Opinion
HHDCV176078558S
03-11-2019
Lisa RANSOM v. CARECORE NATIONAL, LLC
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
PECK, JTR
The plaintiff, Lisa Ransom, filed a one-count complaint against the defendant, Carecore National, LLC (Carecore), on May 18, 2017, alleging a violation of General Statutes § 31-290a. The plaintiff maintains that her employment was terminated for discriminatory or retaliatory reasons due to her filing of a workers’ compensation claim. The facts as best determined from the evidence submitted by the parties are as follows: The defendant does business as MedSolutions and originally employed the plaintiff through a temporary staffing agency on July 28, 2014. In early March 2015, the plaintiff became a full-time data entry specialist with the defendant in their Plainville, Connecticut facility. On or before March 5, 2015, only a few days into her employment, the plaintiff sustained a left shoulder injury while walking into work. As a result of her injury, the plaintiff required surgery, physical therapy, and an extended leave of absence from work. The plaintiff notified her supervisor, Lynn Wuller, that her absence would be for about three months and that she would likely be returning to work on July 6, 2015. Following her injury, the plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim, of which the defendant had notice. On June 22, 2015, the plaintiff received a phone call from a human resources representative, Cordero, and Wuller, notifying the plaintiff that her employment was terminated. The plaintiff recalls that the reason for her termination was that she presented "too many doctor’s notes" and was "out [of work for] too long."
The complaint alleges that the plaintiff was injured on March 16, 2015. At plaintiff’s deposition on March 1, 2018, however, it was established that the plaintiff actually fell and sustained her injury on or before March 5, 2015.
Although the termination date is not mentioned in the complaint, the evidence reveals that the plaintiff was terminated from her employment with Medsolutions, by telephone, on June 22, 2015.
In the defendant’s answer, the defendant denied all the allegations relating to the § 31-290a claim and asserted a special defense stating that the plaintiff was terminated in accordance with the defendant’s neutral leave of absence policy. On August 29, 2018, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, along with an accompanying memorandum of law, and multiple exhibits, arguing that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the defendant terminated the plaintiff’s employment in accordance with its neutral absence control policy, therefore prohibiting the plaintiff from establishing a violation of § 31-290a. The defendant maintains that the plaintiff cannot set forth a valid claim for discrimination as she did not qualify for the defendant’s neutral absence policy, and, even if she did, the defendant had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating her employment.
In support of its motion, the defendant submits the following evidence: (1) relevant sections of the defendant’s employee handbook; (2) excerpts from the transcript of Wuller’s deposition; (3) excerpts from the transcript of the plaintiff’s deposition; (4) the defendant’s employee acknowledgment form, and; (5) the plaintiff’s doctor’s note from Durgesh Nagarkatti, M.D., dated July 9, 2015. On December 3, 2018, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion for summary judgment, along with an accompanying memorandum of law, and supporting exhibits. The plaintiff’s exhibits included the following documents: (1) additional excerpts from the transcript of the plaintiff’s deposition; (2) additional excerpts from the transcript of Wuller’s deposition; (3) the plaintiff’s doctor’s note dated June 11, 2015; (4) the plaintiff’s doctor’s note dated July 9, 2015, and; (5) a portion of defendant’s responses to plaintiff’s first set of interrogatories. On December 7, 2018, the defendant filed a reply memorandum and oral argument was held on December 10, 2018.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
"Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Citations omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534, 51 A.3d 367 (2012). "A motion for summary judgment shall be supported by appropriate documents, including but not limited to affidavits, certified transcripts of testimony under oath, disclosures, written admissions and other supporting documents." Practice Book § 17-45(a). "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bozelko v. Papastavros, 323 Conn. 275, 282, 147 A.3d 1023 (2016). "Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue ... It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact ... are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book [§ 17-45]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tully, 322 Conn. 566, 573, 142 A.3d 1079 (2016). "The existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counteraffidavits and concrete evidence ... If the affidavits and the other supporting documents are inadequate, then the court is justified in granting the summary judgment, assuming that the movant has met his burden of proof." Rivera v. CR Summer Hill, Ltd. Partnership, 170 Conn.App. 70, 74, 154 A.3d 55 (2017). "[A] summary disposition ... should be on evidence which a jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve and which would require a directed verdict for the moving party ... [A] directed verdict may be rendered only where, on the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the trier of fact could not reasonably reach any other conclusion than that embodied in the verdict as directed." (Emphasis in original.) Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 815, 830 A.2d 752 (2003).
DISCUSSION
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the defendant argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the defendant terminated the plaintiff’s employment in accordance with its neutral absence control policy, making it impossible for the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under § 31-290a. The defendant also argues that even if the plaintiff could present a prima facie case of discrimination, it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating the plaintiff’s employment. Further, the defendant maintains that the plaintiff has failed to present evidence to challenge the defendant’s rationale for her firing, or that an overarching discriminatory intent was the basis for her termination.
The plaintiff counters that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was terminated due to her filing of her workers’ compensation claim. She argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant had a neutral absence control policy, and if so, whether it was relied upon in connection with the plaintiff’s termination. In addition, the plaintiff contends that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to what constitutes a reasonable period of time for employers to replace injured employees due to business needs.
"Claims of employment discrimination [pursuant to General States § 31-290a] are evaluated under the burden shifting analysis set forth in Ford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc., 216 Conn. 40, 53-54, 578 A.2d 1054 (1990). Section 31-290a(a) prohibits an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee because the employee had filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits or otherwise exercised her rights under the act ... The plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination." Martin v. Westport, 108 Conn.App. 710, 717, 950 A.2d 19 (2008). "The level of proof required to establish a prima facie case is minimal ..." Craine v. Trinity College, 259 Conn. 625, 638, 791 A.2d 518 (2002).
"To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under § 31-290a, the plaintiff must show that she was exercising a right afforded her under the [Workers’ Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq.] and that the defendant discriminated against her for exercising that right ... [T]he plaintiff must show a causal connection between exercising her rights under the act and the alleged discrimination she suffered. Implicit in this requirement is a showing that the defendant knew or was otherwise aware that the plaintiff had exercised her rights under the act." Martin v. Westport, supra, 108 Conn.App. 717-18. Therefore, in order "to establish [a] prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff must first present sufficient evidence ... to permit a rational trier of fact to find [1] that she engaged in protected [activity] ... [2] that the employer was aware of this activity, [3] that the employer took adverse action against the plaintiff, and [4] that a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action, i.e., that a retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse employment action ..." Id., 718.
If the plaintiff meets her initial burden of establishing a prima facie case, "the burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions ... If the defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted, and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity ... The plaintiff then must satisfy her burden of persuading the factfinder that she was the victim of discrimination either directly by persuading the [factfinder] ... that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Martin v. Westport, supra, 108 Conn.App. 717. If the plaintiff fails to meet its burden by "[failing] to offer any evidence of a retaliatory motive contradicting the defendant’s position that the plaintiff’s termination was as a result of its application of the neutral absence control policy ..." summary judgment should be granted in favor of the defendant. Attruia v. Yale University, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-13-6037617 (April 24, 2014, Wilson, J.) .
"Section 31-290a ... does not require an employer to retain an employee unable to perform his or her work simply because that inability resulted from a work-related injury or illness ... Businesses would suffer significant losses if they were prevented from filling employment vacancies after the lapse of a reasonable period of time." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Martin v. Westport, supra, 108 Conn.App. 720. In the context of claims of retaliatory discharge for the filing of a workers’ compensation claim, "[f]ew courts ... have expanded the definition of discriminatory discharge to include a discharge occasioned by the neutral application of an absence control policy to an employee who was injured and collected workers’ compensation benefits." (Citations omitted.) Chiaia v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 24 Conn.App. 362, 367, 588 A.2d 652, cert. denied, 219 Conn. 907, 593 A.2d 133 (1991). "A discriminatory discharge does not include a discharge because the worker is unable to perform his or her work due to a work-related injury ... nor does it include a discharge occasioned by the neutral application of a policy." (Citations omitted.) Chernovitz v. Preston Trucking Co., 52 Conn.App. 570, 573, 729 A.2d 222 (1999). In Kopacz v. Day Kimball Hospital of Windham County, Inc., 64 Conn.App. 263, 269-71, 779 A.2d 862 (2001), the court affirmed summary judgment for the defendant, and held that there was no discriminatory intent when an employee was terminated after being absent from work for over one year, and budgetary concerns necessitated the hiring of additional employees.
In the present case, the defendant’s employee handbook lays out its medical leave policy, which affords a maximum of twelve weeks leave during a twelve-month period for employees who have completed six months of service with the company and have suffered work-related injuries. During the plaintiff’s deposition, she stated that she signed an "employee acknowledgment form," witnessed by Wuller, acknowledging receipt of the defendant’s employee handbook. In addition, the plaintiff acknowledged that it was her responsibility to read and comply with the company policies contained within the handbook, and that she should contact human resources with any questions. Even though the plaintiff admits that it is her signature on the employee acknowledgment form, she maintains that she never received a copy of the handbook and did not know she was responsible for understanding its contents.
In further support of its motion for summary judgment, the defendant submitted a copy of the plaintiff’s doctor’s note, dated June 11, 2015, which stated that the plaintiff was making significant progress in her recovery, but would not be allowed to return to work for another month. The plaintiff’s leave commenced on, or before, March 5, 2015. Therefore, extending the plaintiff’s leave for an additional month would exceed the maximum allowable twelve-week leave of absence within a twelve-month period, as provided in the employee handbook. The defendant also submitted excerpts from Wuller’s deposition transcript, wherein Wuller stated that due to the plaintiff’s absence, the other twenty or so data collection specialists were required to pick up the backlog of case work. Wuller further stated that there was still an accumulation of cases that needed to be processed when the company terminated the plaintiff’s employment. As a result of the plaintiff’s absence and, in an effort to keep up with the accumulated workload, the defendant had to hire another employee who was elevated from a temporary to a full-time position.
The defendant notes that the plaintiff was not even an employee eligible for leave, as defined in the employee handbook, because she had not been a regular Medsolutions employee for six months. Nonetheless, they allowed her the maximum amount of medical leave of twelve weeks.
In response to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff counters that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the discriminatory nature of her termination. Namely, the plaintiff maintains that the defendant did not have a neutral absence policy, and even if it did, the plaintiff was terminated for discriminatory or retaliatory reasons based on her workers’ compensation claim. The plaintiff’s deposition transcript reflects that the plaintiff was injured when she fell outside of work; that she informed Wuller of her injury; and went to visit a doctor. The plaintiff required an extended leave of absence from work due to the extent of her injuries, which was communicated to the defendant via fax and through copies of the plaintiff’s doctor’s notes. Following her injury, the plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim and notified the defendant of her impending action. While out on leave, on June 22, 2015, the plaintiff received a telephone call from a member of the human resources staff, with Wuller also on the line, notifying the plaintiff that her employment was terminated. The explanation the plaintiff recalls being given for the decision was that she was out of work for too long a period of time and provided too many doctor’s notes. The plaintiff testified that at the time of her firing she had expected to be back at work within a few weeks. She also recalled a conversation with her doctor on June 22, 2015, during which he revealed that she would be able to return to work in a couple of weeks. The plaintiff further testified that she never received or read the defendant’s employee handbook and was unaware of any leave of absence policies. She also argues that Wuller stated in her deposition that she did not recall a neutral absence control policy in the company handbook. Further, the plaintiff asserts that Wuller could not remember whether the plaintiff was terminated for providing too many doctor’s notes or for being absent from work for too long a period of time. Wuller did, however, recall being included on a human resources email wherein the company stated that for business reasons it could no longer afford to hold the plaintiff’s position open.
Beyond the bald assertion that the defendant did not have a neutral absence policy, the plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence to challenge the authenticity of the relevant portion or the defendant’s employee handbook submitted as an exhibit to its motion.
The plaintiff argues that because Wuller could not recall if there was a neutral absence policy in the company handbook, the policy could not be the true reason for the termination of the plaintiff’s employment. There was no evidence presented by the plaintiff, however, to indicate that Wuller was the ultimate decision maker concerning her termination, or that Wuller’s lack of knowledge regarding the policy otherwise should carry any weight. The plaintiff has admitted, and the evidence has shown, however, that the plaintiff signed the employee acknowledgment form binding her to the contents of the employee handbook, including its absence policy. The plaintiff’s statement that she did not actually receive a handbook is irrelevant, as she had access to the handbook through the company intranet and acquiesced to be bound by the absence policy by virtue of her signature on the form acknowledging receipt of the handbook.
In further support of the plaintiff’s claim, she has provided two doctor’s notes and the defendant’s responses to the plaintiff’s interrogatories and requests for production. The June 11, 2015, doctor’s note stated that the plaintiff was making progress in her recovery, but would need to remain out of work for an additional month. The plaintiff received a second doctor’s note, dated July 9, 2015, which stated that she was making significant improvements and would be allowed to complete four hours of regular duty and four hours of light duty, before increasing her work levels in another month. Coinciding with her doctor’s notes, the plaintiff offered a portion of the defendant’s responses to the plaintiff’s interrogatories, which pertained to the plaintiff’s job duties and responsibilities as a data collection specialist. Enumerated within the plaintiff’s duties were mostly data entry tasks, which she argues necessitated only computer or desk work.
As previously stated, in an employment discrimination case, the parties are required to follow the burden shifting analysis set forth in Ford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc., 216 Conn. 40, 53-54, 578 A.2d 1054 (1990). Pursuant to that analysis, the initial burden is on the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of evidence that a prima facie case of discrimination exists. See id., 53. If the plaintiff satisfies her initial burden of proof, the burden then shifts to the defendant to produce some evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See Martin v. Westport, supra, 108 Conn.App. 717. If the defendant meets its burden of production, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her termination was more likely motivated by the defendant’s discriminatory intent or that the proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for termination are unworthy of credence. See id.
The defendant argues that, even assuming the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, the defendant had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions based on its neutral absence control policy and for legitimate business needs. Therefore, the defendant claims, the plaintiff cannot establish a discriminatory motive or that the defendant’s stated reasons for her termination were pretextual and unworthy of credence. The court agrees with the defendant. Courts have held that "[b]ecause the plaintiffs were discharged solely as a result of the neutral application of the defendant’s reasonable absence control policy ... there was not any contravention of General Statutes § 31-290a." Chiaia v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., supra, 24 Conn.App. 369. Additionally, in Attruia v. Yale University, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV- 13-6037617, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant when it terminated an employee in compliance with its neutral absence policy after only a five-month leave of absence. The defendant has a neutral absence attendance policy in its employee handbook, which states in relevant part: "Eligible employees may request medical leave only after having completed 6 months of service ... Eligible employees are normally granted leave for the period of disability, up to a maximum of 12 weeks within the 12-month period." Based on this policy, the plaintiff was ineligible for leave due to the fact that she had only been employed by the defendant for a few days at the time of her injury. Contrary to this policy, however, the defendant afforded the plaintiff the maximum leave of absence of twelve weeks and only terminated her employment after she exceeded that time. The plaintiff’s first doctor’s note, dated June 11, 2015, stated that the plaintiff would not be able to return to work from her March 2015, injury for another month. A second doctor’s note, dated July 9, 2015, (sent post-termination), stated that the plaintiff was cleared to return back to work for four hours of regular duty and four hours of light duty. The note further stated, "[w]e will see her back in one month at which point we will increase her work capacity." On this schedule, the plaintiff would have been absent from work for roughly fifteen weeks. Upon her return, the plaintiff still would have been unable to work at full capacity, as she was only cleared to work for a combination of regular and light duty. By any calculation, the plaintiff’s leave well exceeded the maximum allotment of twelve weeks afforded by company policy.
The note from the plaintiff’s doctor, dated June 11, 2015, stated as follows: "Lisa Ransom comes into the office for follow-up in regard to her left shoulder. The patient has made remarkable progress with range of motion and strengthening of the extremity. PLAN: Lisa will continue with therapy. We will hold her from returning back to work for another month at which point, she will then increase her work capacity."
In order to satisfy its burden and to rebut the presumption of discrimination, the defendant is only required to offer a single, legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct. The court in Callender v. Reflexite Co., 143 Conn.App. 351, 367, 70 A.3d 1084, aff’d, 310 Conn. 905, 75 A.3d 32 (2013), held that "it suffices that the defendant set forth one legitimate nondiscriminatory reason and that the court was not required to examine every reason or explanation set forth by the defendant as long as it met its burden of producing one legitimate reason." Although the defendant herein arguably met its burden by producing evidence that the plaintiff was terminated in accordance with its established neutral absence policy, it has also provided evidence that the plaintiff was terminated for a legitimate business reason. As in Chiaia v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., supra, 24 Conn.App. 367, employers must be allowed to fill vacant positions after a reasonable period of time. Due to the plaintiff’s absence, there was an over accumulation of work, that necessitated current employees to pick up the additional work. Ultimately, the defendant had to hire an additional employee to help with the increased workload. The defendant’s decision to terminate the plaintiff’s employment for business needs, due to an accumulation of work related to her extended absence of over twelve weeks, was not unreasonable.
The plaintiff was absent from work for approximately fifteen weeks, three weeks longer than allowable pursuant to the defendant’s neutral absence policy. The defendant produced excerpts from Wuller’s deposition testimony, wherein she testified that the remaining data collection specialists were required to pick up the growing backlog of case work, which persisted up to, and following, the plaintiff’s termination. In order to keep up with demand, the defendant was required to hire a formerly employed temporary worker as a full-time employee. The plaintiff’s hope that the defendant would keep her position open until she was fully cleared to return to work was not required either by company policy or by the law. Significantly, the plaintiff has failed to present any evidence to refute or undermine the defendant’s legitimate business need to hire a replacement employee due to the accumulating workload. Under all circumstances, the plaintiff has failed to prove that the defendant terminated her employment due to a discriminatory or retaliatory motive or that its proffered reasons for her termination are unworthy of credence. Rather, the court finds that the defendant has established that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff’s termination was based on its established neutral absence policy and due to legitimate business needs.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is hereby granted.