Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-1349 (JBS).
June 19, 2000
KENNETH LAMONT RANSOME, Plaintiff Pro Se Carney's Point, N.J.
OPINION
Plaintiff Kenneth Lamont Ransome ("Ransome"), formerly a prisoner confined at South Woods State Prison in Bridgeton, New Jersey ("SWSP"), brings this action in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1998). Based upon his affidavit of indigence and his prison account statement this Court will (1) grant Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis;(2) direct the Clerk of the Court to file the Complaint without pre-payment of the filing fee; (3) waiving the filing fee in light of plaintiff's status in forma pauperis and his release from prison. Mr. Ransome informed the Clerk of Court, in a letter received May 1, 2000, that he was released from incarceration and lives at the above address.
Plaintiff has submitted an account statement covering the period from November 21, 1999, to February 14, 2000. Because of changes in the computer system at the New Jersey Department of Corrections, Plaintiff apparently has been delayed in obtaining a more comprehensive account statement. Based upon the account statement submitted and the apparent absence of three qualifying dismissals precluding in forma pauperis status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), the Court will grant Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis. In light of plaintiff's recent discharge from confinement, however, there will be no assessment of a partial filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A) based on three months.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2) and 1915A, the Court has reviewed the Complaint to identify cognizable claims. The Court will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Defendants are Andrew B. Consovoy, Chairman of the New Jersey State Parole Board; Rachel Torres-Chowaniec, a Parole Board Member; Ruby J. Washington, a Parole Board Member, and Edward Ocskay, Chief of Parole Appeals and Data Unit System. (Compl., ¶ 5.)
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Plaintiff asserts the following facts: On April 16, 1999, at SWSP, Plaintiff received a parole hearing conducted by Defendants Washington and Torres-Chowaniec. (Compl., ¶ 8.) Plaintiff states that these Defendants deferred his case to Yolanda Muse, Chief of the MAP program [sic]. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that he was approved for MAP in July, 1999. (Id.) On November 3, 1999, while waiting for transfer into the MAP program, Plaintiff received a calculation sheet indicating that his parole had been denied on September 15, 1999, and that it would be sixteen months before he would again be eligible for parole. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he was not given notice and therefore not present at the hearing on September 15, 1999, to present evidence in his favor and to rebut evidence against him. (Id.) On November 6, 1999, Plaintiff was given a statement of reasons for the denial of parole. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that the reasons are without merit, and that he should have had an opportunity to be heard before the Defendants made the decision to deny him parole. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that he prepared an appeal to Defendant Ocskay and sent it by certified mail on November 17, 1999. (Id.) Plaintiff allegedly has received no response. He contends that Defendant Ocskay has failed to render a decision as required within 45 days, violating Plaintiff's due process rights. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Consovoy has purposely allowed Board members to act arbitrarily, has delayed parole hearings, and as a result has caused Plaintiff and thousands of other inmates to remain incarcerated for a longer period of time than they should have been. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks immediate release and compensatory and punitive damages. (Id., ¶ 9.) As noted above, he has been released from custody on some date prior to May 1, 2000.
II. DISCUSSION
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires the Court, prior to docketing or as soon as practicable after docketing, to review a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress against a governmental entity or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. The Act requires the Court to identify cognizable claims and to dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a Defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.
A. Standard for Dismissal
Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); accord Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). The Court "must determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the pleadings, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief, and . . . must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom." Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Holder v. Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1993)); Eli Lily Co. v. Roussel Corp., 23 F. Supp.2d 460, 474 (D.N.J. 1998) (citingNami and Holder).
A pro se complaint is held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976);Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Then v. I.N.S., 58 F. Supp.2d 422, 429 (D.N.J. 1999). "Under our liberal pleading rules, during the initial stage of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant" and give "credit to the allegations of the complaint as they appear in the complaint." Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83, 86 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1462 (3d Cir. 1992). "When it appears beyond doubt that no relief could be granted under any set of facts which could be proved consistent with the allegations of the complaint, a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper." Robinson v. Fauver, 932 F. Supp. 639, 642 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
The Court will liberally construe the Complaint as raising a due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because Plaintiff's claims are not cognizable under § 1983, the Court will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
B. Due Process
(1) Immediate Release
Plaintiff asks this Court to order his immediate release based upon a denial of due process occurring when Defendants Washington and Torres-Chowaniec denied him parole at a hearing at which he was not present on September 15, 1999. (Compl., ¶ 8.) Because this claim challenges the duration of Plaintiff's imprisonment, Plaintiff's exclusive federal remedy is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which requires the exhaustion of state court remedies. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 471, 500 (1973) (sole remedy in federal court for a prisoner seeking restoration of good-time credits is a writ of habeas corpus);Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 397 (3d Cir. 1987) (inmate's action seeking restoration of good-time credits essentially sought habeas corpus relief, and could not be brought before inmate had first exhausted state remedies, citing Preiser). Plaintiff's claim for immediate release will be dismissed because his claim for release has become moot by the fact of release itself.
Decisions of the New Jersey State Parole Board are reviewable as of right in the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court pursuant to N.J. Ct. R. 2:2-3(a)(2) . Benson v. New Jersey State Parole Bd . , 947 F. Supp. 827, 831 (D.N.J. 1996).
(2) Damages
Plaintiff's damages claim challenging the denial of parole also is not cognizable under § 1983, because a favorable judgment on the claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the decision denying parole.See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645-47 (1997); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983 unless the revocation decision is either first overturned in the state system or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. See White v. Gittens, 121 F.3d 803, 806-7 (1st Cir. 1997) (challenge to parole revocation is not cognizable under § 1983 because a favorable decision would necessarily call into question the validity of the decree revoking parole); Benson v. New Jersey State Parole Board, 947 F. Supp. 827 (D.N.J. 1996) (challenge to outcome of parole decision is not cognizable under § 1983). Since the record does not reflect the circumstances of plaintiff's release from imprisonment, this dismissal for failure to state a claim will be without prejudice to plaintiff's right to file a claim in a tribunal of competent jurisdiction if he is asserting that he was wrongfully incarcerated for a period of time beyond that which was authorized by his underlying sentence.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
O R D E R
For the reasons expressed in the Opinion filed herewith,
IT IS on this ___ day of June, 2000,
ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and (b), Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is hereby granted; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall file the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and (b); and it is further
ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), the Clerk shall serve a copy of this Order by regular mail on plaintiff and the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey and the Warden of South Woods State Prison; and it is further
ORDERED that the Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B) (ii) and 1915A (b)(1); and it is further
ORDERED that, due to plaintiff's release from incarceration, the filing fee provisions for payments pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (b)(1)(A) will be waived and no further filing fees are due, the plaintiff being indigent.