Ransom v. Holman

3 Citing cases

  1. McLeod v. Clements

    310 Ga. App. 235 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 4 times

    a plea in abatement is one which, without disputing the justice of the plaintiffs claim, objects to the place, mode, or time of asserting it. It is interposed to stop plaintiffs action, leaving it open to plaintiff, however, to renew the suit in another place or form, or at another time. It should not assume to answer the action upon its merits, or deny the existence of the particular cause of action upon which the plaintiff relies.Id. at 26 (1) (citation and footnote omitted); see also Ransom v. Holman, 305 Ga. App. 533, 535 ( 699 SE2d 849) (2010); Stowers v. Guthrie, 196 Ga. App. 86, 86-87 ( 395 SE2d 371) (1990). Here, McLeod filed the Third Lawsuit against the same party (Clements) that was nearly identical to his two previous lawsuits, despite the fact that those initial actions are still pending.

  2. Odion v. Avesis, Inc.

    327 Ga. App. 443 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 10 times
    Noting that “the plain language of [OCGA § 9–9–6(a) ] makes a motion to compel arbitration optional, but directs that a party opting to file such a motion do so in a pending action, if such an action exists”

    Accordingly, as to Odion's remaining claims (those other than the claims for injunctive relief addressed in Division 3(a), supra), we vacate the order dismissing the claims with prejudice and remand for proceedings not inconsistent herewith. See generally Ransom v. Holman, 305 Ga.App. 533, 534–535, 699 S.E.2d 849 (2010) (vacating dismissal order and remanding case where dismissal of action was proper but trial court erred in doing so with prejudice); Sampson v. Haywire Ventures, 278 Ga.App. 525, 527–528, 629 S.E.2d 515 (2006) (same). (e) Disqualification of trial judge.

  3. Pinnacle Benning, LLC v. Clark Realty Capital, LLC

    314 Ga. App. 609 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 25 times
    Holding that sending a demand letter after the derivative lawsuit had been filed did not satisfy the demand requirement

    17. See supra notes 5–7 & accompanying text. 18. SeeRansom v. Holman, 305 Ga.App. 533, 535, 699 S.E.2d 849 (2010) (“In this matter, the trial court's order did not specify whether [the appellant's] second action was dismissed with or without prejudice, and therefore the dismissal was with prejudice by operation of statute.”); see also OCGA § 9–11–41(b) (“The effect of dismissals shall be as follows: (1) A dismissal for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute does not operate as an adjudication upon the merits; and (2) Any other dismissal under this subsection and any dismissal not provided for in this Code section, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, does operate as an adjudication upon the merits unless the court in its order for dismissal specifies otherwise.”). 19. SeeThomas v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 253 Ga.App. 199, 202(1), 558 S.E.2d 432 (2001) (physical precedent only) (“When a purported declaratory judgment action does not meet the criteria for a declaratory judgment, the trial court must dismiss the action without prejudic