Opinion
No. FA 04-0490123S
May 9, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This decision dissolves the 19-year marriage of Vanessa and Robert Ranfone. Both parties appeared with counsel for a one-day trial on March 21 of this year, testified, and offered certain exhibits into evidence. Evidence was supplemented after trial by submission of an attorneys fee affidavit and information regarding the cost of COBRA medical benefits. The principal issues in this limited contested dissolution proceeding are financial ones: whether the marital home should be sold and the net proceeds divided equally after the parties' son graduates from high school, as Mr. Ranfone requests, or awarded to Ms. Ranfone, as she asks; the appropriate property to award each party; whether the husband should pay alimony and, if so, how much; and whether he should pay his wife's counsel fees. The parties do not dispute the parenting orders, both agreeing to joint legal custody, primary residence with the mother, and the father enjoying reasonable and liberal visitation.
The court has observed the demeanor of the parties and evaluated their credibility. The court has carefully considered all of the evidence, including the exhibits and the testimony presented, according to the standards required by law. The court has carefully considered the statutory criteria for dissolving a marriage and entering orders regarding alimony, child support, the equitable division of property and debt, and counsel fees.
After making jurisdictional findings, the court will discuss the issues here.
I — JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS
The court has jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage. One party has resided in Connecticut continually for more than one year prior to the bringing of this action. The parties were married in Muscogee County, Georgia, on April 22, 1986. They have one minor child who is issue of the marriage: Daniel Ranfone, born on May 27, 1988. Neither party has received state or municipal financial assistance. The marriage between the parties has broken down irretrievably with no reasonable hope of reconciliation.
II — DISCUSSION A. The parties
Vanessa and Robert Ranfone met while still teenagers and married three years later, just before she turned 20 and just after he did. They next lived in Germany for three years while Mr. Ranfone was stationed there in the military, then returned to the United States, where they lived with her parents for a few months before buying their first home in West Haven. They lived again with her parents for two and a half years after selling their first home and before buying the present marital home at 61 Brockett Farms Road in North Haven. After Daniel's birth, Ms. Ranfone stayed at home until seven years ago, when she returned to work part-time in the job she still holds as a receptionist at a Harley-Davidson dealership, where she works 28 hours per week and earns $14 per hour plus commissions. In 2003 she earned $23,658.42 and 26,201.73 in 2004; both amounts reflected commissions averaging approximately $100 per week. In 2005 her income has been less, only $381 per week gross, which would result in weekly net pay of $359 after taxes upon dissolution. But since she works 28 hours per week and earns $14 per hour, her earnings to date have not yet included any commission income, which she testified that she still receives.
Mr. Ranfone is a police officer for the City of East Haven, where, working 40 hours a week plus overtime, he earns a base salary of $1,040 per week and $40 an hour for overtime. In the late nineties and first years of this decade, he worked approximately 15 to 20 hours per week of overtime; but since his pension benefit will be based on his three years of highest salary, he has taken advantage the last two years of a major highway construction project in East Haven to boost his average overtime hours to 30 and almost 40 hours per week in 2003 and 2004, earning $116,933.62 and $137,236.46 in medicare wages, respectively. In 2005 he worked less his overtime during the winter months, averaging 20 hours per week through the time of trial. The projected end of the major construction project this year will significantly reduce his overtime.
Both parties, nearly 40 years of age and in good health, have many remaining years of employment. Although both are high school graduates, there is no doubt that at present, Mr. Ranfone has significantly greater income prospects than his wife does. He is an experienced police officer, has regular opportunities for overtime, and has a pension and voluntary savings plan. Ms. Ranfone candidly admitted during trial that she has not needed to work more than 28 hours a week because she has been able to make ends meet, even during the pendente lite period, with the support her husband has provided. During the pendente lite period, he paid voluntary unallocated support of between $600 and $800 per week. Her proposed orders request that, in addition to child support in accordance with the child support guidelines, he pay her lifetime alimony of $850 per week, an amount that she claims is necessary.
There is no impediment, however, to Ms. Ranfone seeking to develop her own vocational skills and enhancing her income. The parties' son is almost 17 years old and will graduate from high school soon. There was no evidence offered that he has any special needs that would prevent her from working at least 35 to 40 hours per week or from going back to school or for training to improve her occupational skills and financial prospects. The husband's income alone, with her limited income based on part-time employment, is not sufficient now to support two households as they once lived.
B. Financial Issues
"There are three stages of analysis regarding the equitable distribution of each resource; first, whether the resource is property within Section 46b-81 to be equally distributed (classification); second, what is the appropriate method for determining the value of the property (valuation); and third, what is the most equitable distribution of the property between the parties." Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 792-93 (1995). The court finds that all items of property listed on each party's financial affidavit are property subject to distribution under § 46b-81. In addition, the husband has an interest in two choses in action, the value of neither of which was introduced into evidence. The husband's deferred compensation from East Haven is worth $9,669 and the marital home has a fair market value of $400,000, with equity of $260,000. All other items listed on the financial affidavits have the values stated thereon.
The court thus has insufficient data to assign a present value to either lawsuit. "In distributing the assets of the marital estate, the court is required by § 46b-81 to consider the estate of each of the parties. Implicit in this requirement is the need to consider the economic value of the parties' estates. The court need not, however, assign specific values to the parties' assets." Bornemann v. Bornemann, 245 Conn. 508, 539 A.2d 978 (1998). Not having introduced sufficient evidence as to the value of either lawsuit, neither party may now complain that the court cannot do so either and will instead award interest in the lawsuits on a percentage basis of ultimate value. "Both parties in a dissolution proceeding are required to itemize all of their assets in a financial affidavit and to provide the court with the approximate value of each asset. If the parties fail to do so, the equitable nature of the proceedings precludes them from later seeking to have the financial orders overturned on the basis that the court had before it too little information as to the value of the assets." (Citations omitted.) Id., 536-37.
The parties' proposed orders on property distribution differ most on disposition of the marital home. Ms. Ranfone asks that the property be quitclaimed to her, whereas the husband proposes that she be granted exclusive possession of the premises until the youngest child has graduated from high school, at which time he asks that it be sold and the net proceeds equally divided. Ms. Ranfone also asks to keep all of her stocks and deferred compensation, for the husband to be required to pay for her COBRA medical benefits (which will cost $544.92 for medical and $41.99 for dental per month) and to be awarded an unspecified "portion of the defendant's retirement account." (Pl.'s Claims for Relief, ¶ 8.) Her proposal would have the court awarding to her almost eighty per cent of the value of the marital assets owned by the parties (not taking into consideration the worth of the husband's two lawsuits, neither of which the court has sufficient information to value), plus whatever additional percentage any share of his pension awarded to her should also award her.
Although Mr. Ranfone's proposed orders ask that his wife receive no share of his pension, at trial he testified that he thought the parties' deferred compensation should be equalized. Since his deferred compensation is worth almost 80% of the total value of their combined deferred compensation, his testimony obviously acquiesced in a transfer of some portion of his deferred compensation to her. The husband's proposal regarding the marital home recognizes that, at minimum, the parties' son has an interest in continuing to live with his mother in the home he has known for much of his life.
Ms. Ranfone's argument for $850 per week in alimony is strongest if the court assumes the husband can and should continue to work 40 hours per week of overtime and that all of his overtime pay should be factored into the alimony award. Their joint incomes would then be sufficient to meet both of their stated needs, as manifested by the expenses listed on their last financial affidavits and supplemented by the evidence at trial. Mr. Ranfone would still have almost 40% of their joint incomes. The court here has considered both the net overtime that Mr. Ranfone has worked and can work for purposes of establishing an appropriate alimony order. The court finds that it would be an unfair burden to him, however, to create an alimony order that would require him to continue working overtime forever at the levels of the last two years. The amount of overtime he worked in 2003 and 2004 reflects his decision to take advantage of the temporary availability of substantial overtime occasioned by the East Haven highway construction project in order to enhance his pension, which will be based on the three years of his highest earnings. Both parties agreed at trial that the overtime levels will reduce substantially after the major construction project ends, probably this year. Adopting the wife's proposal would effectively require the husband to work 80 hours a week for little more than $22,000 a year after-tax income and would leave him with only about one-quarter of his pay. The court finds that the alimony order should take into account the plaintiff's ability and past record of overtime work. It will not require him, however, to maintain the current level of overtime, which has been tantamount to two full-time jobs.
The Child Support Guidelines Commission also recognized that "some limitation on the number of hours considered is appropriate" for determining a party's gross income in setting the child support award. Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines (1999), Preamble, § (i), p.v. The Guidelines thus limit the amount of overtime and additional employment that can be considered, in determining a party's gross income for child support purposes, to 52 hours per week in an initial child support determination. Regs. Conn. State Agen., § 46b-215a-1(11)(A)(ii) ("`Gross income' means the average weekly earned and unearned income from all sources before deductions, including . . . (ii) hourly wages for regular, overtime, and additional employment up to a maximum of 52 total paid hours per week; . . .") Employing that rule here, the presumptive current support amount is for Mr. Ranfone to pay child support of $189 per week plus 61 per cent of qualifying child care expenses and unreimbursed medical expenses exceeding one hundred dollars per year.
The wife argued that the court should consider all of the husband's overtime income in determining child support. Her position was that doing so would take this case out of the child support guidelines because the parties' combined net income would then exceed $2,500 per week. Hence, she argued, the court would not be bound, because the guidelines would not apply, to follow the guidelines rule that the court should only consider the first 52 hours of work per week in calculating child support. Although she has correctly recited the law that the guidelines do not apply where parties' combined net income exceeds $2,500; see Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines (1999), Preamble, § (d)(7), p. iii; her argument overlooks the guidelines rule, discussed in the text above, that the computation of gross and net income does not include earnings for work of more than 52 hours per week.
The major portion of fault for the breakdown of this marriage lies with Mr. Ranfone. After many years of marriage during which he never expressed any dissatisfaction with his wife, he became involved in an extramarital affair and left his wife for another woman. While married to a police officer earning $80,000 to $115,000 per year, as her husband had in the six years before he brought this action, Ms. Ranfone had no need to worry about her financial future, but now she must. The court's financial orders cannot undo the hurt and disappointment that a rejected spouse may feel, but those orders may take into consideration fault in its award of alimony and distribution of equitable property, as this court has done.
Yet, after considering all the statutory factors and the facts of this case, the court concludes that Ms. Ranfone's proposed orders on alimony and property impose too heavy a penalty on Mr. Ranfone for his fault in the breakdown of their marriage. "The primary basis for an award of alimony has been not to punish a guilty spouse but to continue the duty to support the other who, in legal contemplation, was abandoned." Tobey v. Tobey, 165 Conn. 742, 748, 345 A.2d 21 (1974). The purpose of the property distribution is to "unscramble the ownership of property, giving each spouse what is equitably his." Beede v. Beede, 186 Conn. 191, 195, 440 A.2d 283 (1982). Fault is only one of the factors that a court must consider in determining these financial orders. See General Statutes §§ 46b-51(a) and 46b-81. What Judge Shay recently wrote about alimony is equally true about property distributions — they "should never be awarded solely as a reward to a spouse for virtue, nor as punishment to the other spouse for wrongdoing." Chyung v. Chyung, Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. FA 000181489 S (May 27, 2003), aff'd 86 Conn.App. 665, 862 A.2d 374 (2004) (upholding court's order that it would not "assume the mantle of an `avenging angel' to punish what are, in essence, acts of human frailty"). In this case, the court's financial orders on property, debt, and alimony have all taken the husband's actions into account in the context of the overall facts and evidence, along with the other statutory factors. The court has accorded to the statutory factors and the evidence the significance that it considers appropriate, though undoubtedly attributing less weight to fault than the wife would have preferred.
After considering all the statutory factors for entering orders regarding alimony and equitable distribution of property and debt in light of all the evidence and information presented by the parties here, the court here finds it fair and equitable to award the wife alimony of $350 per week, additional alimony for not more than three years for the COBRA cost of medical and dental benefits, guideline child support, possession of and title to the marital home (less a share of equity awarded to the husband), a half share of the husband's pension, and distribution of other assets and debt as set forth in the orders below.
Ms. Ranfone has also requested payment of her counsel fees. Under General Statutes § 46b-62, the court may order payment of counsel fees after considering the parties' respective financial abilities and the criteria set forth in General Statutes § 46b-82, so long as the court takes care that its determination of this question does not substantially undermine its other financial orders. As the court held in Miller v. Miller, 16 Conn.App. 412, 418, 547 A.2d 922 (1988),
In determining whether to award counsel fees the trial court must consider the total financial resources of the parties in light of the statutory criteria. The statutory criteria are to be applied in light of the following three broad principles: First, such awards should not be made merely because the obligor has demonstrated an ability to pay. Second, where both parties are financially able to pay their own fees and expenses, they should be permitted to do so. Third where, because of other orders, the potential obligee has ample liquid funds, an allowance of counsel fees is not justified. If, on the basis of the total financial resources of the parties, the trial court concludes that denying an award of counsel fees would not undermine its purpose in making its prior financial orders, the court should allow each party to pay his or her own counsel fees.
(Citations omitted; quotations omitted.)
After the conclusion of evidence, plaintiff's attorney, Howard Jacobs, submitted an affidavit of his hours, services, fees, and costs in connection with representing the plaintiff, and counsel for the defendant thereupon filed a written objection to that submission, both pursuant to this court's order permitting them to do so. Attorney Jacobs' submission shows that he and a paralegal spent 53.9 total hours in this matter. He charged his client $450 an hour for his services, and $90 per hour for those of his paralegal. Plaintiff's counsel also charged his client $115.20 for copying and postage and claimed disbursements of $1,377.80 to court reporters, a pension appraisal consultant, and a state marshal for service of process and subpoenas. The total fee he claims is $15,427.96. Defendant's counsel's objection claims that the time expended on this case is excessive. Although his written objection requested an evidentiary hearing and oral argument, defendant's counsel has since waived either. The court may thus decide the reasonable counsel fees on the record.
[T]he determination of reasonableness of attorneys fees appropriately takes into consideration a range of factors, among which the time and labor expended is but one consideration. See O'Brien v. Seyer, 183 Conn. 199, 206, 439 A.2d 292 (1981) (factors properly considered in determining reasonable compensation to attorney summarized in Code of Professional Responsibility, now rule 1.5 of Rules of Professional Conduct); Steiger v. J.S. Builders, Inc., 39 Conn.App. 32, 38-39, 663 A.2d 432 (1995) (adopting list of factors to be considered by trial court if it determines plaintiff is entitled to attorneys fees, costs in unfair trade practices litigation). Esposito v. Esposito, 71 Conn.App. 744, 749, 804 A.2d 846 (2002).
In quoting Rule 1.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, set forth below, the Appellate Court noted in Esposito v. Esposito, 71 Conn.App. 744, 749, fn 5, 804 A.2d 846 (2002) that "[a]lthough that rule governs the reasonableness of the fee charged by an attorney to his client, many of the factors equally are appropriate in determining the reasonableness of a judicial award of attorneys fees."
A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: "(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; "(2) The likelihood, if made known to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; "(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; "(4) The amount involved and the results obtained; "(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; "(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; "(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and "(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent."
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.5(a).
Attorney Jacobs is an experienced, skilled, and highly regarded matrimonial attorney. His preparation and submission of a memorandum of law on an anticipated evidentiary issue shows the thoroughness of his work. Although his billing rate is among the higher charged in this area of the state, it is not excessive for an attorney of his expertise and experience in this area. The court thus finds that the hourly rates charged here were fair and reasonable. The facts involved in this case, however, were not particularly complex or difficult. The parties did not contest the parenting orders. The financial issues were relatively straightforward. Yet the plaintiff did have a legitimate reason to explore her husband's extramarital affair, his deferred compensation, and, in light of his extensive overtime recently, his earnings history. Although reasonable minds might differ on the question, this court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, and after considering all the relevant factors, that the hours expended in this matter were fair, just, and reasonable under the circumstances. The court also finds that the fees charged by plaintiff's counsel for copying, postage and disbursements were, with one exception, fair, just and reasonable.
The expense that was not reasonable is a marshal's fee for service of a subpoena for testimony at trial by Laura Cusano, Mr. Ranfone's female friend. The subpoena's return, which indicated that it had been served by an "indifferent person," stated that service had been made "by reading the same in the presence and hearing of and leaving a true copy thereof with . . . Laura Cusano." (Pl.'s ex, 12.) When Ms. Cusano did not appear at trial, plaintiff's counsel sought to compel her presence by issuance of a capias and offered the testimony of state marshal Charles Vingione in support of that request. Vingione testified on direct examination that he had mistakenly indicated marked the return as having been served by an indifferent person but that the return was otherwise accurate and that he served the subpoena on Ms. Cusano.
Q. If I could show you Exhibit 12, a subpoena for Laura Cusano, . . . is that your signature on the return?
A. Yep.
Q. And did you serve that on her?
A. Yeah. I just, made a mistake. I mark an indifferent person
Q. Is your return accurate?
A. Yeah.
Transcript of proceedings, March 21, 2005, at 7 and 8. The clear import of this testimony, in view of what the return said, was Vingione had served the subpoena personally on Ms. Cusano and read it to her. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he neither read the subpoena to Ms. Cusano nor delivered it to her personally, but instead gave the subpoena to another person, whom he believed to be her father and who, Vingione testified, said he would give the subpoena to Ms. Cusano.
Section 52-143 of the General Statutes authorizes service of a subpoena and provides various sanctions against a subpoenaed person who does not appear in court on the day and time designated in the subpoena. Subsection (e) of the statute authorizes a trial court "on proof of the service of a subpoena and the tender of [witness] fees, [to] issue a capias directed to some proper officer to arrest the witness and bring him before the court to testify." "Service" of a subpoena does not require either personal delivery of the subpoena to the proposed witness or that person's physical acceptance of the subpoena, if the person is given notice of the subpoena and its contents. State v. Burrows, 5 Conn.App. 556, 559, 500 A.2d 970 (1985), cert. denied, 199 Conn. 806, 508 A.2d 33 (1986). Though the "father" may have told the marshal that he would give the subpoena to Ms. Cusano, and the statement of an intention to do an act in the future may be evidence that such act was indeed performed; State v. Perelli, 125 Conn. 321, 328, 5 A.2d 705 (1939); other evidence, from Mr. Ranfone, showed that the subpoena was still in father's possession the next day and refuted the permitted inference that Ms. Cusano had actual notice of the subpoena and its contents. The court thus refused to issue a capias against her. See DiPalma v. Wiesen, 163 Conn. 293, 298, 303 A.2d 709 (1972). Under the circumstances here, any fee for the marshal's services in connection with that subpoena, particularly where the return and marshal's initial testimony here both falsely indicated personal service upon Ms. Cusano, is not fair, just, or reasonable.
Taking into consideration the evidence in this case and all the statutory factors mandated by § 46b-62, as elucidated by the Appellate Court in Miller v. Miller, the court orders that Mr. Ranfone shall contribute $10,000 toward his wife's counsel fees. Not ordering the defendant to pay these fees would undermine the court's other orders.
III — ORDERS CT Page 8654
After considering all the statutory and regulatory criteria for dissolving a marriage and entering orders regarding custody, visitation, equitable distribution of property and division of debt, alimony, child support, and the award of counsel fees, together with applicable case law and all the evidence and information presented by the parties presented here, the court hereby enters the following orders
A. Dissolution of marriage
The marriage of the parties, having broken down irretrievably, is hereby dissolved.
B. Parenting Orders
a. The parties will share joint legal custody of their minor child, Daniel, who will reside primarily with his mother. Mr. Ranfone will have reasonable and liberal visitation, including but not limited to alternating weekends from Friday afternoon to Sunday evening.
b. Holidays and vacations shall be shared equally and alternated, and the holiday and vacation schedule will override the regular weekend parenting schedule. Each party will be entitled to two weeks of exclusive vacation time each year, which shall not occur during the other party's scheduled vacation time or during the year-end holiday period unless the other party agrees in writing. They shall notify each other in writing by May 1st of each year of the weeks when each intends to exercise exclusive vacation time; If their proposed times conflict then in odd-numbered years the plaintiff's preferences shall control, and in even-numbered years the defendant's shall control.
c. The parties shall have reasonable access to their son when Daniel is with the other party, including free access by telephone, mail and e-mail. Daniel shall be able to call either parent at any time.
d. Neither party shall disparage the other party in Daniel's presence. The parents shall exert every reasonable effort to promote and foster feelings of love and affection between their son and the other parent. Each parent shall exert his and her best efforts to refrain from doing anything to estrange Daniel from the other parent, or to disparage Daniel's opinion of his mother or father, or to act in such a way as to hamper the free and natural development of love and respect between Daniel and the other parent.
e. If either parent plans any trip or vacation with Daniel for longer than one day's duration, that party shall notify the other in writing at least 48 hours prior to their time of departure, indicating their itinerary and providing the other parent with the following information: the duration of the trip, lodging addresses and telephone number, airline flight number and travel information including means of travel, departure and arrival times and destinations.
f. Each party shall keep the other party informed of the general whereabouts of Daniel when their son is with that parent.
g. Each party will keep the other apprised of their current address, telephone number, and, if a party has such, fax number and email address.
h. Both parents shall be entitled to complete copies of all records and documents from third parties and/or institutions concerning Daniel's health, welfare, education and general well being; and each party shall immediately provide the other parent upon their receipt with copies of any and all such documents and records concerning their son.
i. If either parent has knowledge of any illness or accident or other circumstance, seriously affecting Daniel's health or welfare, that party shall promptly notify the other. Each party shall similarly notify the other of any change in the Daniel's medical status, including visitations to medical providers.
j. Each parent shall provide Daniel's school with his or her contact information and request that the school issue duplicate notices of any and all teacher conferences or counseling sessions or meetings involving Daniel so that both parents receive them and both parents shall have the right to attend such meetings.
k. Each of the parties shall have the right to attend school, extracurricular and public events in which Daniel participates. Each parent shall inform the other of any such events as soon as they are scheduled.
l. In the event that either party intends to relocate his or her residence from the greater New Haven area, he or she shall give advance written notice by certified mail, to the other party, at least ninety (90) days prior to the date of relocation, indicating the place of relocation and the reasons therefore. Nothing contained herein shall prevent either party from seeking a judicial determination that Daniel shall not move until the issue of relocation has been resolved or a change in custody or principal residence by reason of the relocating party's move.
C. Financial Orders 1. Child Support
a. Mr. Ranfone shall pay Ms. Ranfone child support in the amount of $189 per week plus 61 per cent of qualifying child care expenses and unreimbursed medical expenses exceeding one hundred dollars per year until Daniel turns age 18 or, if he still in high school, until age 19 or his graduation from high school whichever comes first.
b. Mr. Ranfone shall continue to provide health insurance for the Daniel as long as it is available to him at a reasonable cost through his employer. if such insurance is not available at a reasonable cost through his employment but is available to Ms. Ranfone at a reasonable cost through her employer, she shall provide it. If health insurance is not available to either parent at a reasonable cost through employment, they shall apply for any publicly-funded health insurance for which Daniel may be eligible and split the cost of such insurance.
2. Post-secondary educational support
The court retains jurisdiction to enter an order regarding post-secondary educational support upon motion or petition of either party.
3. Alimony
a. Mr. Ranfone will pay alimony of $350 per week to Ms. Ranfone.
b. As additional alimony. Mr. Ranfone pay for medical and health insurance for Ms. Ranfone under COBRA for 36 months. If she obtains her own health and or dental insurance during that time, he shall instead contribute to any payments she must make for such insurance or for co-pays in an amount not to exceed what his employer would be charging him for COBRA benefits. He shall also cooperate with her in obtaining COBRA coverage through his employer. This portion of the alimony order is not intended to be modifiable as to term, except as set forth in the next paragraph.
c. Alimony shall terminate upon death of either party or remarriage or cohabitation, as defined in the General Statutes and case law thereunder, of the wife.
4. Equitable Distribution
Each property is awarded the property, assets, and debt listed on its most recent financial affidavit, except as set forth below.
a. The Marital Home
(1) The wife is awarded all right, title and interest in and to the marital home, subject to the following orders. She shall be responsible from all mortgage, tax and insurance obligations on the marital home from the date of judgment. Until the husband is released from all financial liability for debt or taxes on the marital home incurred after the date of dissolution, the wife shall indemnify and hold him harmless thereon.
(2) Within 30 days of the date of dissolution, Mr. Ranfone shall deliver to Ms. Ranfone a quitclaim deed transferring to her all of his right, claim and interest in the property. Simultaneous with his delivery of the quitclaim deed, she shall deliver to him a mortgage note, secured by a mortgage deed on the property, in the amount of $110,000, plus 5 per cent simple annual interest. Said note shall be due and payable two years after the youngest minor child has graduated from high school or turned age 19, whichever occurs first. Upon her delivery to him of the sums due under this paragraph, he shall give to her a full release of the mortgage note and deed.
(3) Should Ms. Ranfone not pay the sums due under the preceding paragraph by the end of the second year after the youngest child has turned 19 or graduated from high school, whichever occurs first, the house shall be, unless the parties agree otherwise in writing, sold and the amount due to Mr. Ranfone under the previous paragraph paid to him from the net proceeds, after the costs of sale.
(4) The court retains jurisdiction over any sale and the distribution to Mr. Ranfone of his interest in the marital home.
b. Deferred Compensation
(1) The wife is awarded fifty per cent of the value of the husband's pension with the Connecticut Municipal Employees Retirement System, valued and payable to her as of the date that he first becomes eligible to begin collecting his share of the pension, The court retains jurisdiction to approve any qualified domestic relations orders necessary to effectuate this order. The husband shall be responsible for preparing the QDRO, and the parties shall split the cost thereof.
(2) All other deferred compensation is awarded to the party listing such on its financial affidavit.
c. Choses in action
The wife is awarded one-half of the net proceeds of any causes in action received by the husband. Net proceeds shall mean after disbursements for costs of litigation and attorneys fees.
d. Other personal property (not listed on financial affidavit)
Each party is awarded its own clothing, jewelry, and personal property located in their current residences, except as may be otherwise specifically awarded under these orders.
e. Division of debt and liabilities
Each party will be liable for the debts and liabilities listed on its own financial affidavit and will indemnify and hold the other harmless thereon, except as otherwise stated herein.
5. Life Insurance
The husband shall maintain life insurance in the amount of $250,000 naming the wife as exclusive beneficiary so long as he has an obligation to pay alimony or child support and shall provide the wife with proof by February first of each year that such insurance is in full force and effect.
6. Dependency Exemption CT Page 8659
The parties shall alternate the dependency tax exemption for as long as Daniel is eligible to be claimed as a dependent for tax purposes, the plaintiff for taxes due in odd-numbered years and defendant in even-numbered years.7. Counsel fees
Within 60 days of the date of judgment, Mr. Ranfone shall pay plaintiff's counsel $10,000 toward her counsel fees.
D. Restoration of birth name
The defendant's name is changed so that she will again and hereafter be known as Vanessa Marie Corso.
BY THE COURT
STEPHEN F. FRAZZNI JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT