See, e.g., Gully v. Kunzman, 592 F.2d 283, 286-87 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 924, 99 S.Ct. 2850, 61 L.Ed.2d 292 (1979); Jackson v. Justices of Superior Court of Mass., 549 F.2d 215, 216 n. 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 975, 97 S.Ct. 1666, 52 L.Ed.2d 370 (1977); Foster v. Murphy, 686 F. Supp. 471, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). But see Rasmussen v. White, 502 F. Supp. 237, 240 (E.D.Tex. 1980) ("The mandate of Younger is broad and clear; federal courts are not to interfere with pending state criminal actions absent a strong showing of bad faith, harassment, or other extraordinary circumstances. The mere fact that a petitioner raises a double jeopardy claim does not, by itself, raise the implication that the prosecution is conducted in bad faith to harass the petitioner, or that extraordinary circumstances are present."); Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, 1990 WL 223071, at *13 (E.D.Pa. 1990) ("[T]his Court holds that a claim of double jeopardy, without more, is insufficient to overcome principles of federalism which dictate respect for the authority and ability of state courts to protect constitutional rights in the first instance."), aff'd 959 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1071, 122 L.Ed.2d 498 (1993).

the expert prepare a report and then travel to Alaska to testify for the defendants. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 717 F.2d 473, 475 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding a manifest necessity for a mistrial because an extended continuance was necessary to allow a new attorney to prepare the case, because it was likely that many jurors would be unavailable on the new trial date, and because there was a substantial risk of juror prejudice resulting from media coverage of the case); United States v. Peng, 602 F.Supp. 298, 305 (S.D. N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 766 F.2d 82 (2nd Cir. 1985) (a mistrial was justified by the impracticability of keeping the jury impaneled during a continuance that would be of uncertain duration, and w as likely to be lengthy); MacArthur v. Bank of New York, 524 F.Supp. 1205, 1207-08 (S.D. N.Y. 1981) (a mistrial was justified by the impracticability of retaining the jury during the several weeks that would be needed for a new defense attorney to prepare to litigate the case); Rasmussen v. White, 502 F.Supp. 237, 240 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (holding that the mistrial was manifestly necessary when a continuance was not feasible); State v. Messier, 686 P.2d 272, 275 (N .M . App. 1984) (same); Commonwealth v. Robson, 337 A.2d 573, 577 (Pa. 1975) (a mistrial was justified when the trial had to be delayed for several weeks due to the trial judge's mid-trial illness). When a trial judge's decision to grant or deny a mistrial is challenged on appeal, the applicable standard of review is "abuse of discretion". Under this standard, we must affirm Judge Smith's decision to order a mistrial unless we are left with a "definite and firm impression" that it was unreasonable, under the circumstances, for Judge Smith to conclude that it was necessary to discharge the jury, given Saddler's refusal to consent to this course of action.

Where a continuance is not feasible, manifest necessity may justify the granting of a mistrial. Rasmussen v. White, 502 F. Supp. 237 (E.D.Tex. 1980). Explicit findings on the presence of manifest necessity, while strongly recommended, are not determinative of the issue involved, but the record must provide sufficient justification for the granting of the mistrial.

In spite of the lengthy review of the federal standard in the majority opinion in Somerville, four justices felt compelled to dissent.Rasmussen v. White (E.D.Tex. 1980) 502 F. Supp. 237, in which a federal court, on habeas corpus, in language clearly identified as dicta, indicated it might permit the state to begin a new trial after a first was aborted due to trial court congestion, is simply in accord with no precedent in any jurisdiction found by us. Respondent cites People v. Manson (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 102 [ 132 Cal.Rptr. 265], certiorari denied (1977) 430 U.S. 986 [52 L.Ed.2d 382, 97 S.Ct. 1686] for the proposition that "absence of counsel may qualify as legal necessity."