Neal v. Gillett, 23 Conn. 437, 443; 43 C.J.S. 206, 91; Prosser, Torts (2d Ed.) p. 788; 1 Harper James, Torts 8.13. It is true that in determining the negligence of a minor the law applies to him a standard of conduct which will vary according to his age, judgment and experience, but the law does not grant him a complete immunity from liability for his torts, even in negligence. General Statutes 52-217; Rappa v. Connecticut Co., 96 Conn. 285, 286, 114 A. 81; Colligan v. Reilly, 129 Conn. 26, 29, 26 A.2d 231; Magaraci v. Santa Marie, 130 Conn. 323, 330, 33 A.2d 424. We see no logic or reason in affording an immunity when the plaintiff and the defendant are unemancipated minor children in the same family.

"`Ordinary or reasonable care, as applied to a young child, means such care as may reasonably be expected of children of similar age, judgment and experience, under the circumstances.'" DiMaio v. Yolen Bottling Works, 93 Conn. 597, 600, 107 A. 497; Lederer v. Connecticut Co., 95 Conn. 520, 525, 111 A. 785; Rappa v. Connecticut Co., 96 Conn. 285, 288, 114 A. 81.

We have ourselves given partial recognition to this principle in holding that the care required of a child is to be measured in the light of that which is to be expected of one of his immature years. Rappa v. Connecticut Co., 96 Conn. 285, 114 A. 81. Certainly in all reason he who stricken by paralysis or seized by an epileptic fit, still continues with his hands upon the wheel of the automobile he was driving, and, unconscious, so directs it as to cause its collision with another, cannot be held negligent for the way in which he controlled it; and no more can he who exercises a like direction after he has been overtaken by sleep. In such a case, the question must be, was the defendant negligent in permitting himself to fall asleep.