Opinion
June 4, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Bucaria, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
Because the plaintiffs failed to establish that the defendants exercised supervisory control over the work performed on the premises in question or either created or had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition which produced the injury ( see, Lombardi v. Stout, 80 N.Y.2d 290; Seaman v. Chance Co., 197 A.D.2d 612; Mantovi v. Nico Constr. Corp., 217 A.D.2d 650), the Supreme Court properly dismissed their causes of action premised upon common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 Lab..
Furthermore, in view of the strict liability imposed by Labor Law § 240 Lab. (1), this Court has refused to "strain the language of the statute to encompass the routine activities involved * * * (which are] clearly distinguishable from the risks associated with the construction or demolition of a building" ( Cosentino v. Long Is. R. R., 201 A.D.2d 528, 529; see also, Smith v. Shell Oil Co., 205 A.D.2d 681, affd 85 N.Y.2d 1000). Based upon the fact that the injury sustained occurred when the plaintiff Eugene Raposo was performing "routine maintenance" on an air conditioning system, the plaintiffs' cause of action under Labor Law § 240 Lab. (1) was properly dismissed ( Cosentino v. Long Is. R. R., supra, at 529).
Lastly, as was properly conceded by the plaintiffs, Labor Law § 241 Lab. (6) is inapplicable because the plaintiffs failed to plead any sections of the Industrial Code ( see, Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494).
Miller, J.P., O'Brien, Pizzuto and Friedmann, JJ., concur.