Ransmeier v. Camp Cody, Inc.

9 Citing cases

  1. Estabrook v. American Hoist Derrick, Inc.

    127 N.H. 162 (N.H. 1985)   Cited 19 times
    In Estabrook v. American Hoist Derrick, Inc., 127 N.H. 162, 498 A.2d 741 (1986), this court held that the workers' compensation act did not bar wrongful death actions by the Administratrix of the Estate of Nelson Estabrook against the decedent's fellow employees.

    The action was apparently in response to two decisions handed down by this court. See Stevens v. Lewis supra (employee may maintain common law negligence action against fellow employee even where fellow employee is sole owner of the corporate employer, unless the fellow employee is the alter ego of the corporation); Ransmeier v. Camp Cody, Inc., 117 N.H. 736, 378 A.2d 752 (1977) (administrator of an estate may sue employer for wrongful death because administrator is not "employee" under the statute and because wrongful death was not a common law action barred by the statute). RSA 281:12, II (Supp. 1983) now provides:

  2. Park v. Rockwell Int'l Corp.

    121 N.H. 894 (N.H. 1981)   Cited 22 times
    In Park v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 121 N.H. 894, 436 A.2d 1136 (1981), the plaintiff successfully claimed that RSA 281:12 (Supp.

    The constitutional question now before us was not addressed in a recent case involving actions against an employer for death of an employee because RSA 281:12, as of 1977, barred only actions by the employee, and not those brought by his legal representatives. Ransmeier v. Camp Cody, Inc., 117 N.H. 736, 738, 378 A.2d 752, 753-54 (1977). In Ransmeier, we held that an employee's estate could maintain a wrongful death action against the decedent's employer if work-related injuries caused the decedent's death.

  3. Nelson v. United States

    639 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1980)   Cited 59 times
    Holding that "the need for uniformity in maritime wrongful death actions requires extension of Moragne to cover claims based on negligence, to the exclusion of state wrongful death statutes"

    In such cases the employee may elect between common law and compensation remedies. See generally, 2A A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 69 (1976 Supp. 1979). An additional consideration for delineating the scope of "others" in section 413 of the Restatement in the context of wrongful death actions is that in a few states a wrongful death action is treated as different from the injured decedent's own cause of action, and so may not be held barred by workmen's compensation acts. See, e.g., Ransmeier v. Camp Cody, Inc., 117 N.H. 736, 378 A.2d 752 (1977); Alizzi v. Employers Ins., 351 So.2d 258 (La.Ct.App. 1977), writ denied, 353 So.2d 1037 (La. 1978). See generally 2A A. Larson, supra, § 66.

  4. Cummings v. Bostwick

    481 F. Supp. 1251 (D.N.H. 1980)   Cited 4 times

    However, it was held in the same year, 1977, that the employee's waiver of his "rights of action at common law" pursuant to RSA 281:12 did not bar the administrator of his estate from suing the employer, as this statute served only to bar common law rights, and not a statutorily created right to recover for wrongful death. Ransmeier v. Camp Cody, Inc., 117 N.H. 736, 378 A.2d 752 (1977). RSA 281:14, as it stood at the time the plaintiff in the instant case sustained his injury, provided in pertinent part:

  5. Clark v. Jackson

    455 F. Supp. 537 (D.N.H. 1978)   Cited 2 times

    Unless the defendant is both the corporate alter ego and is performing a corporate responsibility, he will derive no immunity from RSA 281:12. Especially is this so in light of New Hampshire's restrictive view of who is an "employer", and therefore exempt from suit. See LaBonte v. Nat. Gypsum Co., 110 N.H. 314, 269 A.2d 634 (1970) and Ransmeier, Admr. v. Camp Cody, Inc., 117 N.H. ___, 378 A.2d 752 (1977). Stevens v. Lewis, supra, 387 A.2d at 639.

  6. Royal Globe Insurance Companies v. Graf

    453 A.2d 1262 (N.H. 1982)   Cited 4 times

    John A. Graf was appointed administrator of the decedent's estate and brought a wrongful death action against Process Engineering, Inc. The writ was dated April 17, 1978. In Ransmeier v. Camp Cody, Inc., 117 N.H. 736, 378 A.2d 752 (1977), a wrongful death action brought by an administrator was not barred by the version of the workmen's compensation statute in effect prior to June 27, 1978, RSA 281:12, which presumed the waiver of other legal remedies (e.g., a wrongful death action) because that statute applied only to the employee, not to his spouse or legal representative. Although a 1978 amendment to the statute now bars actions by an employee's spouse and legal representative, see RSA 281:12 (Supp.

  7. Lozier v. Brown Company

    121 N.H. 67 (N.H. 1981)   Cited 12 times

    1979) does bar the action. In Ransmeier v. Cody, 117 N.H. 736, 738, 378 A.2d 752, 754 (1977), we held that the provisions of the workmen's compensation statute, RSA 281:12, did not bar a wrongful death action by the administrator of a deceased employee's estate. Subsequently, the legislature amended the statute to bar such actions, effective June 27, 1978.

  8. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Poirier

    415 A.2d 882 (N.H. 1980)   Cited 14 times
    In Poirier, it is uncertain whether the applicable policy also contained an express exclusion discharging the insurer from coverage of workers' compensation claims, similar to that in clause (i) of the National Union policy.

    We recognize that the scope of damages recoverable by a plaintiff in a common law action is greater than in a compensation proceeding. Ransmeier v. Camp Cody, Inc., 117 N.H. 736, 378 A.2d 752 (1977); Wentworth Hotel v. Gray, Inc. supra. Were we to extend the language of exclusion "j" to include the broad interpretation that Royal Globe now claims, an employer could very well be required to indemnify damages that are not compensable under the workmen's compensation statute, damages from which his insurer is immunized.

  9. Stevens v. Lewis

    387 A.2d 637 (N.H. 1978)   Cited 18 times
    In Stevens v. Lewis, 118 N.H. 367, 387 A.2d 637 (1978), the court recognized that when a person who is an alter ego of a corporation performs a corporate responsibility, that person is immune from liability under RSA 281:12 for failure to provide a safe workplace.

    Unless the defendant is both the corporate alter ego and is performing a corporate responsibility, he will derive no immunity from RSA 281:12. Especially is this so in light of New Hampshire's restrictive view of who is an "employer," and therefore exempt from suit. See LaBonte v. Nat. Gypsum Co., 110 N.H. 314, 269 A.2d 634 (1970) and Ransmeier v. Camp Cody, Inc., 117 N.H. 736, 378 A.2d 752 (1977). The defendant here requested only one instruction that relates to the test we have prescribed above.