Opinion
No. FA 04-0490123S
August 31, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO RE-ARGUE AND FOR ARTICULATION
The defendant has filed several motions to reargue and for articulation of the court's financial orders in the Memorandum of Decision dissolving the parties' marriage. In particular, defendant's Motions to Re-Argue and for Articulation dated May 16, 2005, address that portion of the court's Memorandum of Decision awarding the plaintiff
fifty per cent of the value of the husband's pension with the Connecticut Municipal Employees Retirement System, valued and payable to her as of the date that he first becomes eligible to begin collecting his share of the pension.
The defendant claims that this order "exceeds the court's jurisdiction in that it can only order a distribution of assets owned by the parties at the time of the hearing." His motion to re-argue asks the court to vacate this order and issue new financial orders. The motion for articulation asks the court, in effect to amend the order and limit the portion of the pension divided between the parties to pension benefits already earned by the defendant. His motion to reargue dated May 18, 2005, asks for re-argument of that portion of the decision requiring the defendant to maintain the plaintiff on COBRA medical benefits and new financial orders on that issue.
The purpose of a motion for re-argument is "to demonstrate to the court that there is some decision or some principle of law which would have a controlling effect, and which has been overlooked, or that there has been a misapprehension of facts . . . It also may be used to address alleged inconsistencies in the trial courts memorandum of decision as well as claims of law that the [movant] claimed were not addressed by the court." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Opoku v. Grant, 63 Conn.App. 686, 692, 778 A.2d 981 (2001). The May 16 motion to CT Page 11935-cz reargue clearly meets that standard, as it claims that the Memorandum of Decision overlooked a controlling principle of law regarding award of pension benefits. The May 18 motion does as well, for it raises the factual question not considered by the court: what if the plaintiff is able to obtain medical coverage identical to that provided under COBRA but at a cheaper cost, but declines to do so. The court thus granted re-argument on both motions, for which counsel appeared at short calendar on August 25, 2005.
I — May 16 Motion to Reargue
This court carefully considered all of the evidence in this case, including the husband's primary fault for the breakdown of the marriage. These parties were married for nineteen years. In the last years of the marriage, the defendant worked exceedingly long days because he wanted to increase the ultimate value of his pension. During the marriage the plaintiff purposely limited her income and earning potential by being a stay-at-home mother for the first eleven years of the marriage. They had met when she was sixteen years old and were married before she turned 20. Shortly after the marriage they moved to Germany, where he served in the armed forces. Two years after they were married, she bore their only child, whom she stayed at home to raise until seven years ago. Even after entering the work force, she worked only part-time. Relying on her belief that she had a good marriage and could count on her husband's financial support, the plaintiff thus set aside her own career and deferred her opportunity to develop occupational skills in order to raise the parties' son. Until two years ago, she believed that she had a wonderful marriage and she was shocked and upset when she learned that her husband had an affair. Although her financial affidavit showed modest amounts of deferred compensation, her work and earning history shows that she was not relying primarily on own employment to meet her present and future financial needs but was instead relying on being primarily supported by her husband's earnings for as long as he worked and then by his retirement benefits. Although she has the capacity to improve her occupational skills and financial prospects, the defendant's decision to leave his wife for another woman deprived the plaintiff of opportunity to share fully in his pension. The court concluded that a fair and equitable distribution of the marital estate, taking into consideration all the statutory factors, required that she some day enjoy an equal share in his pension benefits.
The legal claim raised by the defendant and challenging the court's pension award has previously been considered and expressly rejected by our Appellate Court, however. In Hansen v. Hansen, 80 Conn.App. 609, 836 A.2d 1228 (2003), the trial court awarded the wife "one half of the CT Page 11935-ca defendant's retirement benefits, when and as available . . ." Id., 610. At the time of the dissolution, the defendant had been a school teacher participating in the state employees retirement program. When presented with a qualified domestic relations order prepared by plaintiff that would provide "an equal division of the defendants monthly retirement benefit when it actually becomes available to him," he refused to sign the order. Instead, he presented a draft QDRO that would have split the pension based on its value as of the date of dissolution. After both parties moved for contempt, the defendant argued that pension benefits must be valued as of the date of dissolution, but the trial court found him in contempt for not signing the QDRO prepared by the plaintiff. Although he appealed, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court:
Although the defendant has asserted correctly the rule that assets are, as a general matter, to be valued as of the date of dissolution, that proposition does not preclude the court from awarding to a spouse a portion of retirement benefits earned by his or her former spouse subsequent to the date of dissolution.
Id., 612.
The motion for re-argument having been granted, the court has carefully considered whether its decision exceeded its authority, and concludes that there is no legal impediment to its orders. The relief requested in the motion for re-argument dated May 16 is therefore denied.
II — May 18 Motion to Reargue
At short calendar the court orally granted the relief sought in the May 18 motion to reargue. The Memorandum of Decision ordered the defendant to pay, as additional alimony, for COBRA benefits for the plaintiff for 36 months or
[i]f she obtains her own health and or dental insurance during that time, he shall instead contribute to any payments she must make for such insurance or for co-pays in an amount not to exceed what his employer would be charging him for COBRA benefits.
The court did not consider the possibility that the CT Page 11935-cb plaintiff might elect not to purchase medical coverage that became available to her and was identical to but less costly than the COBRA coverage. There is no reason not to order such except to punish the defendant financially. Such an order would provide the plaintiff with the same level of medical coverage as provided by the Memorandum of Decision. The relief sought in the May 18 motion to reargue is therefore granted, and paragraph 3b of the Orders contained in the Memorandum of Decision modified to read as follows:
b. As additional alimony, Mr. Ranfone shall pay for medical and health insurance for Ms. Ranfone under COBRA for 36 months. If she obtains her own health and or dental insurance during that time, or if medical and health insurance identical to the COBRA coverage (except for its cost) becomes available to her at less than the cost of COBRA coverage, he shall instead contribute to the cost of such insurance or for co-pays in an amount not to exceed what his employer would be charging him for COBRA benefits. He shall also cooperate with her in obtaining COBRA coverage though his employer. This portion of the alimony order is not intended to be modifiable as to term, except as set forth in the next paragraph.
III — May 16 Motion for Articulation
The defendant's motion for articulation asks that the court modify the decision "to reflect that although the deferred compensation may be valued in the future the distribution shall be one-half of the pension benefits earned by him through the date of the dissolution decree." "The purpose of a motion for articulation is to clarify an ambiguity or incompleteness in the decision of the trial court. It is not an opportunity for a trial court to substitute a new decision or to change the reasoning or basis of a prior decision." Miller v. Kirshner, 225 Conn. 185, 208, 621 A.2d 1326 (1993), quoting Koper v. Koper, 17 Conn.App. 480, 484, 553 A.2d 1162 (1989). The motion for articulation is therefore denied.
SO ORDERED.
BY THE COURT
STEPHEN F. FRAZZINI CT Page 11935-cc
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT CT Page 11935-cd