Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-0938, Section "K"(2).
June 25, 2004
Before the Court is defendant Joseph Cornelius Rathborne's Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Rec. Doc. 5). Having reviewed the pleadings, exhibits, and relevant law, and having heard oral argument, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion as meritorious.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Carol Simmons Rathborne ("Mrs. Rathborne") and defendant Joseph Cornelius Rathborne, III ("Mr. Rathborne"), were married on May 25, 1981 in New York. The parties' marriage produced two children: John Campbell Rathborne and Alexis Simmons Rathborne (the "Children"), now 21 and 18 years old, respectively.
On March 3, 1994, defendant sued plaintiff for divorce in the matter entitled Rathborne v. Rathborne, No. 94-2523, Domestic Relations Section "1", Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana. Civil District Court entered a Judgment of Divorce on October 31, 1994.
The parties entered into a contract on April 5, 1995 (the "1995 Contract") establishing defendant's financial obligations to plaintiff and the Children. On May 3, 1995, Civil District Court entered a child support judgment adopting the terms of the 1995 Contract. Upon plaintiff's subsequent remarriage, the parties allegedly entered into a supplemental contract on approximately December 21, 1997 (the "1997 Supplemental Contract").
The parties dispute the existence of this agreement. Plaintiff alleges that the 1997 Supplemental Contract exists in written form and that defendant possesses the only copy. Defendant denies the agreement's existence.
On April 2, 2004, plaintiff filed the instant matter. See Rec. Doc. 1. Upon establishing that plaintiff is a resident and domiciliary of Florida and defendant resides and is domiciled in Louisiana, plaintiff alleged diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Plaintiff's Complaint seeks declaratory judgment and breach of contract damages arising out of the 1995 Contract and the 1997 Supplemental Contract.
Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss on April 6, 2004 under the domestic relations exception to diversity. The Court heard oral argument in open court on May 26, 2004, and took the motion under submission that day.
II. LAW ANALYSIS
Motions to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of a federal district court. A claim is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the claim. See Home Builders Assoc., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). A 12(b)(1) motion may be appropriate when a plaintiff's claim is barred by sovereign immunity, as well as in the typical situation where a defendant alleges that there is no diversity of citizenship between the parties, jurisdictional amount, and/or the plaintiff's claim does not involve a federal question. See 5A Charles A. Wright Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1350 (2d ed. 2003).
Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, absent jurisdiction conferred by statute, they lack the power to adjudicate claims. See e.g., Stockman v. Federal Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). Thus, a federal court must dismiss an action whenever it appears that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. Stockman, 138 F.3d at 151.
In considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, "a court may evaluate (1) the complaint alone, (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 2001). Thus, unlike a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the district court is entitled to consider disputed facts as well as undisputed facts in the record. See Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 1986). Uncontroverted allegations of the complaint, however, must be accepted as true. Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As, 241 F.3d at 424.
As far back as the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court has limited the extent to which federal courts can entertain claims arising out of domestic relations. "The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states, and not to the laws of the United States." In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890). The domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction has been invoked often by lower federal courts. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 693 (1992). "The seeming authority for doing so originally stemmed from the announcement in Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582, 16 L.Ed. 226 (1859), that the federal courts have no jurisdiction over suits for divorce or the allowance of alimony." Id.
In Ankenbrandt v. Richards, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the issue of whether a domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction exists. Id. at 692. "Because we are unwilling to cast aside an understood rule that has been recognized for nearly a century and a half . . .," the Court commented, "we will continue to recognize this limitation on federal jurisprudence." Id. at 694-95. Citing stare decisis as a particularly relevant consideration, the Court found that the domestic relations jurisdictional limitation existed on a statutory, rather than constitutional basis. Id. at 699-700. The Court described the domestic relations exception as follows:
[T]he domestic relations exception, as articulated by this Court since Barber, divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees. Given the long passage of time without any expression of congressional dissatisfaction, we have no trouble today reaffirming the validity of the exception as it pertains to divorce and alimony decrees and child custody orders . . . the domestic relations exception encompasses only cases involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree.Id. at 703-04.
An oft-cited Fifth Circuit case, Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1978), further delineates the scope of the domestic relations exception. Crouch, a pre- Ankenbrandt decision, acknowledged that federal courts have traditionally refused to exercise diversity jurisdiction in domestic relations cases, including suits for alimony and child support. Crouch, 566 F.2d at 487. The Fifth Circuit cited the following reasons for federal abstention in domestic relations situations: (1) strong state interest in domestic relations matters, (2) competence of state courts in settling family disputes, (3) the possibility of incompatible federal and state court decrees in cases of continuing judicial supervision by the state, (4) and the problem of congested dockets in federal court. Id.
In Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit again addressed the domestic relations exception in the context of a child support or alimony dispute. There, the court applied federal jurisdiction to some claims while refusing to exercise jurisdiction as to others based on the domestic relations exception. Citing Crouch, the court held that a dispute as to alimony and child support arrears involving no questions regarding the parties' marital relationship was subject to federal jurisdiction. Jagiella, 647 F.2d at 564. On the other hand, the Fifth circuit held that the domestic relations exception applied to claims seeking to modify the divorce decree by reducing child support payments and increasing visitation rights and seeking damages for the alienation of children's affection. Id. at 565.
In Rykers v. Alford, 832 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1987), the Fifth Circuit provided further guidance on the application of the domestic relations exception:
[t]he decisive factor is not the formal label attached to the claim (tort, contract, etc.), but the type of determination that the federal court must make in order to resolve the case. If the federal court must determine which parent should receive custody, what rights the noncustodial parent should have, how much child support should be paid and under what conditions, or whether a previous court's determination on these matters should be modified, then the court should dismiss the case. On the other hand, if the court need only decide whether an already-set custody or child support award has been complied with, or whether the parties have committed acts that would be actionable even if everyone involved was unrelated, then the federal courts should retain the case.Rykers, 832 F.2d at 900.
Under Ankenbrandt and the Fifth Circuit jurisprudence, the existence of a domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction is clear. Those cases indicate that the domestic relations exception applies to cases seeking to issue or modify a domestic support award but does not apply to suits to enforce such a judgment or agreement. Thus, the issue here becomes whether plaintiff's Complaint seeks to modify the state court child support judgment. The Court finds that it does and therefore declines to exercise jurisdiction.
Mr. Rathborne contends that plaintiff's breach of contract and declaratory relief claims are "nothing more than a poorly disguised attempt to modify a binding state court child support order." Mrs. Rathborne, on the other hand, disputes that the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction applies to this matter. Essentially, plaintiff denies attempting to modify the child support judgment, the 1995 Contract or the 1997 Supplemental Contract in any way. Instead, plaintiff characterizes her Complaint as claims seeking to enforce the 1995 Contract and the 1997 Supplemental Contract.
Plaintiff attempts to invoke the provisions of the 1995 Contract without reference to the state court judgment which adopts its terms. The 1995 Contract was drafted as a settlement to then-pending community property, child support and alimony litigation. The state court incorporated the 1995 Contract settlement provisions into its judgment. Accordingly, this Court regards plaintiff's claims under the 1995 Contract as claims made pursuant to the state court judgment.
The Court disagrees with plaintiff's characterization of her lawsuit. A careful review of plaintiff's Complaint reveals that, in at least two respects, Mrs. Rathborne seeks relief that would entail a modification of the state court's support judgment. As such, the domestic relations exception applies to this matter.
First, plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment that the child support award obligates defendant to maintain an irrevocable life insurance trust established for the benefit of the Children. However, the child support judgment does not require Mr. Rathborne to carry such insurance. Rather, it notes that defendant had established such an insurance trust and requires defendant to notify plaintiff of any change or lapse of insurance. It also requires that defendant designate the Children as beneficiaries of all life insurance on his life except the aforementioned insurance trust. The state court judgment does not, however, obligate the defendant to carry any form of life insurance. Thus, plaintiff's claim that the support agreement obligates defendant to maintain the insurance trust seeks to modify the existing child support award by adding the requirement that Mr. Rathborne carry life insurance.
Second, Mrs. Rathborne seeks declaratory judgment that defendant is required to pay plaintiff $2,000 monthly under the 1997 Supplemental Contract. Such child support payments are not provided for in the judgment. By asking the Court to enforce a $2,000 monthly child support obligation under the 1997 Supplemental Contract, plaintiff has sought to modify the terms of the state court child support judgment. Consequently, the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction applies to the instant lawsuit because Mrs. Rathborne's Complaint seeks to modify the terms of the governing state court child support judgment. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED defendant Joseph Cornelius Rathborne's Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Rec. Doc. 5) is hereby GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff Carol Simmons Rathborne's claims are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction.