In Rasmussen v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 233, 522 S.E.2d 401 (1999), we addressed Rasmussen's contention "that the result of a breathalyzer test administered to him following his arrest was improperly admitted at trial." Id. at 235-36, 522 S.E.2d at 402. Relying on Code §§ 18.2-268.2(B) and 18.2-268.9, Rasmussen made the same argument as appellant; he contended he was denied his right to obtain and observe the results "for each and every breath sample taken." Id. at 237-38, 522 S.E.2d at 403.
The trooper signed the certificate of analysis attesting that it was an accurate record of the test conducted, that the test was conducted in accordance with the type of equipment, methods and specifications approved by the Division of Forensic Science, and that the equipment was recently tested and found to be accurate. See Rasmussen v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 233, 239 n. 2, 522 S.E.2d 401, 404 n. 2 (1999) (explaining that properly attested certificate of analysis "assures an accused that the machine is operating as designed").
As the concurring opinion correctly states, we "must assume that `the legislature chose, with care, the words it used when it enacted the relevant statute, and we are bound by those words as we interpret the statute.'" Rasmussen v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 233, 238, 522 S.E.2d 401, 403 (1999) (quoting Frazier v. Commonwealth, 27 Va.App. 131, 135, 497 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1998)). Thus, we disagree with the concurring opinion's conclusion that under the facts of this case appellant's recruitment of A.G. into the Bloods may be used as one of the predicate criminal acts to establish that the Bloods were a criminal street gang during the relevant time period.
And "we must assume that `the legislature chose, with care, the words it used when it enacted the relevant statute, and we are bound by those words as we interpret the statute.'" Rasmussen v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 233, 238, 522 S.E.2d 401, 403 (1999) (quoting Frazier v. Commonwealth, 27 Va.App. 131, 135, 497 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1998)). Furthermore, it is our "duty . . . `to interpret the several parts of a statute as a consistent and harmonious whole so as to effectuate the legislative goal.'"
And " we must assume that ‘ the legislature chose, with care, the words it used when it enacted the relevant statute, and we are bound by those words as we interpret the statute.’ " Rasmussen v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 233, 238, 522 S.E.2d 401, 403 (1999) (quoting Frazier v. Commonwealth, 27 Va.App. 131, 135, 497 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1998)). Furthermore, it is our " duty ...‘ to interpret the several parts of a statute as a consistent and harmonious whole so as to effectuate the legislative goal.’ "
This appeal is controlled by our ruling in Rasmussen v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 233, 522 S.E.2d 401 (1999). In response to an identical claim, we ruled as follows: [Appellant] also contends that the term "process of analysis" necessarily encompasses the analysis of both samples taken and that, therefore, he was entitled to view the results obtained from each sample.
Additionally, the phrase "blood alcohol level" has been used interchangeably in Virginia's courts to refer to the results of both breath tests and blood tests. CompareWebb v. Rivers, 507 S.E.2d 360, 361 (Va. 1998) ("a breath test indicated that the defendant had a blood alcohol level of.21%"), withBasfield v. Commonwealth, 398 S.E.2d 80, 81 (Va.Ct.App. 1990) (using the phrase "blood alcohol level" to refer to the result of defendant's blood test); See alsoDugger v. Commonwealth, 580 S.E.2d 477, 479 (Va.Ct.App. 2003); Chase v. Commonwealth, 555 S.E.2d 422, 423 (Va.Ct.App. 2001); Dalo v. Commonwealth, 554 S.E.2d 705, 707 (Va.Ct.App. 2001); Hall v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 829, 837 (Va.Ct.App. 2000); Rasmussen v. Commonwealth, 522 S.E.2d 401, 403 (Va.Ct.App. 1999); U.S. v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1019 (4th Cir. 1982). Based on the Virginia Code and Virginia case law, it is apparent to this Court that a chemical breath test tests a person's "blood alcohol level."
"This language plainly does not allow a person to continue driving until circumstances stop the vehicle." Id. at 768-69; see also Rasmussen v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 233, 238 (1999). Ultimately, we held that Edwards was not at the scene of the accident when she drove fifty to a hundred feet away.
And, “[this Court] must assume that ‘the legislature chose, with care, the words it used when it enacted the relevant statute, and we are bound by those words as we interpret the statute.’ ” Rasmussen v. Commonwealth , 31 Va.App. 233, 238, 522 S.E.2d 401, 403 (1999) (quoting Frazier v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., Div. of Child Support Enforcement ex rel.Sandridge , 27 Va.App. 131, 135, 497 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1998) ). In clear and unambiguous language, Code § 65.2–502 provides three requirements regarding the payment of compensation to a partially-disabled worker.
“ ‘When analyzing a statute, we must assume that “the legislature chose, with care, the words it used when it enacted the relevant statute, and we are bound by those words as we interpret the statute.” ’ ” Rasmussen v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 233, 238, 522 S.E.2d 401, 403 (1999) (quoting Frazier v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Soc. Servs., Div. of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Sandridge, 27 Va.App. 131, 135, 497 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1998)). Here, as acknowledged by the commission, the authority to designate or recall a retired commissioner to participate in a review hearing is not expressly provided by statute.