Opinion
01 C 2137
February 20, 2002
Plaintiff Ransom moves for reconsideration of my ruling of January 31, 2002 and brings to this Court's attention that she has five claims remaining against defendant Gurnee Volkswagen ("Gurnee"). The five claims are a federal claim under the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1638, a federal claim under the Magnuson-Moss Consumer Product Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310, and three state law fraud claims. Additional briefing on this issue is unnecessary as the original motion was fully briefed and presents all of the arguments I need to make a decision on Gurnee's motion to dismiss Ransom's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 12(b)(1).
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Turning first to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, I note that Gurnee offers no grounds upon which the TILA claim should be dismissed. This claim forms the basis for subject matter jurisdiction for this lawsuit. Accordingly, with respect to the Magnuson-Moss claim, it is unnecessary for Ransom to allege an amount in controversy of $50,000 since another basis of federal jurisdiction exists.
The TILA claim also provides the basis for jurisdiction over the state law claims. I find unpersuasive Gurnee's argument that the claims are unrelated. The car purchase transaction and the documentation necessary to purchase and finance it form a common nucleus of operative facts sufficient to permit the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.
Failure to State a Claim
Turning next to the issue of whether Ransom has failed to state a claim, I accept the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true, construe ambiguities in favor of Ransom and will dismiss only if Ransom can prove no set of facts to support her claims. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12 (b)(6); Kelley v. Crosfield Catalysts, 135 F.3d 1202 (7th Cir. 1998); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
With regard to the Magnuson-Moss Act claim, Gurnee argues that Ransom did not properly allege that she provided Gurnee a reasonable opportunity to cure, a requirement of the Magnuson-Moss Act at 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (e). I find that Ransom's allegations in the Complaint meet the required threshold. The Magnuson-Moss claim survives.
One element of a claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and at common law that Ransom must allege is who made representations to her. Gurnee argues that Ransom has failed to adequately plead with specificity the "who" elements of these claims because her allegation names Gurnee and not the precise identity of the individual who allegedly made the representations. Gurnee would have me read an additional and burdensome requirement into the laws and I refuse to do so; naming the company is sufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements for these two claims. Further, in both claims, I find that Ransom has properly alleged "more than a breach of contract claim." The statutory and common law fraud claims survive the motion to dismiss.
With regard to Ransom's express warranty claim, and leaving aside the issue of attorney's fees and litigation expenses, I find that Ransom has properly pleaded a claim under 810 ICS 5/2-313. This claim survives.
Finally, as Gurnee offers no grounds upon which the TILA claim should be dismissed, the TILA claim survives.
Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for reconsideration [40-1] is GRANTED, and defendant's motion to dismiss [28-1] is DENIED.