In making this determination, we look only at the dissolution decree itself. Rau v. Rau, 37 Conn. App. 209, 211, 655 A.2d 800 (1995). We conclude that the order is nonmodifiable as to term and amount and that the decree unambiguously expresses that fact.
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). Burke v. Burke, supra, 94 Conn.App. at 421, 892 A.2d 964. “In determining whether the alimony award is modifiable or nonmodifiable, only the dissolution decree itself may be used.” Rau v. Rau, 37 Conn.App. 209, 212, 655 A.2d 800 (1995).Section 46b–86 (a) provides in relevant part: “Unless and to the extent that the decree precludes modification, any final order for the periodic payment of permanent alimony or support ... may, at any time thereafter, be ... modified by the court upon a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party....” “This statutory provision suggests a legislative preference favoring the modifiability of orders for periodic alimony ... [and requires that] the decree itself must preclude modification for this relief to be unavailable.... If an order for periodic alimony is meant to be nonmodifiable, the decree must contain language to that effect.... Such a preclusion of modification must be clear and unambiguous.”
Section 46b–86 (a) “suggests a legislative preference favoring the modifiability of orders for periodic alimony ... [and requires that] the decree itself must preclude modification for this relief to be unavailable.... If an order for periodic alimony is meant to be nonmodifiable, the decree must contain language to that effect.... Such a preclusion of modification must be clear and unambiguous.... If a provision purportedly precluding modification is ambiguous, the order will be held to be modifiable.... In determining whether the alimony award is modifiable or nonmodifiable, only the dissolution decree itself may be used.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rau v. Rau, 37 Conn.App. 209, 211–12, 655 A.2d 800 (1995). The defendant first argues that this case is not controlled by Scoville.
"If a provision purportedly precluding modification is ambiguous, the order will held to be modifiable." Rau v. Rau, 37 Conn. App. 209, 212 (1995); McGuinness v. McGuinness, 185 Conn. 7, 9 (1981); Scoville v. Scoville, supra 280. "Where a provision which precludes or restricts a later court's power to modify financial orders is clear and unambiguous, however, it will be upheld." Eldridge v. Eldridge, supra 493-494; Solo v. Solo, 2 Conn. App. 290, 293 (1984).
Our jurisprudence concerning the trial court's authority to overturn or to modify a ruling in a particular case assumes, as a proposition so basic that it requires no citation of authority, that any such action will be taken only by the trial court with continuing jurisdiction over the case, and that the only court with continuing jurisdiction is the court that originally rendered the ruling. See Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 276 Conn. 168, 225-30, 884 A.2d 981 (2005);Adams v. Vaill, 158 Conn. 478, 482, 262 A.2d 169 (1969) ("courts have inherent power to change or modify their own injunctions where circumstances or pertinent law have so changed as to make it equitable to do so" [emphasis added]); see also Rau v. Rau, 37 Conn. App. 209, 211, 655 A.2d 800 (1995) (General Statutes § 46b-86 [a], which authorizes modification of order for periodic payment of alimony after judgment, confers "continuing jurisdiction over alimony awards" on trial court); Hall v. Dichello Distributors, Inc., 14 Conn. App. 184, 193, 540 A.2d 704 (1988) ("a permanent injunction necessarily requires continuing jurisdiction"); cf. General Statutes § 52-212a ("[u]nless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed" [emphasis added]). This assumption is well justified in light of the public policies favoring consistency and stability of judgments and the orderly administration of justice.
Our analysis in this case is only that modification of child support is permitted under the consent to judgment but that it is precluded until the condition precedent has been met. We distinguish this case from the facts and circumstances presented in Rau v. Rau, 37 Conn. App. 209, 655 A.2d 800 (1995), Burke v. Burke, 94 Conn. App. 416, 892 A.2d 964 (2006), and Sheehan v. Balasic, 46 Conn. App. 327, 699 A.2d 1036 (1997), appeal dismissed, 245 Conn. 148, 710 A.2d 770 (1998), which all concerned whether the alimony award or child support order at issue could be modified at all, given the language in the original dissolution decrees. In Rau v. Rau, supra, 37 Conn. App. 212, the language in the original divorce decree stated that the alimony award was to terminate after ninety-six payments were made. This court concluded that because the divorce decree contained no express, clear language precluding modification of the award, the award was modifiable.
" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rau v. Rau, 37 Conn. App. 209, 211-12, 655 A.2d 800 (1995)."The fact that the dissolution agreement was incorporated into a dissolution decree does not deprive the court of authority to modify a support agreement that does not expressly preclude modification."
(Emphasis added.) Rau v. Rau, 37 Conn. App. 209, 211, 655 A.2d 800 (1995). Section 46b-86 (b) provides in relevant part that "the Superior Court may, in its discretion and upon notice and hearing, modify such judgment and suspend, reduce or terminate the payment of periodic alimony upon a showing that the party receiving the periodic alimony is living with another person under circumstances which the court finds should result in the modification, suspension, reduction or termination of alimony because the living arrangements cause such a change of circumstances as to alter the financial needs of that party."
If a provision purportedly precluding modification is ambiguous, the order will be held to be modifiable. McGuinness v. McGuinness, 185 Conn. 7, 9, 440 A.2d 804 (1981); Scoville v. Scoville, supra, 179 Conn. 280; Rau v. Rau, 37 Conn. App. 209, 212, 655 A.2d 800 (1995). "Where a provision which precludes or restricts a later court's power to modify financial orders is clear and unambiguous, however, it will be upheld."
The language of any decree that limits or precludes modification, must be "clear and unambiguous." Rau v. Rau, 37 Conn.App. 209, 212 (1995). When construing a contract, a court seeks "to determine the intent of the parties from the language used interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction ... The intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and ... the language must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage ..." Magsig v. Magsig, 183 Conn.App. 182, 191 (2018).