Rappa v. Connecticut Co.

5 Citing cases

  1. Mahon v. Heim

    332 A.2d 69 (Conn. 1973)   Cited 9 times

    " In so charging the jury the court correctly stated the settled law in this state as recently repeated in Overlock v. Ruedemann, 147 Conn. 649, 654, 165 A.2d 335, in which this court, speaking by Baldwin, C.J., noted that "in determining the negligence of a minor the law applies to him a standard of conduct which will vary according to his age, judgment and experience," citing Rappa v. Connecticut Co., 96 Conn. 285, 286, 114 A. 81, Colligan v. Reilly, 129 Conn. 26, 29, 26 A.2d 231, and Magaraci v. Santa Marie, 130 Conn. 323, 330, 33 A.2d 424; see also Santor v. Balnis, 151 Conn. 434, 436, 199 A.2d 2; Greene v. DiFazio, 148 Conn. 419, 424, 171 A.2d 411; Marfyak v. New England Transportation Co., 120 Conn. 46, 50, 179 A. 9, with the many cases cited therein on page 50. This accords with the generally accepted rule as summarized in Restatement (Second), 2 Torts 283 A, as follows: "If the actor is a child, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence and experience under like circumstances." While agreeing that the charge as given was that applicable in ordinary circumstances, in his request to charge, in his exception to the charge and in his brief the plaintiff has argued that the trial court committed error in not charging that the rule is otherwise with respect to minor operators of motor vehicles and that a minor engaging i

  2. Overlock v. Ruedemann

    165 A.2d 335 (Conn. 1960)   Cited 22 times
    Concluding that no relevant public policy consideration "prevents an unemancipated minor from recovering damages for the negligence of [plaintiffs] unemancipated minor brother or sister"

    Neal v. Gillett, 23 Conn. 437, 443; 43 C.J.S. 206, 91; Prosser, Torts (2d Ed.) p. 788; 1 Harper James, Torts 8.13. It is true that in determining the negligence of a minor the law applies to him a standard of conduct which will vary according to his age, judgment and experience, but the law does not grant him a complete immunity from liability for his torts, even in negligence. General Statutes 52-217; Rappa v. Connecticut Co., 96 Conn. 285, 286, 114 A. 81; Colligan v. Reilly, 129 Conn. 26, 29, 26 A.2d 231; Magaraci v. Santa Marie, 130 Conn. 323, 330, 33 A.2d 424. We see no logic or reason in affording an immunity when the plaintiff and the defendant are unemancipated minor children in the same family.

  3. Lange v. Hoyt

    159 A. 575 (Conn. 1932)   Cited 24 times
    Recognizing that an eight year-old child is dependent upon her parents regarding steps to be taken to bring about recovery from an injury and concluding that, even if the mother had neglected to obtain proper surgical treatment for the child, her negligence would not be imputable to the child

    Upon these facts, it is clearly a question to be decided by the jury whether or not the defendant was negligent in the operation of her automobile, and whether the plaintiff Minelda, considering her age, experience and judgment, was free from contributory negligence. Lederer v. Connecticut Co., 95 Conn. 520, 525, 111 A. 785; Rappa v. Connecticut Co., 96 Conn. 285, 287, 114 A. 81. Upon the evidence presented, the decision of these questions was for the jury. The trial court did not err in refusing to set aside the verdict.

  4. Menzie v. Kalmonowitz

    107 Conn. 197 (Conn. 1928)   Cited 76 times
    In Menzie v. Kalmonowitz, 107 Conn. 197, 139 A. 698 (1927) it was said that "Wanton misconduct is more than negligence, more than gross negligence," but since the statute did not include gross negligence it was not necessary for the court to explain the distinction.

    "`Ordinary or reasonable care, as applied to a young child, means such care as may reasonably be expected of children of similar age, judgment and experience, under the circumstances.'" DiMaio v. Yolen Bottling Works, 93 Conn. 597, 600, 107 A. 497; Lederer v. Connecticut Co., 95 Conn. 520, 525, 111 A. 785; Rappa v. Connecticut Co., 96 Conn. 285, 288, 114 A. 81.

  5. Bushnell v. Bushnell

    103 Conn. 583 (Conn. 1925)   Cited 174 times
    Upholding jury charge that "[m]ental suffering . . . is also as proper an element of damage as physical suffering when it is a natural and proximate consequence of the physical injury"

    We have ourselves given partial recognition to this principle in holding that the care required of a child is to be measured in the light of that which is to be expected of one of his immature years. Rappa v. Connecticut Co., 96 Conn. 285, 114 A. 81. Certainly in all reason he who stricken by paralysis or seized by an epileptic fit, still continues with his hands upon the wheel of the automobile he was driving, and, unconscious, so directs it as to cause its collision with another, cannot be held negligent for the way in which he controlled it; and no more can he who exercises a like direction after he has been overtaken by sleep. In such a case, the question must be, was the defendant negligent in permitting himself to fall asleep.