Opinion
9374 Index 654875/16
05-21-2019
Virupaksha RAPARTHI, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. Michael Joseph CLARKE, Defendant–Respondent.
O'Brien, LLP, New York (A.J. Monaco of counsel), for appellants. Reisman Rubeo & Altman, LLP, Hawthorne (Mark I. Reisman of counsel), for respondent.
O'Brien, LLP, New York (A.J. Monaco of counsel), for appellants.
Reisman Rubeo & Altman, LLP, Hawthorne (Mark I. Reisman of counsel), for respondent.
Sweeny, J.P., Renwick, Tom, Kapnick, Oing, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Arthur F. Engoron, J.), entered November 2, 2018, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied plaintiffs' motion to dismiss defendant's counterclaim for defamation, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted.
The statements on which the defamation counterclaim is based were made in a uniform termination notice for the securities industry (Form U–5), and are therefore protected by an absolute privilege ( Rosenberg v. Metlife, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 359, 834 N.Y.S.2d 494, 866 N.E.2d 439 [2007] ). Defendant's allegation that plaintiff Raparthi, in completing the compulsory form on behalf of his firm and explaining the reasons for defendant's termination, acted outside the scope of his official capacity or authority or exploited his official position in furtherance of a private pursuit unrelated to the business is conclusory and in any event would not provide a basis for sustaining the counterclaim (see Stega v. New York Downtown Hosp., 31 N.Y.3d 661, 669, 82 N.Y.S.3d 323, 107 N.E.3d 543 [2018] [absolute privilege "entirely immunizes an individual from liability in a defamation action, regardless of the declarant's motives"] ).