Rasheed v. Klopp Enterprises, Inc.

18 Citing cases

  1. Connie v. Garnett

    360 Ga. App. 24 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 5 times

    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Rasheed v. Klopp Enterprises , 276 Ga. App. 91, 92 (1), 622 S.E.2d 442 (2005). There is no issue regarding the first relation-back element โ€” Connie's claims against Turner arose out of the occurrence set forth in the original complaint, that is, the medical treatment Connie received on October 11, 2014.

  2. Rothschild & Co. v. Sklarov

    440 F. Supp. 3d 1385 (N.D. Ga. 2020)   Cited 1 times

    The Corporate Defendants are either incorporated in the United States, or are alleged to be the alter egos of Sklarov, a Georgia resident, who allegedly disregards the separateness of the various entities in a way that abuses the corporate form. SeeRMS Titanic, Inc. v. Zaller , 978 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1291 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (quoting Rasheed v. Klopp Enters., Inc. , 276 Ga. App. 91, 95 n. 4, 622 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) ). Even Defendants' counsel is unclear on the various corporate entities, and why they are organized the way that they are.

  3. Kunkel v. Hillman

    904 S.E.2d 91 (Ga. Ct. App. 2024)   Cited 1 times

    That said, "[w]e have held that when a plaintiff can satisfy the statutory requirements for relation back of an amendment, set out in OCGA ยง 9-11-15 (c), denying a motion for leave to amend the complaint to add a defendant is an abuse of the trial courtโ€™s discretion." Rasheed v. Klopp Enterprises, Inc., 276 Ga. App. 91, 92 (1), 622 S.E.2d 442 (2005) (footnote omitted). OCGA ยง 9-11-15 (c) provides in relevant part:

  4. Seay v. Valdosta Kidney Clinic, LLC

    353 Ga. App. 378 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 8 times
    Vacating trial courtโ€™s grant of summary judgment to medical providers in wrongful death action; vacation of order and remand was necessary because trial court erred by denying plaintiffsโ€™ motion to add decedentโ€™s widow to litigation

    A trial court exercises its discretion in deciding whether to add a party to a lawsuit under OCGA ยง 9-11-21, and we will not reverse that decision absent an abuse of discretion. See Rasheed v. Klopp Enterprises , 276 Ga. App. 91, 92 (1), 622 S.E.2d 442 (2005). But in reaching its decision, the trial court must construe OCGA ยง 9-11-21 in conjunction with OCGA ยง 9-11-15 (c), which allows an amendment adding a party to relate back to the filing of the original complaint "[w]henever the claim ... asserted in the amended pleading arises out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading[.]"

  5. Matson v. Noble Investment Group

    288 Ga. App. 650 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 15 times
    Discussing O.C.G.A. ยง 9-11-15 and citing Crane v. State Farm Ins., Co., 629 S.E.2d 424, 426

    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Rasheed v. Klopp Enterprises, 276 Ga. App. 91, 92 (1) ( 622 SE2d 442) (2005). The assault in this case occurred on October 22, 2003, and Matson filed her original complaint on October 19, 2005, three days prior to the expiration of the applicable two-year statute of limitation for personal injury. OCGA ยง 9-3-33.

  6. Dearth v. Collins

    441 F.3d 931 (11th Cir. 2006)   Cited 191 times
    Holding that Busby applies to all employers, both public and private

    To justify piercing the corporate veil, "`the plaintiff must show [that] the owner abused the corporate form by disregarding the separateness of legal entities by commingling [funds] on an interchangeable or joint basis or confusing the otherwise separate properties, records, or control.'" Rasheed v. Klopp Enters., Inc., 276 Ga. App. 91, 95 n. 4, 622 S.E.2d 442, 446 n. 4 (2005) (citation omitted). Dearth points to no evidence that Collins disregarded Info Pro's corporate form; that Collins used Info Pro to transact his own affairs or commingled Info Pro's funds with his own funds; or that Collins is hiding behind Info Pro's corporate form in order to protect his own fraudulent behavior.

  7. RMS Titanic, Inc. v. Zaller

    978 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (N.D. Ga. 2013)   Cited 11 times   1 Legal Analyses

    To justify piercing the corporate veil, โ€œ โ€˜the plaintiff must show [that] the owner abused the corporate form by disregarding the separateness of legal entities by commingling [funds] on an interchangeable or joint basis or confusing the otherwise separate properties, records, or control.โ€™ โ€ Rasheed v. Klopp Enters., Inc., 276 Ga.App. 91, 95 n. 4, 622 S.E.2d 442, 446 n. 4 (2005) (citation omitted). Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have failed to allege in the Amended Complaint a sufficient factual basis to support the alter-ego theory.

  8. McCommons v. White

    899 S.E.2d 731 (Ga. Ct. App. 2024)

    "Such evidence may include the owner using corporate funds for personal expenses or the owner bleeding one company to pay the expenses of another company he owns or the owner treating all his companies and himself as one unit."Rasheed v. Klopp Enters., 276 Ga. App. 91, 95 (2), n. 74, 622 S.E.2d 442 (2005). [17] The record is replete with evidence of commingling funds between the businesses and of McCommons using the company funds for personal expenses and treating the companies and himself as one unit, which allowed the plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil of any of the defendants to hold McCommons liable.

  9. St. Francis Health, LLC v. Weng.

    354 Ga. App. 310 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 3 times

    And here, Weng presented no evidence showing that SF Health had such notice. Compare Rasheed v. KloppEnterprises , 276 Ga. App. 91, 93-94 (1), 622 S.E.2d 442 (2005) (amended complaint adding a new party-defendant following the expiration of the statute of limitation related back to the filing of the original complaint; the original defendant and the new defendant were "intertwined corporations which both [had] received notice of [the] action before the expiration of the statute of limitation") (citation and punctuation omitted); Robinson v. Piggly Wiggly of Calhoun , 193 Ga. App. 675, 676, 388 S.E.2d 754 (1989) (relation-back provision of OCGA ยง 9-11-15 (c) applied where the evidence showed that the agent for the improperly-named defendant also served as president of the newly-named defendant, whom plaintiff sought to add as a party after the limitation period had expired; because its president had accepted service of the original lawsuit, the new defendant had notice of the lawsuit within the statute of limitation). Even if we assumed that the attorneys for SFH Wind Down informed SF Health of the underlying lawsuit, t

  10. Crowder v. State

    348 Ga. App. 850 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 2 times

    Stone , 265 Ga. at 480, 458 S.E.2d 343 (punctuation omitted); accord SRB Inv. Servs., LLLP , 289 Ga. at 7 (3) (b), 709 S.E.2d 267.See SRB Inv. Servs., LLLP , 289 Ga. at 7 (3) (b), 709 S.E.2d 267 (holding that defendants were not prejudiced by plaintiff's delay in seeking interlocutory injunction freezing defendants' assets to prevent fraudulent transfers, and thus plaintiff was not precluded by laches from obtaining injunction); Rasheed v. Klopp Enters., Inc. , 276 Ga. App. 91, 94-95 (1), 622 S.E.2d 442 (2005) (holding that plaintiffs' amendment of complaint to add another defendant was not prejudicial and, therefore, was not barred by laches).SRB Inv. Servs., LLLP , 289 Ga. at 7 (3) (b), 709 S.E.2d 267.