He cites cases in which this court concluded that spousal-maintenance awards that consumed 54% and nearly 62% of the obligor's net income were unreasonably high. See Rask v. Rask, 445 N.W.2d 849, 854 (Minn. App. 1989); Kostelnik v. Kostelnik, 367 N.W.2d 665, 670 (Minn. App. 1985), review denied (Minn. July 26, 1985). These cases are inapposite.
Justin points to Rask v. Rask to support his argument. 445 N.W.2d 849 (Minn. App. 1989). There, the district court awarded the spouse $2,000 a month in permanent spousal maintenance, but this court reversed its decision because, in part, the district court failed to mention available assets at all when discussing spousal maintenance and because the assets could be invested to help supplement her income.
"A [district] court's calculation of living expenses must be supported by the evidence." Rask v. Rask, 445 N.W.2d 849, 854 (Minn. App. 1989). But factual findings regarding monthly expenses in a spousal-maintenance calculation "must be upheld unless clearly erroneous."
Based on Pamela's stipulated W-2 gross income of $2,148 and a monthly maintenance award of $5,600, the court found that Pamela will have a $274 after-tax surplus. Citing Rask v. Rask, 445 N.W.2d 849, 854 (Minn. App. 1989); cf. Kampf v. Kampf, 732 N.W.2d 630, 634 (Minn. App. 2007) (referring to the "speculative mortgage payment"), review denied (Minn. Aug. 21, 2007), Thomas argues that Pamela's surplus will be greater because her reasonable monthly expenses are $500 less than the $5,412 found by the district court because Pamela did not incur some of her claimed expenses, such as $54 for window-and-gutter cleaning, $50 for a home security system, $10 for AAA service, and $30 for golf and cross-country skiing.
This court has held that a district court's inclusion of a mortgage payment in a party's reasonable monthly budget is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the "record concerning when or whether [the party] will begin incurring the mortgage expense." Rask v. Rask, 445 N.W.2d 849, 854 (Minn. App. 1989). In Rask, this court held that it was not enough to "merely estimate[]" that a specific monthly payment "would be required to purchase the type of home she wants."
The district court is not confined to the expenses listed in the parties' prehearing statements. See, e.g., Rask v. Rask, 445 N.W.2d 849, 851 (Minn. App. 1989) (noting that the parties submitted "estimates of their current monthly needs," which the district court considered as evidence of their reasonable monthly expenses). Here, pursuant to the judgment and decree, respondent is required to vacate the parties' residence.
In determining whether extrinsic evidence is available to ascertain the meaning of "necessary and reasonable," the district court may find guidance by analogizing to Minnesota caselaw in which the findings of district courts as to what constitutes reasonable living expenses have been affirmed when supported by the evidence. See, e.g., Rask v. Rask, 445 N.W.2d 849, 854 (Minn. App. 1989) (analyzing district court's calculation of reasonable living expenses for an abuse of discretion). In addition, while not precedential authority, caselaw from foreign jurisdictions that have addressed payment of post-secondary education expenses may be instructive.
We have previously remanded the issue of spousal maintenance to the district court for failure to include interest income the spouse would earn from her share of a marital property award. Rask v. Rask, 445 N.W.2d 849, 855 (Minn.App. 1989); see also, Fink v. Fink, 366 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Minn.App. 1985) (stating that district court should take interest income that may be generated from marital property award into account when calculating spousal maintenance). Under these facts, the district court erred when it failed to consider interest income. On remand, the district court should address not only this potential interest income but also the effect, if any, of the other marital property awarded to Rhonda McElroy on her ability to meet her own needs.
The court found, inter alia, that the list included "a number of speculative expenses that he does not currently pay." See Rask v. Rask, 445 N.W.2d 849, 854 (Minn.App. 1989) (stating that a speculative mortgage expense, when unsupported by other evidence, should not be considered in determining living expenses). Appellant's proposed living expenses also included line items that the district court found to be "duplicative or nonspecific" and which contained "substantial discretionary amounts for liquor, vacations, and furniture replacement."
In In re Harrison, 13 Kan. App. 2d 313, 316, 769 P.2d 678 (1989), the Court of Appeals described and approved both approaches to distribution. Some states have specifically stated a preference for either the reserve jurisdiction method (see Mitchell v. Mitchell, 4 Va. App. 113, 120-21, 355 S.E.2d 18 [deferred distribution required by statute]; In re Marriage of Steinke v. Steinke, 126 Wis.2d 372, 385, 376 N.W.2d 839) or the present cash value/immediate offset method (see Rask v. Rask, 445 N.W.2d 849, 852 [Minn. App. 1989]; Moore v. Moore, 114 N.J. 147, 162, 553 A.2d 20). However, Kansas has found neither method to be preferred as a matter of law.