to conduct a preliminary screening of every complaint filed by a prisoner who seeks redress from a government entity, official, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Screening is also required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) when the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. Here, both statutes apply, and the standard of review is the same. As such, the Court reviews Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint by accepting all factual allegations as true. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (11th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff may not amend his operative Complaint to bring claims that are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or to bring claims that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The complaint must allege facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting a claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. The Court will screen Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint as to each group of Defendants, as follows:
A. The Medical Defendants
To state an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must show (1) a medical need that is serious; and (2) that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to that serious medical need. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (citations omitted). In the Eleventh Circuit, a serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hill v. Dekalb Reg'l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994)). In either of these circumstances, the medical need must be “one that, if left unattended, ‘pos[es] a substantial risk of serious harm.'” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000)). Additionally, a plaintiff must plead facts showing that the defendant was subjectively aware of the medical need and nevertheless acted with deliberate indifference, which requires more than gross negligence. Wade v. McDade, 67 F.4th 1363, 1371-74 (11th Cir. 2023) (discussing Townsend v. Jefferson Cnty., 601 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2010)).
To state a claim for medical malpractice under Georgia law, a “plaintiff must show (1) the duty inherent in the doctor-patient relationship; (2) the breach of that duty by failing to exercise the requisite degree of skill and care; and (3) that this failure was the proximate cause of the injury sustained.” Myrick v. Fulton Cnty., Ga., 69 F.4th 1277, 1306 (11th Cir. 2023) (citing Med. Ctr. of Cent. Ga. v. Landers, 274 Ga.App. 78, 616 S.E.2d 808, 813 (Ga.App. 2005)).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 also requires plaintiffs asserting claims for medical malpractice in Georgia to attach an affidavit from an expert setting forth at least one negligent act or omission. Myrick, 69 F.4th at 1306. However, Plaintiff does not address the expert affidavit or attach an expert affidavit. Plaintiff's failure to do so does not require dismissal of his state law medical malpractice claims. In this case, “the Erie doctrine also applies to pendent state claims litigated in federal courts.” Palm Beach Golf Center-Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A., 781 F.3d 1245, 1259 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Lundgren v. McDaniel, 814 F.2d 600, 605 (11th Cir. 1987)). As a result, state procedural law does not apply to Plaintiff's state law medical malpractice claims. Instead, “federal law governs matters of procedure.” Id. (citation omitted). Consequently, courts in the Middle District of Georgia have “consistently held that the expert affidavit rules of [O.C.G.A.] § 9-11-9.1 are purely procedural and therefore not applicable in cases before the Court” where the Erie doctrine would apply. Allen v. Kroger Co., 2018 WL 6729646, at *5 (M.D. Ga. 2018) (collecting cases).
Where a private corporation contracts with a county to provide medical services to inmates, the corporation is treated in the same manner as the county for the purposes of § 1983 liability. Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (citations omitted). “A local government may be held liable under § 1983 only for acts for which it is actually responsible, ‘acts which the [local government] has officially sanctioned or ordered.'” Turquitt v. Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 137 F.3d 1285, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986) (alteration in original)). Thus, a “county's liability under § 1983 may not be based on the doctrine of respondeat superior[,]” or supervisor liability; rather, a “county is liable only when the county's ‘official policy' causes a constitutional violation.” Grech v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of a failure on the part of the medical team at HCDC to administer tests prior to changing his medications, Plaintiff developed an extremely painful condition, which progresses fast, and which was obvious to non-medically trained observers. Indeed, lay observers could - and did - see his distress, which included Plaintiff bleeding from open wounds over large portions of his skin, as well as the detachment of part of the mucous membrane of his eye. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Broome, Cox, Sprague, Vaughn, and Wrobel's actions and inactions were a proximate cause thereof, in that they did not perform tests prior to changing Plaintiff's medications, and that after he developed Stevens Johnson Syndrome/Toxic Epidermal Necrology, Defendants Broome, Cox, Sprague, Vaughn, and Wrobel continually declined to treat Plaintiff's obviously severe condition, or to escalate his care further, despite Plaintiff's continued complaints and requests for treatment, including instances when he was denied medication for pain despite Plaintiff's requests for pain medication. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that, despite being immunocompromised because of the lesions in his skin resulting from the medical condition, the individual Medical Defendants moved Plaintiff to general population, which is not a sterile environment. (See, generally, Doc. 213-1, pp. 7-22).
As to Defendant Southern Correctional, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Southern Correctional had notice of grievances that Plaintiff filed regarding his allegedly inadequate medical treatment, that Defendant Southern Correctional was aware of Plaintiff's medical condition through the individual Medical Defendants, and that Defendant Southern Correctional did nothing to improve Plaintiff's treatment. Further, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Southern Correctional had authorized a practice of ignoring the serious medical needs of other inmates; in support thereof, Plaintiff alleges that two inmates provided affidavits to that effect, and Plaintiff attaches those affidavits to the proposed amended complaint. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Southern Correctional did not educate its staff or address the policies that allowed or encouraged the allegedly ongoing and pervasive neglect. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the individual Medical Defendants were carrying out the policy of Defendant Southern Correctional by declining to sufficiently treat Plaintiff. See, generally, id. at 15-16, 19, 345, 347.
The Court finds that, at this stage, Plaintiff has adequately alleged claims of deliberate indifference as to the Medical Defendants, including Defendant Southern Correctional. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claims against the Medical Defendants shall proceed for further factual development. The Court further finds that Plaintiff's state law medical malpractice claims against the Medical Defendants may proceed for further factual development. See, id. at 29-35, 42-44.
B. The Officer Defendants
As an initial matter, in his proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the Officer Defendants ordered and approved Plaintiff being moved to general population. Id. at 14. While it does not appear that Plaintiff asserts these allegations as claims per se, the Court notes that, the law of the case doctrine prohibits this Court from considering any claims based on the Officer Defendants moving Plaintiff to general population. An “appellate decision is binding in all subsequent proceedings in the same case unless the presentation of new evidence or an intervening change in the controlling law dictates a different result, or the appellate decision is clearly erroneous and, if implemented, would work a manifest injustice.” Litman v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 825 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (citations omitted). Here, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this Court's grant of summary judgment to the Officer Defendants for “both officers on the movement claim.” (Doc. 201, pp. 23, 25). As a result, to the extent that Plaintiff asserts any claims related to the moving of Plaintiff to general population by the Officer Defendants, the Court recommends that they be dismissed. The Court now addresses Plaintiff's remaining allegations as to the Officer Defendants.
Like the Medical Defendants, Plaintiff alleges that the Officer Defendants were also deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. In relevant part, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Freeman angrily confronted a nurse because the nurse provided Plaintiff with a guide that explained Plaintiff's condition in more detail. On at least fifteen (15) occasions, Plaintiff allegedly asked the Officer Defendants for medical request forms, but they denied Plaintiff's requests. Plaintiff allegedly laid “in agony” for nearly six hours after requesting a medical request form from Defendant Freeman, but Defendant Freeman never brought a form to Plaintiff, despite Plaintiff being able to observe coagulated blood on his legs. Defendant Freeman allegedly forced Plaintiff to go ten (10) days without showering, despite Plaintiff having open sores on his body. (See, generally, Doc. 213-1, pp. 14, 20-22).
The Court finds that, at this stage, Plaintiff has adequately alleged claims of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need as to the Officer Defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claims against the Officer Defendants shall proceed for further factual development. See, id. at 35-38.
C. The Food Service Defendants
As to the Food Service Defendants, Plaintiff asserts two separate sets of claims. First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Thomas and Wheeler violated Plaintiff's First Amendment rights by impermissibly burdening his sincerely held religious beliefs because they denied Plaintiff kosher meals. Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Summit violated RLUIPA because it substantially burdened Plaintiff's religious exercise by refusing to provide Plaintiff kosher meals. Id. at 38-42. The Court addresses each set of claims in turn.
i. First Amendment Claims
“Although prison inmates retain protections afforded by the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, prison officials may impose limitations on an inmate's exercise of sincerely held religious beliefs if the limitations are ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.'” Johnson v. Brown, 581 Fed.Appx. 777, 780 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987)). Whether a prison regulation is reasonable depends on four factors:
(1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and a legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the asserted constitutional right that remain open to the inmates; (3) whether and the extent to which accommodation of the asserted right will have an impact on prison staff, inmates, and the allocation of prison resources generally; and (4) whether the regulation represents an exaggerated response to prison concerns.Id. (quoting Hakim v. Hicks, 223 F.3d 1244, 1247-48 (11th Cir. 2000)). This inquiry is highly fact-specific, and thus, “First Amendment claims involving state interference with or establishment of religion should not be dismissed without a hearing inquiring into the sincerity of the plaintiff's alleged religious beliefs and the state's justification for regulating the manner in which those beliefs are practiced.” Saleem v. Evans, 866 F.2d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).
As to Defendants Thomas and Wheeler, Plaintiff alleges that he is Jewish and that he keeps a kosher diet as part of his religious practice. Plaintiff received a kosher food tray for the first few days of his incarceration at HCDC, but then his kosher food tray was allegedly stopped. Plaintiff submitted grievances for almost five weeks, but he never received a reply. Plaintiff believes that, instead of answering his grievances, Plaintiff was provided with inedible non-kosher food trays on numerous occasions, at least some of which were prepared by Defendant Wheeler, with the knowledge of Defendant Thomas, the kitchen supervisor at HCDC. (See, generally, Doc. 213-1, pp. 22-29).
The Court finds that, at this stage, Plaintiff has adequately alleged violations of his First Amendment rights as to Defendants Thomas and Wheeler for their alleged failure to provide Plaintiff with kosher food trays. Accordingly, Plaintiff's First Amendment claims against Defendants Thomas and Wheeler shall proceed for further factual development. See, id. at 38-40.
ii. RLUIPA Claim
To state a claim under RLUIPA, “the plaintiff must demonstrate that his engagement in religious exercise was substantially burdened by the law, regulation, or practice he challenges.” Smith v. Owens, 848 F.3d 975, 979 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Knight v. Thompson, 797 F.3d 934, 943 (11th Cir. 2015)). The burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the regulation was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental purpose. Id. (citation omitted).
As to Defendant Summit, Plaintiff makes the same allegations as he does as to Defendants Thomas and Wheeler. In addition, Plaintiff also alleges that, on information and belief, HCDC receives federal funding, and that HCDC uses some of that federal funding to pay Defendant Summit. Finally, Plaintiff also alleges that he was forced to choose between adhering to his kosher diet or abandoning his religious practice as a result of Defendant Summit's failure to provide kosher food trays to him. (See Doc. 213-1, pp. 22-29).
The Court finds that, at this stage, Plaintiff has adequately alleged a violation of RLUIPA as to Defendant Summit for its alleged failure to provide Plaintiff with kosher food trays, thereby substantially burdening his religious exercise. Accordingly, Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim against Defendant Summit shall proceed for further factual development. See, id. at 40-42.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claims against Defendants Southern Correctional Medicine, Broome, Cox, Sprague, Vaughn, and Wrobel; Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claims against Defendants Freeman and Jackson; Plaintiff's First Amendment claims against Defendants Thomas and Wheeler; Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Summit Food Group for violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act; and, Plaintiff's state law claims for inadequate medical care under Georgia law against Defendants Southern Correctional Medicine, Broome, Cox, Sprague, Vaughn, and Wrobel, shall all proceed for further factual development. (See Doc. 213-1, pp. 29-44). However, to the extent that Plaintiff asserts claims for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against Defendants Freeman and Jackson for their alleged failure to move Plaintiff, it is RECOMMENDED that those claims be DISMISSED.
ORDER FOR SERVICE AND RESPONSE
Having found that Plaintiff has made colorable constitutional violation claims, it is accordingly ORDERED that service be made by the Court on Defendants Southern Correctional Medicine, Broome, Cox, Sprague, Vaughn, and Wrobel, and that they file an Answer, or such other response as may be appropriate under Rule 12, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Defendants are reminded of the duty to avoid unnecessary service expenses, and of the possible imposition of expenses for failure to waive service pursuant to Rule 4(d).
It is FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Freeman, Jackson, Summit Food Group, Thomas, and Wheeler, each having previously been served with Plaintiff's now-operative Complaint (Doc. 213-1) pursuant to Rule 5(b)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, SHALL FILE their respective Answer or other responsive pleading WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS of the date of this Order, pursuant to the Court's authority under Rule 15(a)(3) of said Rules.
DUTY TO ADVISE OF ADDRESS CHANGE
During the pendency of this action, all parties shall keep the Clerk of this Court and all opposing attorneys and/or parties advised of their current address. Failure to promptly advise the Clerk of a change of address may result in the dismissal of a party's pleadings.
DUTY TO PROSECUTE ACTION
Plaintiff is also advised that he must diligently prosecute his Complaint or face the possibility that it will be dismissed under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to prosecute. Defendants are similarly advised that they are expected to diligently defend all allegations made against them and to file timely dispositive motions as hereinafter directed. This matter will be set down for trial when the Court determines that discovery has been completed and that all motions have been disposed of or the time for filing dispositive motions has passed.
FILING AND SERVICE OF MOTIONS, PLEADINGS, AND CORRESPONDENCE
It is the responsibility of each party to file original motions, pleadings, and correspondence with the Clerk of Court. A party need not serve the opposing party by mail if the opposing party is represented by counsel. In such cases, any motions, pleadings, or correspondence shall be served electronically at the time of filing with the Court. If any party is not represented by counsel, however, it is the responsibility of each opposing party to serve copies of all motions, pleadings, and correspondence upon the unrepresented party and to attach to said original motions, pleadings, and correspondence filed with the Clerk of Court a certificate of service indicating who has been served and where (i.e., at what address), when service was made, and how service was accomplished (i.e., by U.S. Mail, by personal service, etc.).
DISCOVERY
The Court will enter a Rule 16/Rule 26 Discovery Order at the appropriate time.
RECOMMENDATION
As to the Food Service Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 208), an amended complaint supersedes the prior operative complaint. Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Dresdner Bank AG v. M/V Olympia Voyager, 463 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2006)). Because that is so, the prior operative complaint is “a legal nullity.” Id. Accordingly, the Court recommends that the Food Service Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be terminated as moot. See Jamison v. Long, 2021 WL 2936132 at *5 (M.D. Ga. 2021) (terminating as moot the defendants' motions to dismiss when the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint was granted).
Therefore, for the above stated reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants Summit Food Group, Thomas, and Wheeler's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 208) be TERMINATED as moot.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. The district judge shall make a de novo determination as to those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made; all other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed by the district judge for clear error. Any objection is limited in length to TWENTY (20) PAGES. See M.D. GA. L.R. 7.4.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO ORDERED and RECOMMENDED.