Rankin v. Curtis

13 Citing cases

  1. Scarlett v. Goldman

    No. H049622 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2023)

    It is "well established" that a trial court exercises "broad discretion in ruling on a motion for continuance." (In re Marriage of Johnson (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 148, 154; see also Rankin v. Curtis (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 939, 947 (Curtis).)

  2. City of Santa Monica v. Gonzalez

    140 Cal.App.4th 1134 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)

    ment of a receiver. Rule 1901(d) applies when a receiver has been appointed without notice and an order to show cause why the appointment should not be confirmed has issued. The rule entitles the parties to a continuance "to enable them to oppose the confirmation." The rule is inapplicable to a noticed hearing on a petition to appoint a receiver. Moreover, Gonzalez never filed a noticed motion or an ex parte application for a continuance as required by the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 375(b), 379.) He never provided the trial court with good cause for a continuance, again as required by the California Rules of Court. ( Id., rule 375(c).) He did not explain why he never filed opposition to the petition or demonstrate that his attorney's absence was "because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances" ( id., rule 375(c)(3)). The trial court accordingly did not abuse its discretion in refusing to continue the hearing on the petition. ( Rankin v. Curtis (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 939, 947 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 753]; Ohmer v. Superior Court (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 661, 666 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 224].) Compliance with Health and Safety Code sections 17980.6 and 17980.7 Health and Safety Code section 17980.6 provides that if a building is maintained in a manner that substantially endangers the public, "the enforcement agency may issue an order or notice to repair or abate pursuant to this part." The order or notice must be mailed to or posted at each residential unit on the property and must include the name, address and telephone number of the issuing agency; the "date, time and location of any public hearing or proceeding concerning the order or notice"; and information that a lessor cannot retaliate against a lessee pursuant to Civil Code section 1942.5. Health and Safety Code section 17980.7 contains provisions that apply "[i]f the owner fails to comply within a reasonable time with the terms of the order or notice issued pursuant to Section 17980.6." These include appointment of

  3. Franklin Mint Co. v. Superior Court

    130 Cal.App.4th 1550 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 20 times

    The amount of discovery — if any — to be allowed and the scope of the good faith settlement proceeding rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Manatt's reliance on Rankin v. Curtis (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 939 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 753], in support of its assertion of an absolute right to discovery is misplaced inasmuch as Rankin was decided before the Supreme Court made clear in Abbott Ford that a nonsettling defendant does not have a right to a mini-trial on the valuation issue. "By suggesting some methods the court might use to evaluate components of the settlement, we do not mean to indicate that these methods are exclusive.

  4. Aero-Crete, Inc. v. Superior Court

    21 Cal.App.4th 203 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 16 times

    Petitioners do not assert that they sought and were denied adequate discovery on the issue of Pieri-Debbas's financial condition. (See, e.g., Rankin v. Curtis (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 939, 947-948 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 753].) Petitioners also contend the settlement was not in good faith because Dale Village failed to show that James Pieri and Nicholas Debbas were without personal assets which could be tapped to satisfy an adverse judgment.

  5. Price Pfister, Inc. v. William Lyon Co.

    14 Cal.App.4th 1643 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 6 times

    The Legislature intended the "good faith" concept to be "a flexible principle imposing on reviewing courts the obligation to guard against the numerous ways in which the interests of nonsettling defendants may be unfairly prejudiced." ( Rankin v. Curtis (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 939, 945 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 753]; see also River Garden Farms, supra, 26 Cal.App.3d at p. 997, quoted with approval in Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 494-495.) The "good faith" concept is sufficiently flexible to cover the present case, because the "settlor's proportionate liability" is a key element in a good faith determination. ( Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 499.)

  6. In re Christopher A.

    226 Cal.App.3d 1154 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 32 times

    (1a), (2a) Relying on 9 Witkin, California Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, section 747, pages 714-715, Manuel's counsel asserts this court's prior denial of Christopher's motion to dismiss constitutes "law of the case," that is, a prior statement of a rule of law necessary to the earlier decision by this court on the appeal, to which we must now adhere, absent injustice or a change in substantive law. Because the question is a recurring one ( see, e.g., Rankin v. Curtis (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 939, 941, fn. 1 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 753]), it is useful to examine it in some detail. If this court's earlier denial of the motion is the law of the case, we ought not now even consider the question of the validity of the appeal, but treat it as settled.

  7. Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank

    220 Cal.App.3d 1117 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 95 times
    Relying on Trotsky

    Some have indicated that the ruling was not an abuse of discretion — i.e., there was no error at all — if it did not prejudice the appellant. (E.g., Larson v. Solbakken (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 410, 429 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 450]; see also Rankin v. Curtis (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 939, 947 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 753] [discretion is abused if lack of continuance results in denial of fair hearing].) Others have said that there is no miscarriage of justice and thus no reversible error — i.e., assuming there was error, it was harmless — if there was no prejudice to the appellant.

  8. Greshko v. County of Los Angeles

    194 Cal.App.3d 822 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 30 times
    In Greshko v. County of Los Angeles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 822, there was evidence that the settling defendants had settled for reasons unrelated to their possible exposure -- and there is no such evidence here.

    (13) In addition, the Legislature intended the "good faith" concept in section 877.6 to be a flexible principle imposing on reviewing courts the obligation to guard against the numerous ways in which the interests of nonsettling defendants may be unfairly prejudiced. ( Rankin v. Curtis (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 939, 945 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 753].) The court in Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. Holdener (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 25 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 57], rejected the concept that "cleaning up the pleadings" by dismissing a defendant is a proper basis for finding a good faith settlement as envisioned in Tech-Bilt because such a purpose does not reflect a good faith determination of relative liabilities or the good faith toward the nonsettling defendant required by sections 877 and 877.6, Code of Civil Procedure.

  9. City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court

    192 Cal.App.3d 1251 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 94 times
    Finding that an objecting nonsettlor may move for a continuance "for the purpose of gathering facts, which could include further formal discovery, to support its statutory burden of proof as to all Tech-Bilt factors nonsettlors placed in issue in order that the matter can be fully and fairly litigated."

    "[W]e accept as a general proposition that the Legislature intended the `good faith' concept in section 877.6 to be a flexible principle imposing on reviewing courts the obligation to guard against the numerous ways in which the interests of non-settling defendants may be unfairly prejudiced." ( Rankin v. Curtis (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 939, 945 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 753] (italics added) citing, inter alia, Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 494, fn. 4; Ex-Cell-O-Corp. v. Holdener (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 25, 32-33 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 57].)

  10. Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. Superior Court

    187 Cal.App.3d 1030 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 13 times
    Holding that the assigned claims should either be assigned a value or the court should have provided that Non-Settling Defendants would be credited for any recovery by Plaintiffs as to the assigned claims

    (2) If there was ever any question about the matter, it is now clear that to entitle a settling defendant to a discharge from claims for proportional indemnity or contribution by nonsettling defendants under section 877, the settlement entered into must be in good faith not only in respect to the settling plaintiff or plaintiffs but also in respect to the nonsettling defendants. ( Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde Associates, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 494-495, 496-497; Ex-Cello-Corp. v. Holdener (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 25, 32-33 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 57]; Torres v. Union Pacific R.R. Co. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 499, 507 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 825] ; River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 986, 996, 997, 1000 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 498]; cf. Rankin v. Curtis (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 939, 945 et seq. [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 753] .) Disposition