Rau v. Rau

35 Citing cases

  1. Sheehan v. Balasic

    46 Conn. App. 327 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997)   Cited 25 times
    In Sheehan, the defendant claimed that, while a nonmodification clause precludes modification of an alimony award pursuant to § 46b-86 (a), such a clause does not preclude a modification pursuant to § 46b-86 (b).

    In making this determination, we look only at the dissolution decree itself. Rau v. Rau, 37 Conn. App. 209, 211, 655 A.2d 800 (1995). We conclude that the order is nonmodifiable as to term and amount and that the decree unambiguously expresses that fact.

  2. Robaczynski v. Robaczynski

    100 A.3d 408 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014)   Cited 2 times

    (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). Burke v. Burke, supra, 94 Conn.App. at 421, 892 A.2d 964. “In determining whether the alimony award is modifiable or nonmodifiable, only the dissolution decree itself may be used.” Rau v. Rau, 37 Conn.App. 209, 212, 655 A.2d 800 (1995).Section 46b–86 (a) provides in relevant part: “Unless and to the extent that the decree precludes modification, any final order for the periodic payment of permanent alimony or support ... may, at any time thereafter, be ... modified by the court upon a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party....” “This statutory provision suggests a legislative preference favoring the modifiability of orders for periodic alimony ... [and requires that] the decree itself must preclude modification for this relief to be unavailable.... If an order for periodic alimony is meant to be nonmodifiable, the decree must contain language to that effect.... Such a preclusion of modification must be clear and unambiguous.”

  3. Pite v. Pite

    43 A.3d 229 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 10 times

    Section 46b–86 (a) “suggests a legislative preference favoring the modifiability of orders for periodic alimony ... [and requires that] the decree itself must preclude modification for this relief to be unavailable.... If an order for periodic alimony is meant to be nonmodifiable, the decree must contain language to that effect.... Such a preclusion of modification must be clear and unambiguous.... If a provision purportedly precluding modification is ambiguous, the order will be held to be modifiable.... In determining whether the alimony award is modifiable or nonmodifiable, only the dissolution decree itself may be used.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rau v. Rau, 37 Conn.App. 209, 211–12, 655 A.2d 800 (1995). The defendant first argues that this case is not controlled by Scoville.

  4. Byrne v. Byrne

    1997 Ct. Sup. 12595 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997)

    "If a provision purportedly precluding modification is ambiguous, the order will held to be modifiable." Rau v. Rau, 37 Conn. App. 209, 212 (1995); McGuinness v. McGuinness, 185 Conn. 7, 9 (1981); Scoville v. Scoville, supra 280. "Where a provision which precludes or restricts a later court's power to modify financial orders is clear and unambiguous, however, it will be upheld." Eldridge v. Eldridge, supra 493-494; Solo v. Solo, 2 Conn. App. 290, 293 (1984).

  5. Valvo v. Freedom of Information Com'n

    294 Conn. 534 (Conn. 2010)   Cited 25 times
    In Valvo, this court concluded that a trial court presiding over an administrative appeal did not have subject matter jurisdiction to overturn sealing orders issued by another trial court in an unrelated case involving different parties.

    Our jurisprudence concerning the trial court's authority to overturn or to modify a ruling in a particular case assumes, as a proposition so basic that it requires no citation of authority, that any such action will be taken only by the trial court with continuing jurisdiction over the case, and that the only court with continuing jurisdiction is the court that originally rendered the ruling. See Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 276 Conn. 168, 225-30, 884 A.2d 981 (2005);Adams v. Vaill, 158 Conn. 478, 482, 262 A.2d 169 (1969) ("courts have inherent power to change or modify their own injunctions where circumstances or pertinent law have so changed as to make it equitable to do so" [emphasis added]); see also Rau v. Rau, 37 Conn. App. 209, 211, 655 A.2d 800 (1995) (General Statutes § 46b-86 [a], which authorizes modification of order for periodic payment of alimony after judgment, confers "continuing jurisdiction over alimony awards" on trial court); Hall v. Dichello Distributors, Inc., 14 Conn. App. 184, 193, 540 A.2d 704 (1988) ("a permanent injunction necessarily requires continuing jurisdiction"); cf. General Statutes § 52-212a ("[u]nless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed" [emphasis added]). This assumption is well justified in light of the public policies favoring consistency and stability of judgments and the orderly administration of justice.

  6. Monette v. Monette

    102 Conn. App. 1 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007)   Cited 8 times

    Our analysis in this case is only that modification of child support is permitted under the consent to judgment but that it is precluded until the condition precedent has been met. We distinguish this case from the facts and circumstances presented in Rau v. Rau, 37 Conn. App. 209, 655 A.2d 800 (1995), Burke v. Burke, 94 Conn. App. 416, 892 A.2d 964 (2006), and Sheehan v. Balasic, 46 Conn. App. 327, 699 A.2d 1036 (1997), appeal dismissed, 245 Conn. 148, 710 A.2d 770 (1998), which all concerned whether the alimony award or child support order at issue could be modified at all, given the language in the original dissolution decrees. In Rau v. Rau, supra, 37 Conn. App. 212, the language in the original divorce decree stated that the alimony award was to terminate after ninety-six payments were made. This court concluded that because the divorce decree contained no express, clear language precluding modification of the award, the award was modifiable.

  7. Burke v. Burke

    94 Conn. App. 416 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006)   Cited 18 times
    In Burke v. Burke, 94 Conn. App. 416, 420-21, 892 A.2d 964 (2006), we declined to review a party's claim regarding the trial court's decision on a motion for articulation where the sole remedy for review was by way of motion for review and where the party already had obtained review via the proper procedure.

    " (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rau v. Rau, 37 Conn. App. 209, 211-12, 655 A.2d 800 (1995)."The fact that the dissolution agreement was incorporated into a dissolution decree does not deprive the court of authority to modify a support agreement that does not expressly preclude modification."

  8. Wichman v. Wichman

    49 Conn. App. 529 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998)   Cited 15 times

    (Emphasis added.) Rau v. Rau, 37 Conn. App. 209, 211, 655 A.2d 800 (1995). Section 46b-86 (b) provides in relevant part that "the Superior Court may, in its discretion and upon notice and hearing, modify such judgment and suspend, reduce or terminate the payment of periodic alimony upon a showing that the party receiving the periodic alimony is living with another person under circumstances which the court finds should result in the modification, suspension, reduction or termination of alimony because the living arrangements cause such a change of circumstances as to alter the financial needs of that party."

  9. Amodio v. Amodio

    45 Conn. App. 737 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997)   Cited 13 times
    Holding that provision restricting modifiability of child support except in case of "change in circumstances reflecting an increase in [the defendant's] gross wages above the base of $900 per week" unambiguously precluded defendant's motion for modification

    If a provision purportedly precluding modification is ambiguous, the order will be held to be modifiable. McGuinness v. McGuinness, 185 Conn. 7, 9, 440 A.2d 804 (1981); Scoville v. Scoville, supra, 179 Conn. 280; Rau v. Rau, 37 Conn. App. 209, 212, 655 A.2d 800 (1995). "Where a provision which precludes or restricts a later court's power to modify financial orders is clear and unambiguous, however, it will be upheld."

  10. Casiraghi v. Casiraghi

    FA124024361S (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 2018)

    The language of any decree that limits or precludes modification, must be "clear and unambiguous." Rau v. Rau, 37 Conn.App. 209, 212 (1995). When construing a contract, a court seeks "to determine the intent of the parties from the language used interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction ... The intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and ... the language must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage ..." Magsig v. Magsig, 183 Conn.App. 182, 191 (2018).