"NEW CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS [sic] GIVES CRIME VICTIMS RIGHTS, EXPANDS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE We note that, due to a typographical error, the Caption of the ballot title approved by this court in Ransom v. Roberts, 309 Or. 654, 665, 791 P.2d 489 (1990), used the word "provisions." We intended in that case, and we intend in this case, that the word "provision" be used. The certified Caption in this case therefore is:
Petitioners also argue that the phrase "victims rights" "provokes a prejudicial emotional response." This court considered and rejected a very similar challenge in Ransom v. Roberts, 309 Or. 654, 791 P.2d 489 (1990). That case considered the ballot title for a proposed measure that would have added sections to Article I of the Oregon Constitution, many of which were similar (and, indeed, in some instances identical) to the ones proposed here. 309 Or at 657-58.
Petitioners here contend that the proposed Question and Summary imply that existing law "requires" union membership and payment of union dues by all public employees against their will. Petitioners' argument in the present case was not addressed or decided in Crumpton. In Ransom v. Roberts, 309 Or. 654, 663 n 12, 791 P.2d 489 (1990), this court said that, in determining whether a ballot title question states the "chief purpose" of a measure, "`[c]hief purpose' suggests the most significant aim or end which a measure is designed to bring about.
We are not convinced that the Attorney General's caption, which emphasizes one particular effect of the measure, accomplishes that purpose. See Ransom v. Roberts, 309 Or. 654, 662, 791 P.2d 489 (1990) (noting that a proposed caption focused inappropriately on the measure's "perceived effects," rather than on its subject). If enacted, the impact of this measure would be broader than the effect that the Attorney General has chosen to emphasize in the caption.
The question whether to describe in the summary the new council's exclusive power under sections (1)(a) and (c)(4) of the measure is more problematic. In other ballot title cases, this court has required a disclosure in the summary of a measure's major effects on existing state constitutional rights and on the authority of this court to interpret the Oregon Constitution. See Ransom v. Roberts, 309 Or. 654, 664, 791 P.2d 489 (1990): "Something must be said about the effect the measure's passage would have on existing state constitutional rights, and on the power of this state's courts to independently interpret the Oregon Constitution. These are important components of the measure which should be mentioned in the Summary if that can be done within the 85-word limit imposed by ORS 250.035 (1)(c)."
Substantial compliance is the required standard. ORS 250.085 (4); see Ransom v. Roberts, 309 Or. 654, 659, 791 P.2d 489 (1990) (this court will approve a certified ballot title that complies substantially with the statutory standards even if the court does not believe it to be the best of all possible ballot titles). The phrase "raising revenue" meets that standard.
Kafoury was followed by McMurdo, which quoted extensively from Kafoury and then, accordingly, dismissed the timely ballot title petition for failure to raise sufficient arguments to the Secretary of State. Other cases followed the same course, citing to Kafoury and McMurdo and, in one instance, characterized the defect that results in dismissal as a lack of "standing" to bring the action. Ransom v. Roberts, 309 Or. 654, 665, 791 P.2d 489 (1990) (no comments on proposed title made to Secretary of State); Remington v. Roberts, 309 Or. 642, 644, 789 P.2d 662 (1990) (no timely comments to Secretary of State; no "standing"). Only this court's most recent case on this subject, Farago v. Kulongoski, 319 Or. 29, 872 P.2d 964 (1994), raises any question with respect to the foregoing analysis.Farago is a one-page decision in which this court certified the ballot title of the Attorney General, but without any discussion of the choice of that particular disposition and without reference to Kafoury, McMurdo, Ransom, or Remington. It appears that the particular form of disposition in Farago was not considered by this court in the context of its prior decisions.
" Kafoury v. Roberts, 303 Or. 306, 311, 736 P.2d 178 (1987).See also Ransom v. Roberts, 309 Or. 654, 665, 791 P.2d 489 (1990) (petitioner who did not argue in comments to Secretary of State that word "amendment" should be substituted for word "provision" could not thereafter assert such argument on judicial review); McMurdo v. Roberts, 309 Or. 318, 322, 786 P.2d 1268 (1990) (letter to Secretary of State containing writer's suggested ballot title, without reference to noncompliance with controlling legal standards, is insufficient to permit court to consider writer's argument on judicial review of certified ballot title). Even though the legislature had no intent to "import into the statutory scheme a technical `pleading' process," Kafoury v. Roberts, supra, 303 Or at 311, we construe ORS 250.067 (2) and ORS 250.085 (5) to require that comments submitted under ORS 250.067 (2) specify the respect in which the draft ballot title fails to comply with ORS 250.035 and ORS 250.039 and the reasons why the draft ballot title does not meet the statutory requirements.
Even if we do not believe that a certified ballot title is the best of all possible ballot titles, this court must approve a certified ballot title that substantially complies with the statutory standards. Ransom v. Roberts, 309 Or. 654, 659, 791 P.2d 489 (1990). We are not empowered to change a certified ballot title merely because we are of the opinion that we can write a "better" one. Priestley v. Paulus, 287 Or. 141, 145, 597 P.2d 829 (1979); Allison v. Paulus, 280 Or. 197, 199, 570 P.2d 368 (1977).